Super League — The Panthers Move

Part 29 — Joining Super League begins with a deceptively simple statement:

“In May 1995 Panthers had resolved to leave the Australian Rugby League to join Super League…”

Read in isolation, it almost sounds like an ordinary administrative decision. In reality it followed months of uncertainty, strategic analysis and one of the most turbulent periods in rugby league history.

It would be easy for a reader to miss the nuance and significance behind that statement — it sounds almost as simple as resolving to change the club’s soft drink supplier.

The opening phrase is followed up with a hint that this was, in fact, a major decision and noting that Super League was a new competition established by News Limited.

Many simplify the establishment of this new competition as an attempt by Murdoch to attain the broadcast rights of rugby league for his pay television platform, Foxtel. This was true. Kerry Packer’s Consolidated Press held those rights but they were not being used — and it was commonly believed that the Packer deal did not represent the true value of the game.

It’s worth briefly doing a quick history — to take us up to that point in May 1995 when the Penrith Panthers made their resolution to join Super League.

Just over a year before Penrith’s resolution, in April 1994, John Ribot (Chief Executive Officer, Brisbane Broncos) sent Ken Cowley (Chief Executive, News Ltd) a report outlining the concept of a new structure for rugby league in Australia. This was followed up in May 1994 with discussions of the concept with some leading players.

By August 1994 News Ltd had moved well beyond an idea. It had developed an outline for an entirely new national competition. The main points of this outline were:

  • To establish an elite national competition (including New Zealand) between 12 privately owned teams. Up to 4 of these teams to be owned by News Ltd.
  • Superleague Ltd would get revenue from sponsorship, free-to-air and pay television rights, gate receipts and merchandising. New Ltd would receive a 15% management fee and the profit shared amongst the 12 clubs.
  • The 12 clubs would be:
    • 4 based in Sydney
    • 4 continuing teams — Brisbane, Canberra, Newcastle and Auckland
    • New teams in Perth, Adelaide and Melbourne

The greatest challenge was reducing eleven Sydney clubs (plus Illawarra) to four Sydney franchises. News Ltd proposed grouping clubs into sets of three and inviting them to jointly own a single Super League franchise.

For example: Wests, Parramatta, and Penrith could be grouped together and offered a franchise. Ownership would be split evenly between those clubs taking up the offer. The owner of the old club eg Penrith Rugby League Club Ltd would be entitled to 50% of its share of the new club, the other 50% would be offered directly to members.

Over the remaining months of 1994 there was considerable media speculation and News Ltd and ARFL Ltd executives held private discussions.

Following those discussions, Ken Arthurson (ARFL Ltd Chairman) and John Quayle (ARFL CEO) issued agreements to each of the 20 existing club aimed at securing their loyalty to the ARL for the 5 season starting 1995. All 20 clubs signed these agreements by November 1994.

On 6th February 1995 News Ltd presented their proposal to the ARL — offering the ARL positions on the Super League Board as well as the ongoing rights to administer various rugby league programs.

On that same day Kerry Packer addressed the 20 clubs declaring his ownership of the broadcasting rights (free-to-air and pay television) until the year 2000. Part of this address was a threat to sue any club that joined a Super League competition. A short time later in February 1995 all 20 club signed another agreement — the so-called Loyalty Agreements — reinforcing those signed 4 months earlier.

Packer’s declaration made one thing abundantly clear. The dispute was no longer simply about rugby league administration. Rugby league had become the battleground in a much larger corporate struggle over broadcasting, telecommunications and pay television. Robert Gottliebson in an Australian Financial review article in April 1996 suggested this was a battle where $7 billion dollars was at stake.

Packer’s declaration made one thing abundantly clear. The dispute was no longer simply about rugby league administration. Rugby league had become the battleground in a much larger corporate struggle over broadcasting, telecommunications and pay television. Robert Gottliebson in an Australian Financial review article in April 1996 suggested this was a battle where $7 billion dollars was at stake.

By late March 1995, after having their momentum slowed by the reaction of Packer, the ARL and the club, News Ltd resolved to press on. In their eyes they had three strategic choices as shown in the table from Super League Case Study a 2003 research paper for Victoria University written by Robert D, McDonald.

News Ltd elected to take the third approach and start a “rebel competition”.

Their attack was on two fronts:

  1. In late March, early April News Ltd launched an aggressive and clandestine campaign — a ”blitzkrieg” — to sign players and coaches for the rebel league.
  2. Legal action commenced challenging the validity of the two agreements clubs had signed in November 1994 and February 1995.

The early targets for Super League were Brisbane, Canberra, Auckland and Canterbury. When news broke that players and coaches from these four clubs had signed with Super League, there was a flurry of signing activity from both Super League and the ARL.

Neither side approached the Penrith Panthers.

Here’s how the Super League clubs fell:

29 March — Canterbury-Bankstown Bulldogs. Key players signed contracts. Two day later an 1st April, Bulldogs CEO Peter Moore resigned his position on the Board of the NSWRL after aligning the club with Super League.

1 April — Brisbane Broncos. This is the date the Broncos defection broke publicly.  Broncos CEO, John Ribot, left the Broncos to become CEO of Super League at around the same time.

1-2 April — Cronulla- Sutherland Sharks. The Sharks’ players were signed after playing the Western Reds in Perth on 31st March.

2 April — Auckland Warriors. The players signed on this date. Coach John Monie had signed late in March. The Board signed the club to Super League on 20th April.

2-3 April — Canberra Raiders. Following the news breaking on April Fool’s day, most of Canberra’s high profile roster signed.

Early April — Western Reds and North Queensland Cowboys.

During all this activity and publicity there were no communications, offers or invitations for teh Penrith Panthers — from either the ARL or Super League.

The management team at Panthers was very concerned by the silence and paid close attention to every piece of information that could be found about what was happening on both sides of the battle. A comprehensive critical analysis of the situation facing Panthers was undertaken — despite the fact reliable information was scant.

The analysis process was steered by Outcomes Thinking. Rather than beginning with today’s problems, Outcomes Thinking began by defining what success would look like several years into the future. (See Beyond the Book: Education by Experience.)

The highest-level outcome was simply:

Our first step towards survival was to ensure that at least one of the two sides were interested in having Panthers in their competition.

Super League represented the best opportunity to create that interest — among the reasons for this conclusion was that their team list, to date, only included two Sydney-based clubs, Canterbury-Bankstown and Cronulla-Sutherland.

There was also a strong belief Panthers had a compelling case that News Ltd had not yet fully appreciated — while the ARL had had many years to understand the strengths of the Penrith club.

Cowan requested a meeting with Ken Cowley and John Ribot. At that meeting he let them know Panthers hadn’t made any decisions about its future and that we’d be an important club to either Super League or the ARL. In particular, rugby league in Penrith had strong financial backing from the largest licensed club and it also ran junior rugby league with the strongest participation anywhere in the country.

The meeting achieved its immediate objective. Super League, which until then had shown no interest in Penrith, quickly reassessed the club’s strategic value. Negotiations followed and an agreement was reached within days.

That brings us back to the opening of Part 29, where the Penrith Panthers formally resolved to become the eighth club to join Super League.


Continue Exploring the Super League Story

These companion Historical Context articles examine different aspects of Panthers’ decision to join Super League:

  • The Real Money Fight — The corporate battle that lay behind the Super League War.
  • When Panthers Faced the Community — How Panthers’ decision affected its members, supporters and the wider Penrith community.
  • The Panthers Move — How the Penrith Panthers came to join the new competition.

Related Topics


Related Themes

Football Club · Conflict · Governance · Financial Management


To receive new Parts and occasional project updates by email, you may subscribe below.

Readers who hold recollections, documents, or material relevant to this history are welcome to contribute via the Commentary & Contributions page.

Project Updates

Receive updates when new parts are published.