Tag: Financial Management

No Time To Lose

Part 55 of 70 — Original Chapter: Chapter 15: Confidentiality — Dysfunction — Conflict

This article forms part of the serialised republication of Panthers, Passion & Politics – The Roger Cowan Years.

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Keith Rhind speaks about the personalities in the boardroom.

John Bateman was a great stickler for procedures. He had been on council, where things are often deferred over and over again. He thought that things should be tabled, discussed, and directors should go away and come back and resolve it the following meeting.

Roger would bring things to meetings, usually on paper, but sometimes supported verbally, but they were always well put together, and well prepared. There were times when he asked for a matter to be treated with some urgency and this did not go down very well with some of the directors. But sometimes it was very important, if a decision needed to be made immediately to save money or secure a business opportunity.

A classic example of this was the purchase of The Mekong Club in Cabramatta.

The Mekong Club had a bad reputation. Its founding chairman, Phuong Ngo, was eventually convicted of masterminding the assassination of local MP John Newman and sentenced to life imprisonment. The club had also been associated with a number of serious licensing breaches, and a shooting had occurred on the steps of the club. Other crime in the area had attracted intense media coverage.

One Friday, Cowan and John Wilson were travelling to a function with John Gould, then with Aristocrat poker machines, and The Mekong Club came up. 

John told us that the owner of the building had recently made the decision to sell it and close the club.  He said that after paying rent of $350,000, the club’s operating profit was currently about $500,000 per year.  The asking price for the building was $1 million.

On the face of it, it seemed like an unbelievable opportunity. But we had to act fast. We phoned from the car to see if it was still available and made an appointment to see the Mekong club manager that same afternoon. 

The Mekong’s receivers had already made approaches to about 14 clubs, and Gould said he felt that somebody was sure to grab it in the next few days. 

The next morning Cowan sent an email to the directors informing them of the opportunity and giving then some preliminary information. He said management would present a recommendation at the next board meeting, only three days away. 

That Saturday night, Cowan and a number of other managers did a tour of clubs in the area and then visited the Mekong
club. They became even more excited about the opportunity. The team worked on Sunday to have a report ready for the board meeting the following Tuesday.

Cowan could not recall whether particular responses came from Geoff James or Craig Terry, but remembers the exchange going something like this:

Cowan:

 Clubs in that area are amongst the most successful in the state, and they were all busy on Saturday evening. We visited the Mekong Club around midnight, assuming that if there were to be any problems they would be more likely later in the evening. In fact, we were impressed by the customers and by the staff. Our inquiries indicated that there have been no serious behaviour problems there for a long time.

‘f we move quickly, we can buy the premises for $1 million, and the Mekong Club will become a tenant paying $350,000 per annum. The club appears to be well managed, and profits are around $500,000 per annum. We don’t have to commit to amalgamation at this stage, but I want to forecast the likelihood that there will be a recommendation later.

James or Terry:

This is unsatisfactory. We have not been given sufficient notice to make a decision involving $1 million. It should be deferred to the next meeting.

Cowan:

If we can’t make a quick decision, it is almost certain we will miss out. A property investment showing a return of 35% a year is not going to hang around forever. The return could be 85% if we go to the amalgamation. There are other clubs looking at it as we sit here.

James or Terry:

We should have been given more notice.

Cowan (starting to show impatience):

We were not aware of the opportunity until last Friday afternoon.

James or Terry:

It is management incompetence rushing things this way.

Cowan:

You don’t seem to understand. We found the opportunity at 5 pm on Friday afternoon. Since then a team of managers has inspected the club, visited other clubs around it, talked to management and staff, and written a report for the board. It was simply not possible to give any more notice.

Terry:

Well, if we had better relations with the auditors, we would have been told about it sooner. So it’s still management incompetence.

Craig Terry apparently believed that because there had been a connection in the past between Panthers and the company that audited Mekong, Panthers should have known earlier what was happening.

James and Terry both voted against the proposal. The other members of the Footy Five did not join them, and the purchase was approved.

The purchase proceeded, and The Mekong Club subsequently amalgamated with Panthers.1

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  1. The Mekong Club operated as Mekong Panthers from 2001 until 2012. The club (and the building) was then sold to the Mounties Group as part of a broader financial restructuring of the Panthers Group aimed at reducing debt. ↩︎

← Part 54 · All Parts · Part 56 →

Commentary and Contributions

Somebody, Hose it Down!

Part 52 of 70 — Original Chapter: Chapter 15: Confidentiality — Dysfunction — Conflict

This article forms part of the serialised republication of Panthers, Passion & Politics – The Roger Cowan Years.

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For two years Cowan had been agonising about how to improve the decision-making process. His recommendation to the Board in 2000 to employ an external consultant was intended to improve those relationships. Instead, the workshop would expose an issue that took the conflict to a new level.

In 1996, Cowan had negotiated a new contract with the Board Executive, which would take him to his planned retirement date of 2006. The same confidentiality over his remuneration arrangements that he had insisted on since 1965 was written into the contract. In 2000, that confidentiality would become another catalyst for conflict.

We help you clearly define your board’s role and distinguish board from executive accountabilities.

Cowan contacted the company, and board and management agreed to hold an evening workshop, in May 2000, facilitated by John Kilmister. Cowan held high hopes that an independent consultant might help board and management work together more productively and harmoniously.

Kilmister made a number of recommendations that were designed to improve board/management relationships.

In the course of the workshop, somebody asked the consultant if he thought it was appropriate for senior management remuneration packages to be disclosed only to the executive of the board and the club’s auditors. The consultant’s opinion was that it would be preferable for the full board to have that information, but he added that there was nothing illegal about that sort of confidentiality.

Despite Bateman’s later evidence that he had been curious about Cowan’s remuneration since joining the Board, the issue had not previously been raised with Cowan in the boardroom.

In his first day of evidence at the inquiry, John Bateman told Ian Temby that he had been curious about the remuneration of the CEO from the time he first became a director, in December 1995. He cited his experience as a Penrith councillor as the reason for his interest. What is notable is that, despite that longstanding interest, he had apparently not previously raised the issue in the Panthers boardroom.

At the next board meeting1, John Bateman asked Roger Cowan a seemingly simple question. The answer was straightforward. Its significance would not become fully apparent until some four years later.The question?

Does any manager employed by Panthers hold an interest in any company doing business with Panthers?

Although John Bateman maintains that he never asked such a question, Cowan says he has a vivid recollection. It seemed rather confrontational and was quite unexpected, which is why it stands out in his memory. He recalls the question very well because of his reaction to it.

My immediate thought was that he was asking a question when he knew the answer. I sensed that he was trying to lay a silly trap, thinking that I would try to fudge an answer. To me, this was crazy because there was no secret about Phyro Holdings. Everybody in the office knew about it, all the managers knew about it, and then there were all the external companies where we booked our advertising, etc – all through Phyro. I had no reason to think anyone would not know about it.2

I didn’t know that in the week leading up to the meeting, someone in Bateman’s office had carried out ASIC searches on Phyro Holdings. But I still believed he was up to something, and, given my immediate suspicions, can anybody imagine that I would have failed to answer the question?

I replied that the only one that I was aware of was Phyro Holdings.

The discussion became more and more heated as some directors demanded that the confidentiality clause in the contract be ignored in favour of full disclosure to the Board. But confidentiality was a condition of his contract, Cowan told them, and that same confidentiality covered all senior managers. It was quite legal, he told the meeting, and everything was subject to audit at any time by the board executive and the club auditors.

He also told them that his experiences over the previous two years made it clear that once the full board learned the details of his contract, Ron Mulock would have them by the next morning. And the whole of Penrith would be reading it by the end of the week in the Western Weekender.  From Cowan’s perspective, his experiences over the previous two years demonstrated that confidentiality could no longer be relied upon once information reached the full Board.

The friction in the meeting increased. Some directors were insisting that the confidentiality provisions be waived, and Cowan was telling them an agreement was binding and they had no right to change it.  After a final outburst, Cowan walked out, declaring he would not work for such dishonorable people.

In hindsight, Cowan says the words he used at the time were only slightly less stupid than his decision to walk out:

The day this board finds out the details of my remuneration I will leave the club

But in that moment, he says, he had decided enough was enough. How could he have respect for a Board dominated by directors demanding that a long standing contract be broken? He told Ian Temby that in doing what he did, he knew he was resigning.

When I nearly got back home, I thought this is a stupid thing I am doing, I’ve let a lot of people down, I am acting selfishly.  I drove back and went into the room, and nobody said anything.  When I walked back in, I fully expected them to say, “No way, you resigned.”3

Terrence Lynch is a barrister who has acted for Panthers on several occasions4. He says that Cowan’s rigid stance on the whole confidentiality issue was out of character.

It always surprised me that Roger wasn’t prepared to open up his salary and remuneration arrangements to the full board, particularly when it became such a contentious issue.

I was also surprised that he let it continue. Given my understanding of how he had run the place, I am amazed that he allowed it to become an issue. Why didn’t he just step aside and shut it down? I went to many meetings with various groups at the club, and my impression was that it was a very open and relaxed place, and there was no factionalism or camps. I never ever sensed any party lines there at any time.

This was the environment he’d created, so it’s even more surprising that he dug in. It is the one time that I have ever seen him let ego get in the way, though maybe ego’s not the right word.  But he was definitely acting more undisciplined than you would ever expect. It was a concentration on self rather than seeing the big picture – which he had always done for nearly forty years – and what he is known for.

Viewed dispassionately, the dispute was not simply about whether Cowan’s remuneration was excessive. Cowan maintained that his package was commensurate with the responsibilities of running a business approaching $300 million in annual turnover.

The argument had become one about disclosure, confidentiality and trust.

So, why didn’t somebody ever move to hose it down?

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  1. This refers to the next Board meeting after the May 2000 session with John Kilmister.
    ↩︎
  2. Temby’s later findings drew a distinction between knowledge that Phyro Holdings existed and was the Cowan family company, and knowledge of the extent of its financial dealings with Panthers. Evidence before the Inquiry indicated that some directors knew of Phyro but said they did not know the extent or nature of the transactions passing through it.
    ↩︎
  3. Temby later summarised the outcome starkly: “In the result nothing was achieved.” The existing arrangement remained: Cowan’s remuneration was known to him and the Board Executive, as was Phyro’s involvement.
    ↩︎
  4. Lynch, a prominent Sydney barrister, was junior counsel representating Panthers during the Temby Inquiry. It should be noted that in that role he was not representing Cowan, he was representing the Panthers Board and ex-members of the Board including the group that had been labelled “The Footy Five”. ↩︎

← Part 51 · All Parts · Part 53→

Commentary and Contributions

Major Player: Glenn Matthews

Glenn Matthews
Image Source: The Panthers: Men in Black

Glenn Matthews

Accountant, Chief Financial Officer and Chief Executive Officer

Few people contributed to—and witnessed—the modern development of Penrith Panthers as closely as Glenn Matthews.

Joining Panthers in March 1984, on the very day the club’s administration moved into its new Mulgoa Road premises, Matthews would spend the next twenty-six years helping guide the organisation through one of the most significant periods in its history. During that time he progressed from accountant to Chief Financial Officer and ultimately succeeded Roger Cowan as Chief Executive Officer in 2005.

His career spanned the club’s transformation from a rapidly expanding regional licensed club into one of Australia’s leading community organisations, providing a unique perspective on both its growth and the challenges that accompanied that success.

Role in the Narrative

Glenn Matthews appears throughout the middle and later pages of the Panthers, Passion & Politics narrative.

Unlike many figures whose involvement centred primarily on football or board administration, Matthews worked across almost every aspect of the organisation. His responsibilities evolved well beyond finance to include commercial development, strategic planning, football administration and executive leadership.

He was directly involved in many of the defining events covered throughout this series, including:

  • the move into the Mulgoa Road premises;
  • Panthers’ commercial expansion during the 1980s;
  • development of the organisation’s management culture;
  • the organisational restructure of the early 90s;
  • football administration;
  • the Temby Inquiry, the conflict preceding it and its aftermath;
  • Roger Cowan’s retirement;
  • the Global Financial Crisis;
  • development of Panthers Property Trust;
  • Panthers’ transition into a new phase of executive leadership.

Because his career bridged both Roger Cowan’s administration and the years immediately following, Matthews provides an important perspective on the continuity—and eventual evolution—of the Panthers organisation.

Background

Born: 17 September

Raised in Campbelltown before later settling in Western Sydney, Matthews developed an early interest in mathematics and accounting while simultaneously pursuing competitive barefoot water skiing, eventually becoming an Australian representative coach.

He also developed a lifelong passion for endurance sport. A long-time member of the Panthers Triathlon Club, Matthews completed eighteen Ironman-distance events, including the Ironman World Championship at Kona, Hawaii. His achievements earned recognition as an Ironman Legend — an accomplishment reflecting the discipline, persistence and resilience that also characterised his professional career.

He joined Panthers in March 1984 as an accountant – at the very momemnt Panthers was moving from Station Street to Mulgoa Rd.

We looked at it [the Mulgoa Road building] and thought there was just no way the place was going to be ready. But somehow it became ready … People justed pitched in and got stuff done.

from Western Weekender Podcast: On the Record 26 February 2024

That spirit of shared responsibility and willingness to step beyond formal job descriptions would become one of the defining characteristics of Panthers during Matthews’ career—and one of the organisational strengths he most admired.

Panthers Roles

  • Accountant
  • Chief Financial Officer
  • Reserve Grade Trainer
  • Senior Executive
  • Group General Manager
  • Chief Executive Officer (2005-2010)

Throughout his career Matthews accepted responsibilities well beyond traditional financial management, becoming involved in commercial ventures, organisational development, football administration and strategic planning across the wider Panthers Group.

Leadership and Culture

Matthews has consistently acknowledged Roger Cowan as the greatest influence on his development as a leader.

Working alongside Cowan during Panthers’ formative years exposed him to a management philosophy built upon trust, accountability and personal responsibility. Matthews has often recalled the lessons he learnt about treating people with respect, empowering staff to make decisions and responding to mistakes with honesty rather than blame.

One incident early in his career, when he admitted to a significant financial forecasting error, became a defining leadership lesson. Rather than reacting with anger, Cowan focused on solving the problem—an approach Matthews later identified as fundamental in shaping his own leadership style.

Those experiences would later influence Matthews’ own approach to leadership as he assumed increasingly senior responsibilities within the organisation.

Contribution to Panthers

Matthews’ contribution extended well beyond finance.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s he became closely involved in commercial development, organisational planning, tourism initiatives, football administration and strategic projects across the Panthers Group.

Among those projects was the development of the Panthers Cable Ski Park, where Matthews became actively involved in both management and promotion, later overseeing its redevelopment through new accommodation and tourism initiatives. His willingness to move beyond the traditional boundaries of accounting reflected the increasingly integrated management culture that characterised Panthers during this period.

Cheif Executive Officer

Matthews succeeded Roger Cowan as Chief Executive Officer in 2005 during one of the most challenging periods in Panthers’ history.

Rather than inheriting an era of rapid expansion, he assumed leadership as the organisation confronted increasing complexity, significant football decisions, the Global Financial Crisis and growing regulatory pressures affecting licensed clubs, and a Board grappling with the fallout from a major, public and damaging Inquiry.

Matthews has reflected that while Cowan’s strengths lay in innovation and growth, his own strengths were better suited to leading organisations through periods of operational and financial challenge.

Relevance to Events Described

Many of the major events described throughout this series either involved Matthews directly or occurred while he occupied senior executive positions.

His experience provides valuable insight into the reasoning behind many of the decisions discussed elsewhere in the narrative, particularly those involving organisational development, commercial strategy, football administration and executive leadership.

His experience provides valuable insight into the reasoning behind many of the decisions discussed elsewhere in the narrative, particularly those involving organisational development, commercial strategy, football administration and executive leadership.

Legacy

Glenn Matthews occupies a distinctive place in Panthers’ history.

He experienced the organisation as a young accountant during the move to Mulgoa Road, helped shape many of its commercial and organisational developments, and ultimately became the executive entrusted with leading the club following Roger Cowan’s retirement.

His career spans one of the most significant periods of change in Panthers’ history and provides an important link between the organisation’s formative vision and its emergence as one of Australia’s leading licensed club organisations.

Although remembered as a senior executive, Matthews’ influence extended well beyond management. His commitment to developing people, embracing new challenges and serving the organisation across multiple disciplines reflected a culture in which leadership was earned through contribution rather than position.

Related Topics

Related Themes:

Financial Management · Governance · Growth · Culture

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Editorial Note

This profile is presented as contextual background.
Additional material may be introduced as the narrative progresses.

The Not-Enough-Money-For-Football Myth

Part 39 of 70 — Original Chapter: Chapter 12: The Anti-Football Myth

This article forms part of the serialised republication of Panthers, Passion & Politics – The Roger Cowan Years.

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The perception that Roger Cowan was against rugby league was built up through the seventies, as he battled to bring the registered club and the football club under one administration.

Barry Hubbard was on the executive of the registered club through those years.

There was the football committee and our board, and there was very little liaison between them. The football committee called the board the “kings in their castles”. Roger was always up against it because everybody knew he was determined to get hold of football. He once told the board executive, “We should cut the head off rugby league”.

It was a remark that would come back to haunt Cowan. He did not remember the particular occasion, but acknowledged that, when particularly frustrated by the divided administration, it was quite possible he had said something like it.

I used to say that if we were not careful, rugby league would send us broke.

They [the football committee] would give us a budget, and when it came time to pay the bills at the end of the year, the amount would be double. To them there was no limit – they would just spend, didn’t care where it was coming from.

The other thing that I always said – and I’ve never backed away from it – is that the number one priority is to make the registered club successful. Rugby league has to run second. If you reverse the priorities you end up with nothing, not even a team. Western Suburbs came close, and Norths failed to take their place in the fourteen team competition. The Newtown club – with all its traditions – died completely.

Expressed that way, Cowan’s priorities could easily be interpreted as placing rugby league at the margins. His argument was almost the reverse. If the registered club was to provide continuing support for football, its own financial strength had to come first. In his view, weakening the source of the funding would ultimately weaken rugby league itself.

The vote taken in July 1999 was not a vote on whether to merge, but on whether to sign and send the letter to the NRL.

In 1983, Newtown1, one of the original rugby league clubs, with a debt of $1 million and no money to pay its players, was forced to fold. In a similar financial position, Western Suburbs — also one of the rugby league’s foundation clubs — was only saved by legal action. It struggled for many years before amalgamating with Balmain in the late 90s.

Sydney Morning Herald 27 Sep 1983 — click image to enlarge.

Cowan’s own memories of the days when the Penrith club was unable to pay its players had steeled his convictions.

The dispute always made me think of the fable of the goose that laid the eggs of gold. If the goose is treated badly there are no more eggs.

Yet the belief that not enough money was put into rugby league is a big part of the anti-rugby league tag. Merv Cartwright took what he needed for football, because he believed he could, but he was not the only person who saw things that way. In their evidence at the Inquiry, both Greg Evans and Dennis Coffey said that Cowan was not as supportive of football as they would have liked. Both spoke of their passion for football and their love of the team.

There was, however, an important distinction between Cowan’s influence as chief executive and the authority of the Board. Cowan could advise and recommend, but decisions about the level of financial support provided to football ultimately rested with the directors.

That raises a question not explored in evidence presented to the Inquiry. If directors believed football required greater financial support, they had the capacity to propose it and, if they commanded a majority on the Board, to approve it.

When Ian Temby suggested to Coffey that he ‘reckoned the leagues club was mostly there to support the football club and the football team’, Coffey agreed. He said that it would not surprise him if management was prepared to collude in a reverse takeover by amalgamating with clubs that would take control of rugby league out of Penrith’s hands.

Roy Masters does not agree that Roger Cowan could have secured more premierships by providing more money.

Rugby league premierships are extremely hard to win. Look at Cronulla.2 They came in the same year as Penrith, and they’re still waiting for their first one.

Putting more money in does not necessarily help. Penrith put more money in in 98, when Royce Simmons was coach, and didn’t win. They didn’t in 2003, with John Lang, and that year they won. There are many elements to winning a premiership.

Being the type of person that he [Cowan] is, he probably took the view that if you build a tremendously successful licensed club, you are always going to have a cash cow that can support a football club.

Dennis Fitzgerald, who was the long-time CEO of the Parramatta Eels, has faced the same problems with funding;

If you put all the money into the game – and so many clubs have done that – their leagues clubs either have to close or they run into all sorts of financial problems. Newtown is a classic example.

Roger is a rugby league person, but at the end of the day, he is a visionary, a business person who realised that unless you’ve got something funding rugby league, you won’t have anything. He had a massive junior league to fund, as well as an NRL team – as we all have. You need a good profitable facility to generate the dollars to keep everything else running.

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  1. Only tw years earlier, Newtown had played Parramatta in the 1981 Grand Final, leading 7-6 at half-time before losing 20-11. Few watching that game could have imagined that Newtown had only two season leftc in the first-grade competition. ↩︎
  2. Masters was speaking well before Cronulla won its first premiership in 2016. ↩︎

← Part 38 · All Parts · Part 40 →

Commentary and Contributions

Following the Merger Debate

Contemporary newspaper coverage from the Western Weekender, July- September 1998

Editors Note: The articles selected for this Beyond the Book entry are those that best illustrate the major stages in the public debate as it evolved between July and September 1998.

The following newspaper articles are presented in chronological order. Together they allow readers to follow one of the most significant episodes in Panthers’ history as it unfolded during 1998. Rather than viewing events with the benefit of hindsight, they invite readers to experience the uncertainty, competing arguments and rapidly changing public debate that surrounded the proposed merger discussions.

These articles illustrate how the debate gradually expanded — from Board deliberations, to community campaigns, to local government, to the wider media — before eventually reaching the public information meeting that proved to be a turning point in the story

24 July 1998 — Stand Alone

Commentary

This was one of the first major reports after discussion of a possible merger became widely known. The article captures the immediate emotional response within the Penrith community and reflects the strength of the emerging “Stand Alone” campaign.

At the same time, it provides readers with Roger Cowan’s explanation of why management believed every contingency needed to be examined if Panthers was to maximise its chances of remaining in the National Rugby League.

Reading the article today, one feature stands out. The emotional and practical arguments were already beginning to diverge. While much of the public discussion centred on loyalty and identity, management continued to focus on risk, planning and the long-term survival of the club.

Despite Cowan and his management team being as passionate and loyal — as emotionally invested — as the most fervent supporter, these qualities were already being overshadowed by the emerging public narrative.

31 July 1998 — War of Words

Commentary

Within a week the debate had expanded well beyond Penrith itself. Sydney’s leading radio commentator, Ray Hadley, had broadcast damaging misinformation about Panthers prompting the Club to respond with an open letter published in the Sydney Morning Herald and the Western Weekender.

This exchange illustrates how quickly the discussion moved from private Board deliberations to public debate. Importantly, it also demonstrates that Roger Cowan’s explanation of the club’s position was being expressed publicly at the time. The account presented throughout Parts 29–35 is therefore not a reconstruction created years later, but reflects the position being articulated as events unfolded.

Readers may wish to compare this article with the discussion in Part 33 of The Series — A Good Story Trumps Truth — where the relationship between public perception and documented fact is explored in greater detail.

7 August 1998 — Merger Decision Deferred

Commentary

This article is significant because it records Panthers’ management describing its decision-making process while events were still unfolding. It’s headline — Damned if you do … — echoes the difficulties being encountered by those responsible for the Club. Roger Cowan repeatedly emphasises that the Board was analysing the risks, considering several possible scenarios and attempting to avoid making decisions based purely on emotion.

It is also a reminder that the future remained highly uncertain. Today it is easy to assume that Panthers’ eventual survival was inevitable. In August 1998 it was anything but certain — indeed, the uncertainty persisted until North Sydney and Manly announced their merger more than a year after the events chronicled here.

21 August 1998 — Council Enters the Debate

Commentary

By late August the merger debate had expanded well beyond Panthers’ Boardroom. Penrith City Council formally resolved to urge the club to remain a stand-alone participant in the National Rugby League, arguing that the Panthers name had become an important part of the city’s identity and economic development.

The article is of particular significance because it captures the complex position occupied by Deputy Mayor John Bateman, who was both a Panthers director and a councillor. Speaking in his capacity as a councillor, Bateman publicly praised the professionalism of Panthers’ management, confirmed that no merger agreement had been reached and acknowledged that the economic case being examined by management was a strong one. At the same time, he explained why he personally believed the socio-economic arguments for retaining an independent Penrith team were ultimately more compelling.

With hindsight, the article demonstrates that the debate had become far more sophisticated than a simple contest between “for” and “against”. Competing economic, governance and community considerations were all being weighed, even by people who ultimately reached different conclusions.

The relationship between the football team and the identity of Penrith had much earlier found an unusual expression when PENRITH CITY appeared across the Panthers jersey in 1988.

11 September 1998 — The Passion … The Practical

Commentary

The public information meeting marked an important turning point in the merger debate. As described in Part 34, Roger Cowan later recalled the meeting as having become an “ambush”, while many supporters regarded it as the defining moment in the campaign to remain a stand-alone club.

The reporting that followed is interesting for another reason. Rather than simply recording the arguments presented, the article framed the debate as one of “Passion” versus “Practical”. Ron Mulock’s position appeared under the heading The Passion, while Roger Cowan’s appeared under …the Practical.

Whether intentional or not, this framing invites an interesting question. Was the debate really between passion and practicality, or were both men expressing different forms of commitment to the same objective — the long-term future of Panthers?

Readers who have followed Parts 29–35 may notice a striking irony. Throughout those chapters, management’s practical approach — risk analysis, contingency planning and exploring every available option — was itself driven by a determination to preserve Panthers’ place in the National Rugby League. The practical and the passionate were not necessarily opposing ideas; they were different philosophies for pursuing what each believed was in the club’s best interests.

It is obvious that both sides of this debate were driven by people holding strong loyalty and devotion to the Penrith Panthers.

Looking Back

Reading these articles nearly three decades later, several observations stand out.

The uncertainty of the time is unmistakable. Decisions that now seem obvious were anything but obvious in 1998. Much of the debate took place before supporters had access to the information available today.

The articles also reveal how rapidly public narratives developed. As discussions moved from the Boardroom into newspapers, radio and public meetings, the story acquired a momentum of its own. Perceptions often became as influential as documented facts.

Perhaps most interesting of all is the consistency of Roger Cowan’s public position. Whether speaking through interviews, open letters or Board statements, the central themes remained remarkably consistent: the risks were real, the future uncertain, and management had a responsibility to examine every realistic option before events overtook the club.

These articles go beyond being simple contemporary newspaper clippings. They are historical documents that allow readers to experience events as they unfolded, before hindsight shaped later interpretations.

The Panthers Merger Debate Newspaper Collection (PDF Download)

Readers wishing to explore these articles in full can download the accompanying PDF containing the complete Western Weekender collection reproduced in this Beyond the Book entry.

Resources

The Panthers Merger Debate Newspaper Collection (PDF)

Related Topics

Related Themes

Conflict · Financial Management · Media

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Survival Becomes a Numbers Game — The NRL Criteria

Editors Note: The tables reproduced in this article are based on Panthers’ internal working papers prepared during 1998 and 1999. They were management documents used to estimate the club’s position under the NRL Selection Criteria and were never intended for publication. While some financial measures necessarily relied on informed estimates, they provide a rare insight into the information available to Panthers’ leadership as critical decisions were being made.

The settlement that ended the Super League war did not guarantee the survival of every club. In fact, it guaranteed the demise of some teams.

Twenty-two teams competed in the 1997 Season — the split competitions season — twelve played in the Australian Rugby League and ten in Super League.

Before the new National Rugby League competition began in 1998, the South Queensland Crushers and the Hunter Mariners were wound up, leaving twenty clubs to compete in the frist season of a unified competition.

The unity was conditional.

The NRL would operate with twenty clubs during 1998 and 1999, but from the 2000 season the competition would be reduced to just fourteen. The peace agreement had ended one conflict while immediately beginning another — a contest for survival.

To determine which clubs would be admitted to the new fourteen-team competition, the NRL introduced a formal assessment process known simply as the Criteria. (Download PDF: Admission Criteria National Rugby League Competition )

The NRL described the Criteria as a “fair and reasonable” method of selecting the clubs that would comprise the future competition. They consisted of three separate components.

The Basic Criteria required clubs to demonstrate that they met, or had plans to meet, minimum standards relating to playing facilities, administration, solvency and development.

The Qualifying Criteria examined financial capacity, including minimum revenue requirements of $8 million together with five-year business plans demonstrating the ability to sustain those revenues.

It was the third component — the Selection Criteria — that attracted the greatest attention from Panthers and most other clubs.

Selection points were awarded across six categories:

  • Home crowd numbers
  • Away crowd numbers
  • Competition’s points
  • Home game receipts
  • Sponsorship and other income
  • Profitability

Not every club was required to compete under these Selection Criteria.

Brisbane, Newcastle and Auckland were given exemption, leaving seventeen clubs competing for the remaining eleven places.

There were two further provisos that influenced the process.

Firstly, any club created through the merger of two or more existing clubs would also receive automatic admission to the fourteen-team competition. The deadline for merger submissions was 31 July 1999 — a date that becomes critically important later in this story.

Secondly, there was to be a minimum of six Sydney-based clubs. Of the seventeen clubs still subject to the Selection Criteria, twelve were Sydney clubs. While there was no predetermined list of clubs to disappear, it was obvious that the greatest competition for survival would occur within Sydney.

After studying the Selection Criteria, Panthers pursued two parallel strategies.

The first was to prepare submissions challenging aspects of the Criteria that the club believed were flawed or unfair.

The second was to construct an internal model to estimate where Panthers ranked against the other clubs.

The Modelling

Of the six measured categories, three could be obtained directly from publicly available information – home crowds, away crowds and competition points. A fourth category, home gate receipts, could be estimated with reasonable confidence because it was closely related to attendance figures. The remaining two categories – sponsorship and other income, and profitability – required informed estimates based on the information available.

Points were then allocated according to each club’s ranking in every category, with bonus points applying in some areas.

Although the NRL never published progressive rankings, Panthers developed its own working model using the published Selection Criteria and the best information available at the time.

The following table is reproduced from a report for Panthers management explaining the modelling and its results — it shows the estimated rankings at the end of Season 1998. (Download PDF: Working Paper on NRL Selection Criteria – this is the Panthers working paper produced at the end of Season 1998)

Panthers internal estimate of club criteria rankings at the end of Season 1998

The purpose of the modelling was not to predict the future with certainty. It was more to provide information that might guide decision-making and strategy development leading into the final declaration of the 2000 NRL line-up … the merger deadline of 31 July, 1998 was another critical point in the calendar for which this information could prove useful.

Where did Panthers appear to rank? What categories could Panthers take action to improve? Could those areas realistically be improved?

If no potential improvement could be seen or planned, what strategic options needed to be examined before the 31 July 1999 merger deadline expired?

Despite relying on estimated figures in three categories, the analysis painted a concerning picture.

Panthers appeared to be ranked fifteenth — just below the 14-team cut-off. Significantly significantly the team hold fourteenth position, Balmain, was estimated to be around thirty points ahead. Even allowing for some estimation error, the modelling suggested that Penrith faced the genuine threat of being axed from the top rugby league competition.

The calculations did not stop there.

By the beginning of the 1999 season, the Gold Coast Chargers and Adelaide Rams had left the competition, while St George and Illawarra had merged to form the St George Illawarra Dragons.

Those changes did little to improve Penrith’s position.

Both the folded clubs had been ranked below Panthers, while the St George–Illawarra merger simply created another club guaranteed admission under the merger provisions.

So, the 1999 season began with seventeen clubs competing, four of them already guaranteed a place in the 2000 competition. That left thirteen clubs — nine from Sydney — competing for the remaining ten places.

The following table shows the standings as at Monday 26 July 1999 — after Round 21 of Season 1999 — five days before the merger submissions deadline.

Panthers internal estimate of club rankings after Round 21, 1999 Season (26th July 1999)

At this late stage of the process the modelling still had Penrith in fifteenth position.

However, the gap to fourteenth (Balmain) had been narrowed — from 30 points to 4.6 points. And Norths fortunes had them dropping from eleventh position to thirteenth, a reachable (though difficult) 12.75 points ahead of Penrith.

There were still five rounds of the season to be completed.

BUT …

The day after this table was distributed to Panthers management, Balmain and Western Suburbs announced a joint venture — the Wests Tigers were born and another place was taken.

To be sure, throughout 1998 and 1999 there was speculation about potential mergers, so this wasn’t a surprise. So, Penrith now had to close a gap of 12.75 points on North Sydney — given their slide and Penrith’s gathering momentum, there was hope.

However, no internal analysis could predict the final outcome. Some financial measures remained estimates and therefore likely had errors, more mergers could change the landscape and the NRL still retained discretion in applying the Criteria.

Nevertheless, the modelling consistently pointed to the same conclusion.

The Penrith Panthers were vulnerable.

The significance of the Panthers modelling and their companion working documents is not with their accuracy.

Their importance is that they demonstrate commitment by Panthers management to ensuring information was available to maintain their evidence-based approach to decision-making. It was not reacting to to rumours or speculation despite the fact that some influential people were.

Panthers had constructed a detailed assessment of its position using the published Selection Criteria and the best information available at the time. No other club had taken this approach.

That assessment suggested Panthers was outside the projected fourteen-team competition.

Whether the analysis ultimately proved right or wrong is almost secondary.

It explains why management believed the threat was real, why alternative strategies had to be considered before the merger deadline expired, and why simply waiting for the NRL’s final decision was never regarded as a responsible option.

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Counting Crowds to Chase Survival

When the Super League war finally ended, it was conditional.

Twenty clubs would compete in the National Rugby League during 1998 and 1999 before the competition contracted to just fourteen teams for the 2000 season. Which clubs survived would not be determined by tradition, supporter loyalty or even on-field performance.

There was an attempt to determine the clubs that would compete from Season 2000 onwards by more objective means. So, a detailed set of selection criteria was created to decide who’d be eliminated.

Although Panthers’ management was pleased the NRL had tried to apply some science to the process, there was great concern that it was compromised right from the start.

The criteria relied upon historical information that could not easily be audited. For example, attendance figures formed an important part of the assessment, yet clubs reported their own crowds and there appeared to be no independent verification.

In fact, Panthers was encouraged, by the game’s governing body during Season 1997, to “boost” the attendances. They resisted but believed the practice was widespread.

Panthers repeatedly challenged aspects of the criteria, arguing that several measures lacked transparency. Panthers raised its concerns privately and directly with the NRL rather than through the media.

The attitude within Panthers was to formally advise the authorities of the Club’s concerns about serious flaws in the criteria, alerting them that they could easily be challenged. The internal emphasis on evidence, analysis and measurement was applied to this problem — and although there was no solution in sight, the management and Board at least had a solid understanding of the challenges.

That philosophy gave birth to one of the more unusual projects undertaken during the fight for survival.

A War of Words

The immediate catalyst arrived in early May 1998.

Sydney City (The Roosters) chairman Nick Politis publicly criticised Penrith — labelling the Panthers, and Canterbury, “basket cases”. The restrained approach consciously adopted by Cowan had been interpreted as weakness.

Not wanting to exchange insults in the public arena, a decision was made to present evidence that would serve as a “return shot” at the Roosters while alerting Panthers fans that the Club’s public silence did not mean they were sitting on their hands.

Importantly, it also would send a message to the NRL, the other clubs and the general public about the fragility of the measures that were being used to cull clubs.

This was an opportunity for Cowan and the Panthers to go public with evidence demonstrating one of the significant flaws in the criteria.

Cameras Instead of Opinions

The Roosters were scheduled to play the Auckland Warriors at the Sydney Football Stadium on Saturday 2 May. Panthers management team knew the crowd would be relatively small and also had a strong suspicion that their official crowd would be inflated.

So, photographer Neil Billington was dispatched to the Sydney Football Stadium with the task of photographing every section of the stadium. Neil’s media accreditation allowed him to take the photos from the field area and his instruction was to take the photos 5 minutes into the second half when attendees would have returned to their seats.

The resulting enlarged photographs allowed individual seating bays to be examined and the spectators counted manually. The counting was done by members of the Panthers management and marketing teams — sometimes with magnifying glasses deployed. Each count was verified against the others.

The conclusion was clear, the official attendance announced by the Roosters significantly overstated the number of spectators actually present.

The photographs became the basis of a dramatic Daily Telegraph back-page story under the headline “Where Are They?”, accompanied by enlarged photographs of the stadium and detailed comparisons between the official crowd and Panthers’ own calculations.

Daily Telegraph — click image to read article. The article continues here.

What began as an off-the-cuff comment aimed at belittling the Penrith Panthers, became a public debate about the integrity of the selection criteria.

The Project Expands

Encouraged by the clarity of the photographic evidence, Panthers broadened the exercise. Panthers Media & Communications Manager, Rob Weaver, directed Neil Billington’s work.

Contrary to later recollections that suggested almost every match was photographed, the research concentrated on two or three Sydney-based games each round, particularly those involving clubs competing with Penrith for the final places under the criteria. The process was painstaking. Every photograph had to be examined manually and individual spectators counted section by section.

The objective was not to embarrass rival clubs.

It was to determine whether attendance figures—the very figures helping decide which clubs lived and which disappeared—were reliable. In fact Cowan also required at least one Panthers home game to be given the same attention.

According to Roger Cowan, the accumulated material may eventually have supported a legal challenge if Panthers found themselves excluded from the competition. He never regarded it as a particularly attractive strategy, but believed the circumstances justified examining every possible option.

Roger and Nick Declare Peace

Within days, the public dispute subsided.

Correspondence between Roger Cowan and Nick Politis helped calm tensions, and both clubs publicly agreed to move on. There was nothing personal about the exchange — both men were doing what they saw as necessary for their clubs.

The underlying issue, however, remained unresolved.

Whether official attendance figures accurately reflected the crowds attending NRL matches was never independently tested.

Daily Telegraph 8 May 1998 — click image to read.

Looking Back

With the benefit of hindsight, the crowd-counting exercise could appear excessive.

Yet it reflected the reality confronting Panthers during 1998.

Management believed the club was sitting outside the fourteen places destined for Season 2000. Every point on the criteria mattered. Every category was scrutinised. While substantial resources were invested in increasing Panthers’ own crowds and commercial performance, management also continued examining the assumptions upon which the criteria rested. At the same time the club quietly but substantially increased the budget for marketing initiatives designed to improve attendances and strengthen its own position.

Ironically, the photographs were never called upon.

When South Sydney later challenged its exclusion from the competition, Panthers’ collection of crowd photographs was not requested. Whether they would ever have carried legal weight remains unknown.

Perhaps that is not their greatest significance.

The Panthers / Roosters “Where Are They” conflict may have been a dispute over attendance figures, but it was evidence of something more important — a management team, led by Roger Cowan, determined and prepared to investigate every possible avenue in the fight to preserve first-grade rugby league in Penrith.

Postscript

Nick Politis added a postscript to the letter he sent Roger Cowan. It said:

I hope all this controversy between our clubs results in a great crowd for you when the Roosters visit the Panthers in Round 18 (July 10-12)!

The attendance at Penrith Stadium for the Rooster’s game was 11,156—around 20 per cent higher than the club’s average home crowd for the 1998 season. Whether the controversy contributed is impossible to know, but the irony was sweet.

Final Note: The fate of the hundreds upon hundreds of photograph prints from those 1998 games? It is said they were burned.

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The Criteria

Part 30 of 70 — Original Chapter: Chapter 10: A Narrow Escape from Football Oblivion

This article forms part of the serialised republication of Panthers, Passion & Politics – The Roger Cowan Years.

Start · Reader’s Guide · All Parts

The existence of two rival competitions created enormous upheaval throughout rugby league. Traditional club rivalries remained, but supporters were now divided between the Australian Rugby League and Super League. Both sides eventually recognised that the conflict was causing immeasurable damage to the game. While rugby league fought its civil war, AFL, rugby union and soccer continued strengthening their positions in New South Wales and Queensland.

Eventually, both organisations accepted that the conflict could not continue. A peace process began and, after lengthy negotiations, agreement was reached. Super League had lasted just one season.

In 1998 and 1999 twenty teams played in the competition, because newly created Super League teams were accommodated with longer established clubs. Everyone agreed that twenty teams were far too many.

Roger Cowan was directly involved in the peace process. For about 12 months before the parties came to terms, he attended meetings with News Limited’s Ian Frykberg, along with representatives of the other two Sydney Super League clubs, trying to come up with a solution.

It was a slow process. Each side knew what they wanted, but they were poles apart. The ARL wanted all its clubs to be included in any national competition. Super League was advocating a limit of twelve teams. Their position was that fewer teams would mean a much better standard of competition. On a financial level, they believed that too many Sydney teams would make it difficult for clubs to gain the necessary support from sponsors and fans to be successful.

In 1997, a compromise was reached. A set of criteria was established, which would be followed to cut teams down to 14 by 2000. According to Cowan, this path was set in concrete. His close involvement in Super League had given him an opportunity to get to know the people who had driven the concept. The fixity of the ceiling has been borne out by a number of people, including NRL CEO David Gallop.1

The criteria system was sold as the fairest way of deciding which clubs would survive. The clubs would be awarded points, based on things such as crowds at both their home and away games, competition points over the previous five years and actual gate receipt dollars from home games. They would also be judged on sponsorship and other income, and on their overall profitability. Longevity, tradition and emotion just did not come into it. Nor did junior league, which was one of Penrith’s strengths.

Despite repeated objections, Panthers was unable to secure any significant change to the criteria.They continued to fight against the system, believing it was biased on several levels. They sent submissions to the NRL claiming that because some of the criteria were retrospective, the figures were not auditable. It also became obvious that some clubs were fudging their crowd numbers to help boost their chances.

A criticism of Penrith by the chairman of the Easts club was aired in the media, and sparked a Panther strategy to photograph the crowds at other grounds. The first photographs were taken at Easts’ next home game after the criticism was published. The images allowed the crowd to be easily counted – there were less than 3,000 in the ground. Easts claimed a crowd of more than 5,000.

The clarity of the photographs convinced the club to expand the project and photograph the crowds at nearly every game at Sydney venues2 — but especially at the games played by clubs vying for the bottom few spots under the criteria. There was convincing evidence that most clubs were falsifying crowd numbers. Cowan says the figures may have been useful in mounting some kind of last ditch stand on the grounds that the selection criteria would not stand up in court. He says it was a rather negative strategy, with little chance of success, but they were desperate times.

The Panthers’ crowd-counting exercise became one of the more unusual episodes of the fight for survival. Read more Beyond the Book — Counting Crowds to Chase Survival.

In parallel with the photo campaign, the club spent around half a million dollars to market the game to boost its profile and its crowds.3

It was a surprise to Panthers’ management team that South Sydney never called on those photographs during their efforts to be readmitted to the competition. Their legal advisors could evidently see no value and perhaps indicating that it would have been an unsuccessful strategy for Panthers to pursue. No one knows for sure – it was never tested – but it is a fact that Souths eventually lost their case in court.

Penrith had twelve months to compete for points. Two clubs – the Hunter Mariners and the South Queensland
Crushers – had already dipped out, leaving 18 teams vying for 14 places. 

Management’s concern was not based on instinct or pessimism. Week after week, the numbers continued pointing in the same direction.

Tracking Panthers’ position against the selection criteria became the responsibility of marketing manager Max Cowan, whose background included a major in Mathematical Statistics.

Throughout the process, Panthers’ management was surprised by comments from some clubs suggesting they neither understood the criteria nor knew where they stood. It was an issue given high priority in management strategies at Panthers. Every week the club compared its situation with the relative positions of the clubs ranking lowest on the criteria.

Max Cowan remembers:

We were very aware of the commitment and determination to have a fourteen-team competition. Having been right there through the conciliation process, I knew there was absolutely no room for complacency.

Some Clubs had already announced mergers, but at Penrith it was not a word anyone wanted to mention. We also knew that any club considering a merger with us would start negotiation with an advantage because it was obvious where we stood in the criteria ladder. As a management team, we had to look for options. It would be a disaster if we sat on our hands until a decision to cut Panthers was announced. By that time it would be too late to look for a fall-back position.

Part of the reason for our low place in the criteria was the very low attendances at our home games. We had lost our major sponsor when we went into Super League and had been unable to find a replacement. So immediately we were in trouble in two of six categories.Part of the reason for our low place in the criteria was the very low attendances at our home games. We had lost our major sponsor when we went into Super League and had been unable to find a replacement. So immediately we were in trouble in two of six categories.

It was obvious to management that we were running a very poor sixteenth in a race where only fourteen would be selected.  We had to move up two places or have no team in the competition for the following year.  We only had one year to do it. Realistically we knew we would need a miracle. It would be impossible to achieve.

At the very last minute, and in a most unexpected way, we would get our miracle!

Continue Reading: The Criteria — When Survival Became a Numbers Game examines the NRL Selection Criteria and the internal working papers Panthers developed to estimate the club’s position in the race for admission to the fourteen-team competition.

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  1. Inside Panthers there were always processes engaged to inform decision-making. While “gut-feel” was respected it could only ever be part of a more rational approach. Management submissions to the Board were always anchored by by evidence gathered and analysed — especially where decisions had to made in an environmentt of uncertainty. This was probably never more evident than when it came to determining what was happening, and what could or should happen in Rugby League.
    ↩︎
  2. “Nearly every game” is not quite right — perhaps nearly every game in Sydney would be more accurate. We did conduct this research at 2-3 games each round. It was a nightmare to “count the crowd”, if only we had good scanning capability back then. Anyway, we did enough to understand exactly how much Sydney clubs were inflating their attendances – and it may surprise that the Roosters were not the biggest offenders.
    ↩︎
  3. The spend mentioned here was not publicised — in fact, it was known only to a few people — and it is another strong piece of evidence that Roger Cowan was leading a team making every effort to maintain Penrith Panthers as a stand-alone team. This effort did not diminish the responsibility to keep examining all possible outcomes. ↩︎

← Part 29 · All Parts · Part 31→

Commentary and Contributions

Super League — The Panthers Move

Part 29 — Joining Super League begins with a deceptively simple statement:

“In May 1995 Panthers had resolved to leave the Australian Rugby League to join Super League…”

Read in isolation, it almost sounds like an ordinary administrative decision. In reality it followed months of uncertainty, strategic analysis and one of the most turbulent periods in rugby league history.

It would be easy for a reader to miss the nuance and significance behind that statement — it sounds almost as simple as resolving to change the club’s soft drink supplier.

The opening phrase is followed up with a hint that this was, in fact, a major decision and noting that Super League was a new competition established by News Limited.

Many simplify the establishment of this new competition as an attempt by Murdoch to attain the broadcast rights of rugby league for his pay television platform, Foxtel. This was true. Kerry Packer’s Consolidated Press held those rights but they were not being used — and it was commonly believed that the Packer deal did not represent the true value of the game.

It’s worth briefly doing a quick history — to take us up to that point in May 1995 when the Penrith Panthers made their resolution to join Super League.

Just over a year before Penrith’s resolution, in April 1994, John Ribot (Chief Executive Officer, Brisbane Broncos) sent Ken Cowley (Chief Executive, News Ltd) a report outlining the concept of a new structure for rugby league in Australia. This was followed up in May 1994 with discussions of the concept with some leading players.

By August 1994 News Ltd had moved well beyond an idea. It had developed an outline for an entirely new national competition. The main points of this outline were:

  • To establish an elite national competition (including New Zealand) between 12 privately owned teams. Up to 4 of these teams to be owned by News Ltd.
  • Superleague Ltd would get revenue from sponsorship, free-to-air and pay television rights, gate receipts and merchandising. New Ltd would receive a 15% management fee and the profit shared amongst the 12 clubs.
  • The 12 clubs would be:
    • 4 based in Sydney
    • 4 continuing teams — Brisbane, Canberra, Newcastle and Auckland
    • New teams in Perth, Adelaide and Melbourne

The greatest challenge was reducing eleven Sydney clubs (plus Illawarra) to four Sydney franchises. News Ltd proposed grouping clubs into sets of three and inviting them to jointly own a single Super League franchise.

For example: Wests, Parramatta, and Penrith could be grouped together and offered a franchise. Ownership would be split evenly between those clubs taking up the offer. The owner of the old club eg Penrith Rugby League Club Ltd would be entitled to 50% of its share of the new club, the other 50% would be offered directly to members.

Over the remaining months of 1994 there was considerable media speculation and News Ltd and ARFL Ltd executives held private discussions.

Following those discussions, Ken Arthurson (ARFL Ltd Chairman) and John Quayle (ARFL CEO) issued agreements to each of the 20 existing club aimed at securing their loyalty to the ARL for the 5 season starting 1995. All 20 clubs signed these agreements by November 1994.

On 6th February 1995 News Ltd presented their proposal to the ARL — offering the ARL positions on the Super League Board as well as the ongoing rights to administer various rugby league programs.

On that same day Kerry Packer addressed the 20 clubs declaring his ownership of the broadcasting rights (free-to-air and pay television) until the year 2000. Part of this address was a threat to sue any club that joined a Super League competition. A short time later in February 1995 all 20 club signed another agreement — the so-called Loyalty Agreements — reinforcing those signed 4 months earlier.

Packer’s declaration made one thing abundantly clear. The dispute was no longer simply about rugby league administration. Rugby league had become the battleground in a much larger corporate struggle over broadcasting, telecommunications and pay television. Robert Gottliebson in an Australian Financial review article in April 1996 suggested this was a battle where $7 billion dollars was at stake.

Packer’s declaration made one thing abundantly clear. The dispute was no longer simply about rugby league administration. Rugby league had become the battleground in a much larger corporate struggle over broadcasting, telecommunications and pay television. Robert Gottliebson in an Australian Financial review article in April 1996 suggested this was a battle where $7 billion dollars was at stake.

By late March 1995, after having their momentum slowed by the reaction of Packer, the ARL and the club, News Ltd resolved to press on. In their eyes they had three strategic choices as shown in the table from Super League Case Study a 2003 research paper for Victoria University written by Robert D, McDonald.

News Ltd elected to take the third approach and start a “rebel competition”.

Their attack was on two fronts:

  1. In late March, early April News Ltd launched an aggressive and clandestine campaign — a ”blitzkrieg” — to sign players and coaches for the rebel league.
  2. Legal action commenced challenging the validity of the two agreements clubs had signed in November 1994 and February 1995.

The early targets for Super League were Brisbane, Canberra, Auckland and Canterbury. When news broke that players and coaches from these four clubs had signed with Super League, there was a flurry of signing activity from both Super League and the ARL.

Neither side approached the Penrith Panthers.

Here’s how the Super League clubs fell:

29 March — Canterbury-Bankstown Bulldogs. Key players signed contracts. Two day later an 1st April, Bulldogs CEO Peter Moore resigned his position on the Board of the NSWRL after aligning the club with Super League.

1 April — Brisbane Broncos. This is the date the Broncos defection broke publicly.  Broncos CEO, John Ribot, left the Broncos to become CEO of Super League at around the same time.

1-2 April — Cronulla- Sutherland Sharks. The Sharks’ players were signed after playing the Western Reds in Perth on 31st March.

2 April — Auckland Warriors. The players signed on this date. Coach John Monie had signed late in March. The Board signed the club to Super League on 20th April.

2-3 April — Canberra Raiders. Following the news breaking on April Fool’s day, most of Canberra’s high profile roster signed.

Early April — Western Reds and North Queensland Cowboys.

During all this activity and publicity there were no communications, offers or invitations for teh Penrith Panthers — from either the ARL or Super League.

The management team at Panthers was very concerned by the silence and paid close attention to every piece of information that could be found about what was happening on both sides of the battle. A comprehensive critical analysis of the situation facing Panthers was undertaken — despite the fact reliable information was scant.

The analysis process was steered by Outcomes Thinking. Rather than beginning with today’s problems, Outcomes Thinking began by defining what success would look like several years into the future. (See Beyond the Book: Education by Experience.)

The highest-level outcome was simply:

“In the year 2000 Panthers is competing in the highest-level rugby league competition.”

Our first step towards survival was to ensure that at least one of the two sides were interested in having Panthers in their competition.

Super League represented the best opportunity to create that interest — among the reasons for this conclusion was that their team list, to date, only included two Sydney-based clubs, Canterbury-Bankstown and Cronulla-Sutherland.

There was also a strong belief Panthers had a compelling case that News Ltd had not yet fully appreciated — while the ARL had had many years to understand the strengths of the Penrith club.

Cowan requested a meeting with Ken Cowley and John Ribot. At that meeting he let them know Panthers hadn’t made any decisions about its future and that we’d be an important club to either Super League or the ARL. In particular, rugby league in Penrith had strong financial backing from the largest licensed club and it also ran junior rugby league with the strongest participation anywhere in the country.

The meeting achieved its immediate objective. Super League, which until then had shown no interest in Penrith, quickly reassessed the club’s strategic value. Negotiations followed and an agreement was reached within days.

That brings us back to the opening of Part 29, where the Penrith Panthers formally resolved to become the eighth club to join Super League.

Continue Exploring the Super League Story

These companion Historical Context articles examine different aspects of Panthers’ decision to join Super League:

  • The Real Money Fight — The corporate battle that lay behind the Super League War.
  • When Panthers Faced the Community — How Panthers’ decision affected its members, supporters and the wider Penrith community.
  • The Panthers Move — How the Penrith Panthers came to join the new competition.

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Football Club · Conflict · Financial Management

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Joining Super League

Part 29 of 70 — Original Chapter: Chapter 10: A Narrow Escape from Football Oblivion

This article forms part of the serialised republication of Panthers, Passion & Politics – The Roger Cowan Years.

Start · Reader’s Guide · All Parts

In May 1995 Panthers had resolved to leave the Australian Rugby League to join Super League, the new competition being established by Rupert Murdoch’s multi-national corporation News Limited. It had been one of the most difficult decisions the Club had faced.1 Cowan had spent months analysing the situation with both Board and management before a consensus recommendation was finally put to the directors.

Not long before the decision was made, he was still hoping the problem would go away. Long-time Parramatta CEO, Denis Fitzgerald, remembers Cowan standing up at a CEO function at Souths Juniors, speaking passionately about ‘putting up the barriers to News Limited’.

Within a week he’d gone to Super League. I have to say I lost some degree of confidence in Roger after that particular situation.

There was no doubt that Cowan initially supported staying with the ARL and a short time later changed his position — he was nervous about the way things were shaping up and feared that Penrith might miss out completely.  

Coach Phil Gould had asked for a release from his contract with Panthers2 to go to Easts, citing the exciting things that Easts were proposing to do in rugby league. Kerry Packer was putting pressure on clubs to stay loyal to the ARL, but was not offering anything specific, and he had a contract with the ARL to protect.

There were rumours that Packer and a few clubs, including Easts and Manly, were involved in a plan to cull some clubs in order to make a stronger and more profitable competition.3 The rumours fitted with Gould’s statements when he asked for a release but there was never any real evidence to support the rumours.

But rumours often travelled faster than fact during this period — it was increasingly difficult for clubs to distinguish genuine intelligence from speculation.

Packer appeared to have the TV rights tied up for a ridiculously low price and something was in the wind. Fewer teams in the competition would give the remaining teams a bigger slice of the TV revenue. A higher standard of competition would increase the TV value.

First-hand experience had left Cowan with the suspicion that there would no hesitation in cutting clubs that were outside the clique and considered expendable. For him it was another case of risk management. The first step in risk management is to identify the risk. In this case there was a chance that both media organisations, headed by Packer and Murdoch, were both planning how to maximise the commercialisation of Rugby League.

What was the risk to Penrith?

It seemed highly likely that both organisations would want a 12-team competition. They would also want a National Competition including Perth, Adelaide, Melbourne, New Zealand, Newcastle, Brisbane, even North and South Queensland.   It followed that some Sydney clubs would be dropped.   Both groups would already know which teams they wanted in an elite competition.

Neither side had shown any interest in approaching Penrith.

Considering the connections, it was impossible to think Manly or Easts would lose out. Parramatta and St George would seem to be certainties and that might leave only one spot for another Sydney club.

As it turned out, fewer teams was exactly what the Murdoch side wanted. There was never any evidence of any plans by the other side to drop Sydney teams.4 The rumours were never substantiated, but the value of the TV rights was later proved to be more than twenty times what Packer had contracted to pay.

Cowan recalls it was a difficult time.

There was no way of knowing what was happening behind the scenes and the departure of Phil Gould had built a feeling of uncertainty in my mind about the future of the game. I felt that something was going on. I started to think about how we would handle worst case scenarios, and the worst-case possibility was that the two sides would get together and form an elite National Competition of 12 teams. All the other teams would then be relegated to a supporting competition. On all the evidence I could see, the risk of Penrith being one of those relegated teams was very high indeed.

When the two media giants started shaping up to each other it was obvious that Panthers was not a high priority for either of them. It was a worrying time and I started to feel that we had to consider our position carefully and urgently.

All the clubs that had so far joined Super League had been approached by News Limited. Penrith had not. Cowan went to News and put the case that the new competition needed Penrith.

David Gallop, CEO of the new National Rugby League [NRL] remembers that Panthers was the last Sydney club to join.

Roger looked pretty carefully at the ramifications of joining or not. It took him longer to decide.

Cowan became a prominent player in the world of Super League. He was on the board, and chaired its meetings during what became known as the Super League Wars.

He was also invited to be on the international Super League board. In that capacity he attended an international board meeting in Paris, along with representatives from Australia, New Zealand, France, England, South Africa, USA and Pacific Islands. Cowan says this experience gave him an excellent opportunity to get to know the people who were driving Super League, including News Limited executives. 

Super League was due to commence in 1996 with ten teams, but a Federal Court ruling delayed its launch. Instead, a traditional ARL competition was played while the legal battle continued. At the end of 1996 the Federal Court ruled in favour of Super League, allowing the rival competition to proceed in 1997 alongside the ARL. Australian rugby league was now heading into one of the most turbulent periods in its history.

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  1. For readers seeking historical background to the emergence of Super League and Panthers’ decision to join the new competition, see the three realted Historical Context articles The Panthers Move ; The Real Money Fight ; and When Panthers Faced the Community
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  2. This had happened in the middle of the 1994 ARL Season. I think the Souths v Penrith at the SFS on 17th June 1994 was Gould’s last as Penrith coach. We lost that game 26-18 after being well down at half-time. Several players remarked that Gould’s half-time address was uncharacteristically one of resignation – they were puzzled by it.
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  3. One of the catalysts for those rumours was a large offer being made to Canberra lock Brad Clyde, which would have torpedoed salary cap limits. Of course, these sorts of accusations fly through the rugby league world.
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  4. There weren’t rumours about an elite ARL competition after Murdoch made his strike – at that time they were intent on staving off the raid from Murdoch. Before Murdoch struck, there were rumours about clubs opening their chequebooks in anticipation of a big change to the competition. ↩︎

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