Tag: Club Structure

The First Shot at Phyro

Part 23 of 70 — Original Chapter: Chapter 8: A Taste of Injustice

This article forms part of the serialised republication of Panthers, Passion & Politics – The Roger Cowan Years.

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The first few questions of the interview, led by Detective-sergeant Mick Howe, implied that Phyro Holdings1 was acting fraudulently, secretly, and without the knowledge of the Board. This complaint seemed of great interest to the fraud squad officer.

Cowan explained that Phyro was his family company, and it had a contract to provide certain services to the club. He reached into his desk drawer and handed over a contract. Some minutes passed as they went through the document. The fraud squad detective paused and drew Howe’s attention to one specific part on the last page of the contract. They both seemed surprised, and a quick look passed between them.

The fraud squad officer asked Cowan a few more questions, then made to leave. He said to Cowan,

I’ve heard enough. Mick might want to ask a few questions about some other matters, but I don’t need to be involved any further.

And he left the office.

Cowan says it took him a while to catch on to what had happened to cause the quick exit by the fraud squad officer.

That night I was lying in bed still trying to figure it out. What was in the contract that was such a surprise? They had not reacted until they reached the end of it. What was on the last page? Suddenly it hit me. The only thing on that page was the signatures of the parties to the agreement! Why would those signatures surprise them? Certainly, there was no surprise in mine being there, so it must have been one of the others.

It could only mean that the person who signed the letter of complaint to the Assistant Commissioner must have been the same person who had signed the Phyro contract. The person who wrote that the Board knew nothing of Phyro had actually signed the Phyro contract. No wonder the fraud squad detective signed himself off the case so quickly.2

The detectives had also told him that the informant was someone who was seen by the police as highly credible. A director who was a long-standing ex-chairman would certainly fill that description.

The letter of complaint has never been seen by any officer of the club, so its contents — and its signatory — can only be assumed. Whatever was in it, however, had brought large numbers of police and government officers on the Club. To prompt such strong action, the allegations must have led them to suspect dishonesty and breaches of the Registered Clubs Act.

What really bothers me about this affair is that the first part of the complaint had been discredited in the first half hour of the interview. The fraud squad officer acted accordingly. He was not wasting any more time once he saw that the complaint was flawed. 

But Mick Howe was not so easily satisfied.

Current group chairman Barry Walsh3 was a director in 1985. He says it was the big topic of conversation around Penrith that the detective was after Cowan, and he was a very determined man.

‘But Phyro was no secret anyway’, says Walsh. It just wasn’t a big deal for anybody.’

Phil Bennett agrees with Barry Walsh that Phyro’s role and ownership were no secret. He says the investigative accountants went through everything at the time of the investigations.

I think one of them stayed on after the rest of us left. At that time Phyro Holdings was common knowledge. You would always read in the annual report, stuff about Phyro owning certain property.

Bennett points out that the name is “obviously compounded from Phyllis and Roger”.

Cowan remembers the several months of continuous inquiry as one of the most stressful periods he has ever experienced. The investigation itself was not a problem, he says, it was the rumours of Howe’s determination to ‘get him’.

The rumours were strong that Mick Howe had stated that he did not like Panthers, did not like me, and was confident he would find incriminating evidence. At that stage we were already a big organisation, with 850 employees.  It is easy to make mistakes running a business that size. We had good systems in place, but there was always the fear that there might be something wrong that I knew nothing about, and it would be used against me.

I had that constant feeling of being in deadly competition with a well-armed predator and I was the defenceless prey. The hunter had all the time and resources he wanted, and he could attack from any angle. I had two choices, stand out in the open and let him see every side of the target, or go into defence mode by employing a good legal advisor.

I had chosen to stand out in the open. With the benefit of hindsight, it was a dumb move on my part.4

Barry Hubbard was also a director at the time of the police raid. He says everybody was feeling the pressures of Howe’s campaign.

Roger wondered if someone in the club was ‘talking’ to the police and giving them information. He went to each of the directors and asked us.

‘I told him “no”’, says Hubbard. But he was upset by the question.

I said, “Roger, if I knew of anything illegal that was going on in this club, I would first take it to the Board, and if nothing was done, only then would I go to the police”.

Hubbard says that around the time of the licensing raid, he was also questioned by a Penrith detective about a house he had bought from the club. The detective suggested that he had bought the house for nothing, or at a token fee. It was a ridiculous claim, says Hubbard, and he was easily able to prove that he’d paid the right amount for the house.

The same policeman later got in touch with him, asking did he know of anything dishonest that was going on in the club, and suggesting that he keep his eyes open. Hubbard assured him there was nothing, but the calls continued over the next couple of months, asking the same questions.

I wrote to the detective, telling him what I had told Roger. If I knew of anything untoward in the club, it would go straight to the board. If they did nothing, I would take it to the police. I also asked him to stop calling me.

For directors such as Hubbard, the repeated approaches from Howe and his colleagues reinforced the impression that the investigation was not winding down, despite the failure of the original allegations.

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  1. Phyro Holdings Pty Ltd is the family company of Roger & Phyllis Cowan contracted to Penrith Rugby League Club Ltd to supply various services including the publications of The Panthers Magazine.
    ↩︎
  2. Some 20 years later this scenario was replicated. Directors or former directors publicly asserting they had no knowledge of Phyro Holdings and the slipping on their story, showing they must have had knowledge. The final “slip-up” was during the Temby Inquiry when testimony by a former director in one session was recanted the next morning for fear of being in contempt.
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  3. Barry Walsh was appointed Chairman when Leo Armstrong retired, and he held that position until 2009 when Don Feltis took the Chair.
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  4. This approach was not unusual for Cowan, his belief that it was besst to be very open with investigators was considered naive by many colleagues and supporters of Cowan’s. Many saw it as a weakness that made him vulnerable to being ambushed. ↩︎

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Commentary and Contributions

The Right Structure. Finally!

Part 21 of 70 — Original Chapter: Chapter 7: The 16 Year Struggle to Streamline Rugby League

This article forms part of the serialised republication of Panthers, Passion & Politics – The Roger Cowan Years.

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The structural compromise — two CEOs answering to a single board — had not resolved the underlying problems. If anything, it had deepened them. By the early 1980s, the consequences were becoming impossible to ignore — both on and off the field.

The Gibson years saw the Penrith football team continue its sad record of recent times. The club was putting major resources into building the new premises, and there was criticism that the team’s rugby league performance was a direct reflection of that spending.

In their 1992 book Bound for Glory, Greg Pritchard and Gary Lester tell of that period. They quote 1980-81 coach, Len Stacker, as saying that rugby league funds had been frozen before the 1981 season, although this has been disputed by Roger Cowan. Stacker also said he had been forced to bring in some ‘blokes from the bush’ to prop up the numbers. One of these bush blokes turned out to be Royce Simmons, the hero of Penrith’s first premiership and the city’s favourite son.

Also playing for Penrith at the time was Tim Sheens. He had finished 1982 with the club record for the number of games played (166) and was looking forward to the season. Gibson went off on his Kangaroo tour, telling Sheens he would talk to him when he came back.

When Gibson returned, Sheens went to his office to see him. Gibson told him that there was no point in even sitting down. The club had overspent and there was no room for Sheens, who was dropped from the team. Instead, they had signed Tony D’Arcy, a rugby union international, at almost twice the salary of Penrith’s highest paid player. D’Arcy was never to play a first-grade game for Penrith.

By the end of 1983, the football club reached its lowest level yet. It finished close to the bottom of the competition, it had only two players on contract for the following year, and it had no coach.

Even Royce Simmons has said he seriously considered leaving the club at the end of 1983. Community support had dropped along with the team’s performance, resulting in an income shortfall. An injection of funds was urgently needed, but the club was being held on a tight budget. The club under construction over on the Mulgoa Road property incurred significant cost  increases, causing anxious moments in management and at the bank.

The dismal prospects now facing the football team were enough to convince the Board. It finally voted to put rugby league back under the control of Roger Cowan. Gibson left soon after and successfully sued the club for wrongful dismissal. Keith Rhind, when he took the chairman’s seat, had formed a close friendship with Gibson but he would ultimately be instrumental in Gibson’s departure from the club.

 ‘It was one of the worst periods in my life’, he says, ‘and it still upsets me to think about it.’ 

When it came to the vote that would ultimately oust Charlie, it was four all and I had the casting vote. But I had been put in an impossible position. Whichever way I went, I was going to lose friends, but I knew that things couldn’t continue the way they were. I did what I believed was best for the club and voted to move the responsibility for rugby league to the licensed club management.

When it came to the vote that would ultimately oust Charlie, it was four all and I had the casting vote. But I had been put in an impossible position. Whichever way I went, I was going to lose friends, but I knew that things couldn’t continue the way they were. I did what I believed was best for the club and voted to move the responsibility for rugby league to the licensed club management.

The board decided that Cowan’s role would be expanded to include both the licensed club and the rugby league club, and his contract was changed again by mutual agreement. There would be one board of directors and one chief executive of the entire organisation.1 It was the model that Cowan had been advocating for so many years.

After a decade of advocating change, Cowan now had the chance to prove the model that he had recommended. But he had a massive job ahead of him. Three years of compromise had put the club into a weak position. It had money problems, no coach and hardly any players.

He attacked the problem using a tactic that had proved successful within the licensed club. The think-tank-style brainstorming sessions had produced many good ideas for the business, so he decided to carry it through in his new role.

At the end of 1983, he invited a large number of key stakeholders to attend workshops at the Club. The objective was to bring together the people who had an interest, or who would benefit from a successful, competitive rugby league team. There were directors and players, club officials and some former players, representatives from the media and local businesses, even some politicians. The junior league and school rugby league were also well represented. He told them they had to take ownership of the problems, and find solutions they could all support

The workshops were facilitated by Cowan. Despite the gloomy outlook, there was a great deal of enthusiasm and a commitment to succeed irrespective of obstacles.

Again, the results would be positive – this time for rugby league in the district.

There had never been a state or Australian representative player from the Penrith Junior District. Arising from the workshop, the Five by Five Committee was formed. Its goal was to develop five representative players in five years – and it succeeded.

The schools and junior league forged closer relationships, and ideas came up for a stronger junior competition. Profiles of coaches were drawn up. But the most important outcome was a greater feeling of ownership and sharing of the problems throughout the community.

Tim Sheens attended the workshops, but he had a family commitment and left early. Cowan says he had been most impressed by Sheens’ contribution to the workshops and by his strong sense of loyalty to Penrith. Much of the discussion had centred on the type of coach they would need. Sheens had presented strong ideas about coaching and players – and about club management.

It became clear to Cowan that Sheens would be the ideal coach for Penrith. When he discussed his thoughts with some close associates, he found that they had been equally impressed.

When Cowan contacted Sheens, he discovered he was too late. He and wife Rhonda were moving to North Queensland. They had sold their furniture and were ready to leave within days. Further meetings followed, including a momentous dinner with the couple. By the end of the night, both could see the opportunity.

Rhonda Sheens encouraged her husband to take up the challenge. It was a big decision for her — she had been looking forward to a move back to Queensland to be closer to her family. Tim Sheens became the first grade coach, and agreed to also take on some management duties, including recruitment of players.

In his first year, Penrith missed the play-offs by a whisker.  In 1985 Sheens guided the club to its first ever semi-final appearance.

For the following 15 years, the model stood firm. The board set all policy for the entire club including rugby league, and achieving that policy was the responsibility of one person, the CEO of the group. At times Cowan would take on the role of rugby league chief executive. He would have a manager looking after day-to-day issues, but be personally responsible for higher level decisions.

I really enjoyed that role, but when someone was doing a good job – Don Feltis and Mark Levy for instance – I promoted them to the top football position.

The reform had gone beyond the CEO and board — it now meant one management team working in harmony for the betterment of every part of Panthers. The catering manager was now just as likely to have input into rugby league strategies, as the rugby league CEO might have into staff motivation principles for the bars.

But even though Cowan had achieved the goal of ‘one board, one CEO’ at the end of 1983, the Board remained precariously balanced.

A spur of the moment decision by Cowan and Armstrong after a football game at the end of the 1984 season was enough to tip the balance, and almost put Hewett back in the chair. More importantly, it would put some events in motion that led to two police raids on Panthers.

The record books also show that from the time the model was implemented in 1984, there was a marked improvement on the rugby league side. In 1985 the first grade side made the semi-finals and in 1988, they lost a play-off for fifth place. In 1989 they made the finals. In 1990 they were grand finalists and in 1991 the Panthers won the trophy.

The success was not only on the scoreboard. A new sponsorship scheme with the Penrith Star newspaper began to ease the financial burden on the registered club. As the performance of the team improved, crowds began to pick up, which also had an impact on the bottom line.

Tim Sheens stayed until 1987, to be replaced by veteran coach, Ron Willey. Willey’s unorthodox methods led to unresolvable problems with the players, and Cowan negotiated a resignation settlement with him. In late 1989, Cowan and football chief executive Ross Gigg were able to recruit Phil Gould. Gould, who had begun his playing career with Panthers, had coached Canterbury to a premiership in 1988. After losing the grand final to Canberra in 1990, Gould steered the Panthers to their first premiership a year later.

In 1984, the same year that the new management model for rugby league was implemented, the club was opened in Mulgoa Road amid a fanfare of free publicity. It was a brand new model for licensed clubs, and it set the bar higher for the club industry. Both events were turning points for Panthers.

Although the new club opened in a blaze of favourable publicity, it had not been completed. The long delays in getting approvals and other factors beyond the club’s control contributed to a blow-out in the costs of construction. The main entertainment room was an empty shell until profits could be used to complete it. A large part of the car park was left unfinished.

Although the new club opened in a blaze of favourable publicity, it had not been completed. The long delays in getting approvals and other factors beyond the club’s control contributed to a blow-out in the costs of construction. The main entertainment room was an empty shell until profits could be used to complete it. A large part of the car park was left unfinished.

In the planning phases of the new complex, the concept of motel accommodation came up. It would fit neatly into the club’s objectives, but the costs blow-out forced it into the “deferred ideas” drawer.

However, the builder could also see the potential.  He made an offer to build a motel adjoining the new complex, and it was accepted. The agreement was that the club would sell the builder the required area of land for one dollar. The builder would then use the equity in that land to finance construction. Panthers would lease the motel back and manage it until it had the funds to purchase it. The Club had an option to purchase the motel and the land for the cost of construction, plus an agreed profit for the builder. The land would be part of that package and would be put back in at a one dollar value. It was a brilliant scheme, and it worked well for all the parties involved.2

The 54 room Panthers Motor Inn was completed in 1986, with 115 more rooms approved by the Board in 1988. The Club sold it – now 216 rooms – in 2006, for $28.5 million.3

Panthers barrister Terrence Lynch says that this transaction was one that DGR counsel, David Staehli, seized upon in the 41X inquiry, sure that at last he finally ‘had’ Roger Cowan. His hopes were dashed when Cowan was able to show exactly what had happened throughout the entire process.

The new rugby league regime brought the football club the successes that had eluded it for its first 17 years, including two premierships and several finals appearances. The new Panthers licensed club brought significant changes in management and structure, unprecedented growth, and the completion of assets that would ensure the security and cash flow of the organisation through some very difficult times.

But behind the scenes it was not all beer and skittles. John Hewett still carried a badly wounded ego. Cowan’s erstwhile friend and supporter, club patron Ron Mulock, was showing early signs of disapproval about the dramatic growth of the Club.

The football team was finally making its mark, and the business was showing the potential that would take it into the top 300 private companies. In the midst of the successes, trouble was simmering that would eventually bring Panthers and Cowan into their darkest periods.

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  1. This decision fundamentally changed the governance structure of Panthers and helped resolve a decade of conflict over the management of rugby league. For a more detailed explanation of why the “one board, one CEO” model became so important see Beyond the Book — Why One Board, One CEO.
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  2. The arrangement was designed to overcome the club’s immediate financial constraints. The builder funded construction and accepted the development risk, while Panthers retained the right to acquire the completed motel and land at a pre-agreed future price.
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  3. The financial transactions around this part of the Mulgoa Road development would later be examined during the Temby 41X Inquiry where the legitimacy of the arrangement was able to be demonstrated. ↩︎

← Part 20 · All Parts · Part 22 →

Commentary and Contributions

Why One Board, One CEO?

Readers of Parts 19–21 may wonder why Roger Cowan spent more than sixteen years arguing for what appeared to be a relatively simple administrative reform. Why did the issue matter so much to him? Why did he keep returning to it despite repeated setbacks, opposition and criticism?

The answer lies in a question that had troubled Panthers almost from the beginning:

How could the Club pursue a unified direction when rugby league and the licensed club were governed separately?

The issue was not new.

Readers familiar with the events of 1971 may recognise some familiar themes. The removal of football club secretary Merv Cartwright and treasurer Ron Partridge arose from concerns about the administration of rugby league affairs and accountability for financial decisions. Although the circumstances were different, the disputes that emerged again in the late 1970s centred on many of the same questions. Who should make decisions? Who should be accountable for those decisions? And what happened when agreements were not honoured?

From the time Penrith entered first grade rugby league in 1967, the football club and licensed club operated under separate governance structures. The arrangement was common in rugby league, but Roger increasingly came to believe it created problems that could never be fully resolved.

It would be easy to assume the conflict was simply about money. Certainly finances played a part. Rugby league required increasing investment, while the licensed club was trying to strengthen its financial position and pursue long-term development projects. Yet Roger’s frustration was not that football sought resources. In his view, the licensed club had repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to support rugby league and invest heavily in its future.

The real problem arose after decisions had been made.

Budgets would be negotiated. Agreements would be reached. Plans would be approved. Yet time and again, football expenditure exceeded agreed limits or new commitments were entered into without the knowledge or approval of those responsible for managing the Club’s overall finances.

From Roger’s perspective, this was not simply a financial problem. It made long-term planning almost impossible.

A licensed club board could approve a football budget, commit to major development projects and make decisions based upon expected cash flows. If those assumptions later proved incorrect because spending commitments had changed, the consequences extended well beyond rugby league. The entire organisation could be affected.

By the late 1970s, these tensions had become increasingly public. In December 1979, the Sydney Morning Herald reported on financial difficulties and disagreements between the football and licensed club administrations. Around the same time, Panthers was preparing for the enormous financial challenge of constructing its new Mulgoa Road complex.

SMH 1979 Dec 9 – click image for full article.

Reports to members in 1980 revealed the extent of the concern. Directors reported that the football club had exceeded an agreed annual budget of $485,000 by more than $100,000 during 1979, while additional commitments had already been entered into for the following season. To the licensed club board, the issue was not simply the amount involved. It was that decisions affecting the future of the entire organisation had been made outside the framework that had previously been agreed.

These events helped bring the governance debate to a head, but they do not fully explain Roger’s determination.

For him, the issue was ultimately one of organisational unity.

He believed Panthers would never achieve its potential while parts of the organisation operated according to different priorities, different assumptions and different lines of accountability. A football club and licensed club could share the same colours, the same members and the same ambitions, yet still find themselves working against each other.

His solution was straightforward.

One board would determine policy and direction for the entire organisation. Management would then be responsible for implementing those decisions. Everyone would work towards the same agreed objectives and everyone would be accountable to the same governing body.

Not everyone agreed.

Some viewed Roger’s campaign as an attempt to centralise power. The perception is understandable. After all, he was advocating a structure that would eventually place responsibility for football and licensed club operations under a single administration. His persistence over sixteen years inevitably raised questions about motive.

Yet there is another interpretation.

Roger was not arguing that football should receive less support. Nor was he arguing that rugby league was less important than the licensed club. Rather, he believed the entire organisation should operate according to a common plan and that all parts of Panthers should be accountable to that plan.

Many years later, Panthers would use concepts such as “twin citizenship” to describe the idea that people belonged not only to their immediate team but also to the wider organisation. While that language did not exist in the 1970s, the philosophy behind it helps explain Roger’s thinking. He wanted rugby league, club management, directors and staff to see themselves as contributors to a single enterprise rather than separate interests competing for influence.

The first major breakthrough came in 1980 when a single board was finally established. Yet even then, the model remained incomplete. Rugby league and the licensed club continued under separate chief executives. As described in Parts 20 and 21, the compromise produced its own difficulties and did not resolve the underlying tensions.

It was not until the end of 1983 that the structure Roger had advocated for so long was fully implemented. One board and one chief executive became responsible for the entire organisation.

Whether that decision alone explains the improvements that followed is impossible to know. Organisations are rarely transformed by a single reform. Nevertheless, the years that followed saw a stronger emphasis on cooperation, planning and shared ownership. The workshops that led to the Five by Five program, closer relationships throughout the rugby league district and a more integrated approach to football and club operations all emerged during this period.

Reasonable people may still disagree about whether Roger was right. They may also disagree about the extent to which later successes flowed from the governance reforms he championed.

What is difficult to dispute is that he regarded the issue as fundamental. For more than sixteen years he returned to the same argument, often in the face of resistance and disappointment.

Ironically, that persistence contributed to one of the enduring myths about Roger Cowan — that he was somehow anti-rugby league.

The evidence suggests a more complex reality.

His long campaign for “One Board, One CEO” was not driven by a desire to diminish rugby league, but by a belief that Panthers could only achieve lasting success when every part of the organisation was working towards the same goals and operating under the same commitments.

Whether one agrees with that belief or not, it became one of the defining ideas in the history of Panthers.

Source Material*

The following documents are extracts of the relevant sections of larger reports:

Related Topics

Related Themes

Financial Management · Governance · Board Decisions · Culture · Club Structure

* Resource material courtesy of The Ausburn Collection

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Entertainment, Experience & Prestige

Part 11 of 70 — Original Chapter: Chapter 5: Building the Basics – Business Principles and Property

This article forms part of the serialised republication of Panthers, Passion & Politics – The Roger Cowan Years.

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With a broader audience now emerging, attention turned to what would bring people in — and keep them coming back.

Another early innovation was an in-house band, fully employed by the club. Rhind believes it was one of the first in the industry — and unheard of for such a small club. At the time, the Board was resisting putting poker machines in the upstairs auditorium area.

Roger persisted, finally convincing them to trial half a dozen machines upstairs for four hours on a Saturday night — between 6 and 10pm. He and a couple of the assistant managers would carry them upstairs and bring them back down again later.

The trial was successful; the figures increased, and the machines went upstairs permanently. 

Rhind says he and Cowan were both in their thirties but most of the Board at the time were older men who sometimes found it a bit more difficult to cope with all the change being promoted by management.

However, they all shared a quality that would help overcome obstacles. They had a strong sense of ownership of the club they had helped build, and they wanted it to be secure for the future.

There were no hidden agendas and no ambitions of personal gain. It was about loyalty to a common cause. It was their club, and they would do whatever was necessary to protect it.

In the early 1970s the club began to put on prawn nights, other special nights, Sunday afternoon concerts and talent quests. Max Connors recalls,

Mum and Dad would come in for whatever was on, and they would always put a few bucks in the pokies. Roger was doing surveys all the time. He told the board that we had to start to give a little back to people to encourage them to come to the club, even though we might lose a little money on the prawn nights.

Bringing in the couples meant that women were starting to come to the club. It was changing the whole social scene. Back then, there were not many places that women could go, especially if they were on their own. They could come in either with a partner, or a girlfriend, and enjoy a regular night out.

The final shift away from the club’s traditional male bastion came with the launch of what became known as the “purple passion pit”, one of the new extensions to the club. Kevin McGrath remembers,

The room was quite stunning, with beautiful décor, purple furniture and fittings and large fish-tanks along one wall. It had poker machines, comfortable lounges and a full bar and it very quickly became the most popular area in the club.

Also, to attract the mixed market, the club began to focus on entertainment. This was an extraordinary time for the Penrith Leagues Club, says Bryn Miller, who was part of the club’s entertainment team in the seventies.

The first auditorium only held 580 people, so by today’s standards, it was not a big room. Don Ellks was the entertainment manager at the time, and he and Cowan formed an association with an agent, John Hansen. The Board approved their recommendation that the club set up its own entertainment agency as a joint venture with Hansen.

Through the new company, Prestige Attractions1, the club set out to bring in major overseas acts — performers who were appearing at leading Sydney nightclubs such as Chequers2, as well as venues like St George Leagues and Souths Juniors — artists such as Roy Orbison, Rolf Harris, Jerry Lee Lewis, the Hollies, and the Mamas and the Papas.

But we would get them on Tuesday nights — traditionally a dead night in the entertainment industry. Most artists didn’t get bookings for Tuesdays, so we could get them at a good rate. We would put on prawn nights, and beef and burgundy nights, and still charge reasonable prices. These shows were every second Tuesday, and the response was phenomenal. People came from all over Sydney.

We needed to find a way to get more people in, and at the time, there was a fountain in the middle of the auditorium. We ripped that out, and the room was able to hold 800.

We started to advertise in Sydney newspapers, which was our first real exposure out of Penrith. Here we were, this little hick country town, and we were really getting known out there.

Miller adds,

Sundays were another big night. It was Australian rock night, with bands such as Skyhooks, Sherbert, the Little River Band and INXS appearing in the auditorium.

But the building of success inside the club was creating pressures that could not be resolved within its existing footprint.

1982 Advertisement for the week’s rock entertainment.

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  1. Prestige Attractions was a joint entertainment venture involving Penrith Leagues Club and entertainment promoter John Hansen during the 1970s.
    ↩︎
  2. Chequers was one of Sydney’s best-known nightclub venues during the 1960s and 1970s, regularly hosting major Australian and international entertainers ↩︎

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Divided Control: The Club and Football

Part 8 of 70 — Original Chapter: Chapter 4: Insolvency to First Division in One Year

This article forms part of the serialised republication of Panthers, Passion & Politics – The Roger Cowan Years.

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The licensed club was going from strength to strength despite ongoing problems between its board and the football committee. This conflict was to plague Cowan for fourteen years. He would tell every board member in those years,

This club is never going to be truly successful until we bring it all together – the club and the football. We have to be totally united.

There had always been two bodies. Merv Cartwright was the first secretary of the football club, while Cowan managed the registered club.1

Prior to the commencement of the 1967 season, the board of the licensed club had been asked to approve a budget of £40,000 to cover all rugby league-related expenses for the year. At the end of the season, Cartwright informed the committee that he would need £90,000.

The blow-out of more than 100 per cent was a huge impost on a club that was still struggling to establish itself. At that time it was easily the smallest registered club supporting a first grade team. Cowan was furious. So much hard work had been put into making the club profitable and Cartwright appeared to have little regard for budgets and financial controls. He seemed to have the view that there was a bottomless pit of money. Cowan says there were absolutely no controls over the football spending, with money continually wasted on unnecessary things.

When he took the job on the three-month trial, Cowan was confident that if he worked hard for a few months he would be on top of it all and then could take it easy. He was halfway through a university course as an external student of Armidale University. His plan was to get everything sorted out, and once that was done, “I’ll have plenty of time to study and take some time off”.

It did not quite work out that way. At the beginning of 1967, after 16 months of working 7 days a week, Cowan took his first day off since taking on the job. The Cowan family enjoyed a four-day break, driving to Broken Hill and returning via Mildura. The university course was never touched again.

Football expenditure in 1968 again exceeded the budget, and a couple of other problems had arisen with Cartwright during the year.

By 1969, the registered club Board had had enough. The events surrounding the removal of secretary and treasurer —Merv Cartwright and Ron Partrdige — are examined further in Beyond the Book: Removing the Football Club Secretary and Treasurer.

Eventually they called an extraordinary meeting of members. Realising the controversial nature of the event, they invited the mayor, Bill Chapman, to be chairman for the day. The Board’s recommendation was for the licensed club to cease rugby league funding unless Merv Cartwright resigned.2

Directors involved with the club during that period later described Cartwright in mixed but revealing terms.

Merv was an excellent PR man. He had the ability to influence and manipulate people. He did do a lot to build rugby league in the area and was very involved in the campaign for Penrith to join first division.

But he had lots of problems managing the money. Merv was always overspending, and Roger was trying to build a reliable business. That’s where a lot of the friction started.

The issues underlying that recommendation were more complex than this account suggests, particularly in relation to the Club’s financial position and governance arrangements at the time.

Around 1,000 of the club’s 6,000 members attended, with 80 per cent supporting the recommendation.

Cartwright did resign and moves were made to heal the rift between the two boards.

Sydney Morning Herald — Saturday, 20th March 1971

The District Club committee approached Cowan and asked him to take over as Secretary of the football club, a move that surprised him, given the history. The committee members said that they hoped such a move might help build a more co-operative relationship between the two clubs. 

Cowan decided to give it a try. The move gave him responsibility for both entities but after less than a year, the frustrations of managing both sides of the organisation while reporting to separate Boards with competing interests proved unworkable. So, Cowan began advocating his policy to unite them under one board and one CEO.

On two separate occasions after his removal as secretary, Cartwright ran foul of the board of the licensed club and had his membership suspended. The board was adamant that he would never be allowed back into the club. This issue remained unresolved for many years, and intensified, particularly when his sons started to show outstanding rugby league skills and were selected to play for the Panthers.

The board received regular written appeals to lift his suspension.

Long-time director Barry Hubbard (1973-85)3 told of the meetings in the years after Cartwright left:

Every AGM, Tom O’Connor, who was on the board at that time, would stand up and ask for the reinstatement of Merv Cartwright’s membership. This would get a very cool reception from the chairman, Ken [Poker] Ausburn, and the ensuing debates were the fieriest I experienced in my whole time on the board. Ausburn and O’Connor would scream at each other across the room, and O’Connor would invariably end the argument with the words, “It is not British justice that Merv Cartwright, who has done so much for rugby league in this area, is barred from this club”.

Hubbard says the resolution was always beaten, and Ausburn would rule that the matter was resolved and was not to be raised again for the rest of the year. Apart from O’Connor the entire board was against the reinstatement of Cartwright’s membership.

At times, the disputes became highly confrontational, even farcical. In a heated discussion at one of those AGMs, the deputy chairman, Murray Clarke, who was the most vocal critic of Cartwright, was told never to venture into St Marys. If he did, said the speaker, he would never get out alive. It was Clarke who had previously cited Cartwright to appear before the Board after allegedly abusing him and threatening him in public. 

The removal of Cartwright was to have ramifications for Cowan far into the future. The two had repeatedly clashed. Cartwright and his supporters blamed Cowan, not the board, for the loss of his membership. It was a festering antagonism that wouldn’t go away. In fact, it was one of the many small pieces in an intricate maze of events that would place Roger Cowan before Ian Temby in June 2004.

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  1. At this time, both football and licensed club operated under the single entity of Penrith District Rugby League Football Club (PDRLFC). Separate committees had oversight of the football and licensed club operations. Penrith Rugby League Club Ltd was established in June 1967 to take responsibility for the registered club. ↩︎
  2. Related Board papers from 1968 and 1969 illustrate the growing conflict between the licensed club board and football administration. These papers are included in full in Beyond the Book: Removing the Football Club Secretary and Treasurer. ↩︎
  3. Barry passed away in 2021, aged 90. ↩︎

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