Political Ambition

A removed section from the original Chapter 11: A Strange Response to a Lifeline. The following section presents one theory Roger Cowan developed as he tried to understand decisions that had never fully made sense to him. It is an invitation into his thinking on the puzzle and should be read as his interpretation rather than an established historical conclusion.

Relatively speaking, John Bateman was a figure in the public eye in Penrith. In 1993, Sydney won the right to stage the Olympic Games in 2000.  Just over a year later, John Bateman was elected to Penrith council. Soon after that he was appointed to fill a vacancy on the Penrith Rugby League Club board. At first glance these events appear unrelated. To Roger Cowan, however, they gradually formed part of a much larger picture.

Bateman, a member of the Labor Party, ran as an independent against Pat Sheehy – an endorsed Labor candidate. As a result, Bateman was expelled from the Party. Pat Sheehy is a long-time Penrith councillor. He believes there is little doubt that Bateman’s great ambition at the time was to be mayor at the time of the Olympics.

By all accounts, Bateman did an excellent job in that position.

Penrith councillor Jackie Greenow said the Olympics were a wonderful opportunity for Penrith, and Bateman was a good choice at the time.

John is a sporting nut, and he did an outstanding job representing council, Penrith and the entire community. He was meeting with dignitaries such as Princess Anne and Juan Antonio Samaranch, and he put in an enormous amount of work.

Roger Cowan agrees. ‘John Bateman was one of the best mayors we ever had’, he says.

While Pat Sheehy questions Cowan’s judgement on this point, he says ‘Other people could have done it, but probably not with the pizzazz that John Bateman did.’

For many years, mayors of Penrith had been restricted to a one-year term, following a ten-year stint by one mayor in the 70s. After Bateman had served his one year in 1999, he would normally have stepped aside for someone else.

Pat Sheehy explains.

John Bateman became mayor when he did simply because he had the numbers, and it was the year before the Olympics. There was a full council election in September 1999, and the Labor party effectively gained control. But the party decided that it was in the city’s best interest for John to continue as mayor in 2000, if that’s what he wanted to do, because of all the lead-up work he’d been involved in, and all the things that would carry over from September 1999 to the Olympics in September 2000. The other thing was that at that time, there was no-one else on council that could have done the job as well as he did it.

In my mind, there is absolutely no doubt that this is what John wanted more than anything in the world.

The events surrounding the emerging conflict in the Panthers boardroom naturally caused Cowan to search for reasons.

Over time I came to suspect that the real problem with signing it was that the media would start speculating again about ‘done deals’, for the purpose of grabbing headlines. It struck me that publicity indicating Panthers was about to merge with Parramatta, no matter how untrue, was not in the interests of either Bateman or Evans. With council elections looming and a decision to be made about who would be mayor in the Olympics year, it was probably the last thing they would want.

Statements that they believed signing the letter would have resulted in a merger leave a big question mark. How could it have ever led to a merger if the Five were against it? They had the majority vote.

I tried at the time to come up with an alternative to my growing belief that this whole rugby league issue, right from the time it was reported that Panthers was at serious risk, had been about political ambitions.

Their refusal to discuss strategies for reducing the risk generated powerful negative feelings in me. The feeling that it was all about politics and not about Panthers became a deep-seated festering sore in my psyche, even though I had no way of knowing if I was correct. It was this suppressed anger and frustration that caused me to explode in meetings from time to time.

Even in retrospect, I struggle to clean such a cynical view from my mind. I realise that if my interpretation had been correct, it would mean the catalyst for the enormous cost over the last few years to Panthers and to me had nothing to do with rugby league.

I can see one major flaw in my cynicism. To be a complete theory it would need an explanation of Mulock’s involvement. Having agonised over this one question for six or seven years, I could not find any explanation that made sense.

There is no solid evidence. The more objective view of a reader who was not closely involved may help find more generous conclusions.


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Education by Experience

A removed section from the original Chapter 9: An Urgent Need for Research and Change.

IN THE COURSE of more than a year and a half of research and writing for this book, I conducted a large number of interviews. For obvious reasons, more than one of those was with Roger Cowan. Many of our discussions focused on the way things were done at Panthers.

On one occasion, I asked a very specific question. How did that little club evolve into the half billion dollar enterprise that is Panthers today? What made the difference, what did he see as the most important parts of the management philosophy during his 40 years at the helm?

It was an important question, and he wanted plenty of time to consider. Eventually, we decided that it would work better if Roger answered it in his own words.

It is difficult to answer this question because 40 years is such a long time. Many changes have occurred along the way — in knowledge, attitudes, technology, even the way the industry is regulated. In the earlier days  I used a calculator for payroll.

To multiply by seven, for example, we turned a handle seven times. Accounting and stock control were all done manually. The management tools available today demand a much different approach to the use of management time and the expectations of administrative productivity. In many ways, management change has been driven by the changing environment.

The other difficulty I have in answering the question is that I was always inclined to try something new if it looked good. Some things were effective for a while, and made a significant difference at the time, but failed to see the long distance. Some became permanent influences and some failed completely. Some seem too small to mention, yet they held a lot of significance for me.

Applying a very strong filter, I came up with what I considered to be the three most important influences. I am sure it would be an interest­ing debate if members of our management teams were asked the same question. But there is a common thread that runs through the three I have chosen. Each one has quite a lot to do with the need to manage evolu­tionary change rather than merely cope with it. We tend to cope with the results of evolution in our private lives, but business requires a different level of thinking.

Thinking in Outcomes. The success of the human race has depended on the ability to take in information and make rapid decisions. Imagine if our hunter and gatherer forefathers had held meetings to evaluate the knowledge they had gleaned from their observations and then debated what action should be taken. They would have died of starvation or been eaten, and we would not be here to write about it. The natural decision making process for humans is still the same. Our senses collect informa­tion, feed it into our brains in an amazingly short time, and this central processor quickly decides on the options and tells us what to do. Just as well we have that power. You see a car hurtling towards you, out of control, and there is no time to hold a brain storming session to work out how to survive.

Quick thinking is important to us as individuals. My theory, though, is that when it becomes the predominant thinking style used in business, it is often inappropriate and can be downright dangerous. Looking back, I think I harped and nagged about this principle more than anything else in management meetings and training sessions. I was never better than partially successful. It is actually quite difficult to break out of the natural thinking style. It requires discipline and technique. And as soon as you relax the discipline, the natural way of thinking takes over again.

The difference between quick thinking and thinking in outcomes is demonstrated in the following example. The Security Manager puts a proposal to a meeting: there has been an increase in behaviour problems in the club, and the security staff should be increased to deal with the situation. Others in the meeting, respecting the expertise of the Security Manager and seeing the logic of his suggestion, support the proposal. The Finance Manager agrees that the extra cost is affordable. A quick vote and it is all done.

But someone skilled in Outcome Thinking says, “Hold up there. Let’s first agree on what we are trying to achieve. Is it just to cope with increased behaviour problems, or is there more to it?”

The best way to answer that question is by imagining another meeting, some point in the future -say three months ahead. You sit in that meeting, and ask, “What evidence can we find today that proves we made a great decision three months ago? Not just a good decision, but a great one?”

One person might say there are more people visiting the club now than there were three months ago. That proves it was a good decision. Another might suggest that the cost of security has decreased. Others might add that there are fewer incidents of bad behaviour now, the people causing the problems three months ago have gone, there have been no negative stories in the newspapers, and so on.

The challenge is now much different. It is no longer about coping with increased behaviour problems by increasing costs. A great decision would achieve fewer problems, less cost and increased patronage.

The most important debate is about what outcomes the group is willing to support, and what it believes it can achieve. They will usually be much more challenging than expected. When there is an agreed set of outcomes, the next challenge is to find every possible idea for achieving them. That then brings out the creativity in management and usually achieves a better result.

The number -and quality-of ideas might be surprising. In this case it might mean changing the entertainment mix, increasing public relations, zero tolerance in some issues, a different marketing approach, or any number of bright ideas that would never be raised in the quick decision scenario.

The point is that the natural process of quick decision making is the killer of creativity, and often provides solutions to the wrong problems.

Thinking in outcomes ensures that the best goals are set and that they will be creatively pursued. It also encourages creative opposition, and avoids the dangers of ‘groupthink’, where people tend to go along with each other because of respect for expertise or position.

In this situation, you are able to manage the thinking processes, rather than going along with nature.

Values, Beliefs and Culture. Our deep-seated beliefs and values are mostly developed in the very early years. Culture develops from experi­ences, and dictates how people treat each other and expect to be treated. The behaviour in an organisation is a reflection of its culture. The combined beliefs and values of the staff, managers, board, and custom­ers form a rich cultural soup that has to meet the needs of everybody. We see examples every day, and in every part of the world, of the enormous problems caused by clashes of culture, most of which can be traced back to differences in beliefs and values.

Beliefs and values are not impossible to manage. We cannot ask people to change what they believe or how they feel, but we can structure an organisation around the differences. Being aware of the differences allows us to manage them, and achieve a positive culture without the clashes.

Recognition and understanding of values was one of the topics of man­agement training at Panthers. There are many ways of finding out what drives people. When there is better understanding, people work together more harmoniously. There are some good programs and tests available, and most of them are interesting and non-threatening.

One important advantage of setting agreed outcomes is that they define what the group wants to own and achieve in working together. Where there are opposite values, the list will be more limited, but there will still be common purpose.

There is another element in play in the club industry – one that is much less likely to affect other businesses of similar sizes. There is a much stronger board influence on culture, varying significantly from one club to another. Some directors in some clubs enjoy socialising with staff, talking to them during breaks and even – in ways ranging from very subtle to quite demanding – interfering in the way they work. The impact on culture can be profound. Even worse, the influence can be difficult to see until it is entrenched and starts to show up in behaviour.

That is one of the good reasons for clearly separating the responsibili­ties of management from those of directors. A good culture is built on consistency —what is said and done has to be within consistent patterns and plans, and everyone has to be singing the same tune. A good management plan can easily be undermined, quite unknowingly, by directors getting too close to staff and not knowing what the tune is.

The cultures and sub-cultures throughout an organisation will affect the behaviour of people, their satisfaction and productivity. One important subculture is the relationship between board and management. It is the one most difficult to manage. Some of the chapters in this book spell out the type of problems that can arise when it is not well managed.

Panthers workshops involving both management and board always centred on strategic issues. If I had the time over, I would try to interest the directors in joining other workshops that focused on values and culture. In learning to recognise values and understand their impact, everyone could work together to build a shared vision about the cultural objectives of the business. It would not be an easy task, considering that directors often have many other commitments, and the difficulties in getting all the key players together for the time required, but it would be worthwhile.

Evolution and Revolution. Larry Greiner wrote of his theory in 1971, and it was almost 20 years before I discovered it. I wish I had studied it much earlier. It would have helped my understanding of periods of stag­nation and other difficulties.

When a business only has a few employees, the style of management is not as important. The entrepreneurial manager with one assistant and lots of subcontractors can be autocratic and successful. As a business grows and matures, it requires adjustment. Autocracy will not be as effec­tive in a business employing 3,000 people, where the best results come from communication, delegation, participation and good controls. That is not to deny that some successful larger companies are run in a very autocratic fashion. It simply says that Greiner’s research influenced his theory that growth should be handled differently.

There are several stages in the path from small to large, and from young to mature. The needs change through the range of creativity, direction, delegation,  co-ordination and collaboration, each one building on the previous phase. As the business evolves naturally through one stage, pressures start to build almost to bursting point. This causes its own crisis. It is a case of success creating its own problems.

Had I understood the principles much earlier, it would have allowed a smoother transition between the Club’s evolutionary phases. It would probably also have meant a quicker and more effective pathway to what I eventually hoped to achieve — on the democratic ideals of an organisation driven by principles of collaboration. In our case, it was probably more spectacularly noticeable because of the rapid growth of the business over a relatively short period.


Those three principles stand out in my mind because of the impact they had on my thinking. I was influenced about outcomes by reading a great little book on outcomes and performances in my first few years at the Club. I read a lot about culture and did some courses on values and beliefs. In everything you read, you will probably find some gem of wisdom that can improve how you do things. A chance meeting, a brief conversation, a quick word of advice – can plant the tiny seeds that grow into the ideas and concepts that become part of your life.

In my first year at the club I met a director of the City Tattersalls Club in Sydney. One of the things he said that struck a chord in me was that each of us is a totally different person in the eyes of every person who knows us. This had quite an impact on me. It changed not only the way I saw others, but also how I saw myself. We are many, many people living inside the same skin.

In my first year at the Club, I also received some advice from a man named Ken Charlton.

Ken had been a big name in rugby league in the 50s. Around the same time that I started with the Club, he was, if I remember correctly, working as a representative for one of the breweries. He seemed genuinely inter­ested in seeing me make a success of my radical move from teaching to club management. I came to respect him, and when we talked I listened carefully. He told me one day that it is much more effective to ask ques­tions than to make statements. It was simple advice that sounds no more than good common sense. I don’t think that either of us knew just how profound it was at the time. I had an amusing example of its power some years later.

The Club was in the middle of one if its extensions, and I was walking through the work area. We had employed a very clever air conditioning expert, and I wandered up and stood beside him – basically just for a chat. I had no idea at all of what he was doing. I have never been mechanically or technically intelligent. He was explaining some of the work, and I said, purely to show him that I was interested in what he was saying, “Why do we do it like that?”

He stopped for a minute, looked back at the job, and looked at me again. After a pause he said, “You know what? You’re right. That’s not the best way to do it. It would be better if I …

I had asked a dumb question, he mistakenly thought it was an intelligent observation and took it as a challenge to find a better way. Meanwhile, I stood there trying to look as if I really was intelligent. His final disillusionment might come if he reads this book.

But over the years I found that asking questions was important to culture as well as results. Imagine an assistant in the marketing depart­ment prepares a corporate design and presents it to the CEO for approval. The CEO could say, ‘No, I don’t like that. Change the red to purple and make the yellow stronger. Use upper case in the title.’ After the time and effort that has been put into that design, how does the assistant feel about that reaction?

What if the CEO asked questions instead? “Do YOU think the red sends out the message WE want? What if WE tried a bit of purple? How do YOU think that would go?” Plenty of YOU clarifies who still owns the project. Plenty of WE says we are here to work together and help each other.

Questions involving YOU and WE raise the odds in favour of a more motivated assistant, a higher degree of ownership of the design job – and a better design. It is the cultural difference between the organisation being driven autocratically from the top and people collaborating for a better result.

The three main issues I chose are closely linked. They are all about people. Setting outcomes before deciding what to do smooths out values and cultural differences. Some of the essential components of a good, productive culture are well constructed forward plans, logical decisions, and ownership of the plans by all who participated in their making. Outcomes thinking is an important tool.

In some ways the three concepts are a little idealistic. Despite the efforts of a committed management team, we never really reached our own measure of satisfactory. Some sections at Panthers were always closer than others, but we never stopped having to remind people to think in Outcomes. Culture was constantly on the agenda for testing, meas­uring and improvement. And having an organisation fully embrace the Greiner concept of Collaboration is a really challenging dream. Culture and decision-making work in a similar way to systems in a business. Without constant review and discipline, they gradually revert to chaos. What is certain, though, is that we were much closer to those ideals than we would have been had we not been conscious of them, and committed as a team to their pursuit.


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The End of Season Drinks That Weren’t So Cordial

A removed section from the original Chapter 8: A Taste of Injustice.

The Penrith-Parramatta game was the last home game of the 1984 season. If the Panthers won, it would mean a semi-finals appearance for the first time in the Club’s history.

By half-time it was becoming obvious that the game was not going well. During the second half, Cowan walked across and sat with the chairman, Leo Armstrong.

Cowan commented to Armstrong that it was pretty obvious this would be the last game of the season. He suggested to Armstrong that the success of the team should be acknowledged in some way. They — the CEO and Chairman — agreed to invite the players and officials back to the boardroom after the game.

Cowan admits he had not thought the invitation through carefully enough. Because it was a spur of the moment decision, only a few directors knew about it. At the time, though, it did not seem important.

At the start of the next board meeting, managers were asked to leave the room.

Don Ellks says,

It was the first time we had ever been asked to leave. Roger sat for some moments as if deciding what to do. He did leave, but reluctantly. After a while Leo came outside and said the board had moved a vote of no confidence in him, and that John Hewett had been re-elected as chairman.

The perceived slight on the directors who missed out on the after-game drinks had provided enough leverage for JohnHewett to make a grab for the chairman position he still resented losing. Cowan was in a tight spot. Conflict on the board had been effecting decision making since 1983, to the detriment of the Club.

This change would affect the morale of the management team. The turnover of the Club was increasing rapidly, scarcely a day seemed to pass without discussion of new initiatives, and it was vital to avoid any instability.

Sensitive negotiations were taking place to refinance the Club’s loans in a deal that would save the club hundreds of thousands of dollars. The reputation and experience of Leo Armstrong as a bank manager was an advantage – there was obvious respect for him by the negotiating bank.

One faction of the board, led by Armstrong, was supportive of management. As well, Armstrong was an excellent chairman, highly respected in the community, by staff and by the members. The other faction seemed to be driven by Hewett. He was seen as the leader of that faction, but Cowan believed he was being pushed by another director, Murray Clarke. Of late, these two had lost the respect of management, staff and quite a lot of members. In this instance they were not acting in the interests of the Club. Any publicity about the chairman’s removal had the potential to do damage.

Worse for Cowan was that Armstrong was about to be humiliated because he agreed with one of Cowan’s suggestions.

When the board called me back into the meeting, I had already decided that the resolution could do a great deal of damage. The negative publicity, the reaction of the members, the negative impact on the finance negotiations and the unfair impact on Armstrong’s reputation should be avoided at all costs. Importantly, the club’s constitution did not clearly give the Board the power to remove the Chairman and it needed a legal opinion. I refused to return to the meeting unless he was reinstated, or it went back to the members.

Cowan reminded the board that it was unconstitutional to continue the meeting without the company secretary. When they called on Don Ellks to come in to act as secretary, Ellks also refused.

During the following week, Hewett went to Cowan’s office to advise that the board had appointed him chairman. Cowan told him that he believed it was improper to move a vote of no confidence and damage Armstrong’s reputation over such a trivial issue. He told Hewett that the management team would continue to recognise Armstrong as the chairman unless there was compliance with the constitution and members of the club endorsed the vote of no confidence. A stalemate had been reached.

Soon after, two of the directors from the Hewett faction would resign, and a tentative peace would return to the board with Armstrong in the chair. Under the surface though, hostility continued to bubble. Hewett would seek revenge — and eventually get it. ‘The conflict between the two factions had been damaging the Club for years‘, says Cowan. ‘Now war had been declared in no uncertain terms.

The next election, in 1985, was the board’s first ever departure from its traditional practice of presenting itself as one solid unit for re-election. Neither Hewett nor Hubbard were re-elected to the board.

While Hubbard remains ambivalent about the events of those years, he says that Hewett was devastated. It hit him pretty hard, says Hubbard. ‘His health suffered, and I don’t know that he ever really got over it.’


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Rugby League’s Inner Circle

A removed section from the original Chapter 7: The 16 Year Struggle to Streamline Rugby League.

Cowan says that at the time of his campaign for one board, the NSW Rugby League was run by a clique. This was a widely held view within rugby league circles at the time. The General Committee consisted of delegates and vice-presidents from every club – more than 40 delegates attended the monthly meetings. It was extremely unwieldy and inefficient. It is difficult enough for a 15-person board to get to good decisions in reasonable time, says Cowan. He recalls his time on the NSWRL executive in the early seventies.

What’s really funny is that for a while I thought that I was in the clique. We used to meet before every general committee meeting and decide what we were going to support that night. There were about eight of us, and we all thought we were involved in the important decisions.

But I found out later that I was never really “in”. The “in” team was quite small. It was a bit like an archery target – you have the inner and outer circle of the bullseye. So, even though I was on the executive, I was on the outer circle. It took me till 1974 to work it out, and one night I publicly resigned from the executive over a decision they made, but I stayed on the committee as a delegate.

The week after his resignation Cowan crossed paths with Jack Gibson, the coach of Eastern Suburbs, who congratulated Cowan on making a stand. He said a lot of people were sick of the fact that a small group were running the league to suit themselves. The clique still existed in some measure until Super League came on the scene in 1995.

Tom Wilson also remembers the workings of the clique. At the time of the Mulgoa Road
purchase, he was a delegate to the NSWRL. The league was concerned about the bad state of many of the playing fields and was pushing clubs to make improvements.

Back then, the Penrith ground was leased to us by the Department of Lands. For us to commit to spending any large sums of money on doing anything, we would need them to guarantee us something like a forty-year lease. Anyway, there was some talk of having our own playing field on the new land. When I tried to explain all this at a league meeting, the chairman, Kevin Humphreys, accused me – in his inimitable fashion – of hedging. Basically, he said I was bullshitting. I objected and asked for an apology, which I got.

But of course, that was not the end of it. When we all went downstairs for the usual drink after the meeting, I was completely ostracised. The only person who came near me was Peter Moore [former Canterbury CEO]. It was a strong lesson.

Charlie Gibson was widely regarded as part of that inner circle. He was a good friend of Humphreys, and the man that Mackie and the Super Six recommended for the job of rugby league secretary for Penrith.


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Culture — An Early Instance at Panthers

A removed section from the original Chapter 6: Building a Culture — by Accident and Design. This is Roger Cowan’s descirption of the culture of the licensed club in te early days.

The following reflection from Roger Cowan describes how elements of that culture were already taking shape in the early years — often without formal structure.

The importance of managing the culture arose out of the efforts to find better ways of managing Panthers after its rapid growth from 1984 on, and our difficulties coping with it.

Before that, whatever was happening in the culture was happening quite naturally with no thought of planning it. No matter who takes the position of CEO, the culture of the organisation will reflect many of that person’s values, behaviours and beliefs.

The one thing I believed in most strongly was that getting results required hard work and long hours. I think I probably went a little bit overboard, and the family paid the price. But I led the way and before long I had a management team prepared to give a lot of time to chasing the club’s goals.

Don Ellks, Leo Trevena and Bob Donaghy were the key drivers of the business in the early days, and they were prepared to put in whatever time was necessary to make sure they got things done. Leo left after a few years, but Don and Bob were linchpins for many years.

An interesting story shows how recruitment plays a part in building culture in a team. It concerns the promotion of Don Ellks. He came to Panthers as a casual barman, and it was not long before his qualities started to shine through. He was promoted to a supervisory position.

At that time Bob Donaghy and Leo Trevena were the club’s two assistant managers. We needed another assistant to help cover the long hours of operation and Don was suggested. But I was not sure whether he was the sort of person who could handle the hours. I did not want anyone on the management team who would crumble if asked to work long hours, sometimes for a seven-day week. We were a small club and there were a lot of demands.

I asked Bob and Leo to give Don a really tough roster for a couple of months to see how he would handle it. He came through with flying colours and was promoted to assistant manager – where he continued to shine for more than 25 years.

This is a good example of how a culture builds. By that time there were four of us leading the way and you might imagine that the expectations and beliefs of staff was that you would not get far in Panthers if you were not prepared to give a bit extra in time and effort. In those years none of us had ever heard of culture in a business sense but we were building one anyway.

There was another thing I learned in those early days. Most people are more comfortable when they know there are good controls in place. There was a lot of dishonesty in the culture before I arrived – people believing the game was to get what you could without getting caught.

As the controls started to take effect, employees would sometimes very privately give me the tip where something was still going wrong. The culture was changing. The honest people were starting to dominate. They knew that what was happening was wrong and wanted to do something about it, wanted to stop others from getting what they could.

Most people were willing to work together to make the club successful. All they needed was someone to show the way.

Later accounts from those who worked within the Club at the time reinforce this description of the early culture — particularly the expectation that staff would contribute beyond defined roles, and that leadership was demonstrated through action rather than hierarchy.


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The Thomas Paynter Story

A removed section from the original Chapter 6: Building a Culture — by Accident and Design.

At the time of publication (2006), around 25 CEOs of clubs in NSW had spent their ‘formative’ career years at Panthers.

Thomas Paynter is one of those managers.

Now the CEO of Port Macquarie Panthers1, he started at Penrith in 1987, working in the bars, picking up glasses. As he began to work his way up, he was given a couple of opportunities early in the piece, which he says he ‘stuffed up’.

I was lucky enough to be given another chance, and I think that’s why I am here today.

Bathurst was the first of the Panthers amalgamations to be finalised. Paynter was sent there as caretaker for three months, but ended up staying a couple of years, before taking on the job at Port Panthers.

It was a huge learning curve for me. The culture of Penrith was really open. People did their job and knew what was expected of them. Coming into an organisation where there were no systems or procedures in place was very difficult. Everything at Bathurst had been quite dictatorial. People would come up and say, “Well, what should we do?”, and I would answer: “Well, what do YOU think you should do?”  I persevered, and a lot of those people picked up and ran with it.

Coming from the culture of Panthers — with its teams, and systems, that sense of natural ownership — and then walking into the other clubs was like stepping back in time.

Bathurst was a bit of a baptism of fire, especially once I knew I was staying. I had never dealt with a board before, never dealt with the community, or even outside suppliers.

But Roger puts very big shoes on people, so you wear them. The fact that Panthers, and Roger – believe that you can do it — you believe you can too.

Janette Hyde2 is the marketing manager of Port Macquarie Panthers. She is one of the original Port staff and has worked at the club for more than 20 years. Panthers amalgamated with the club in 2002. In a classic example of the way that a culture filters through an organisation, Hyde speaks about the management style of her boss, Thomas Paynter. Her words are almost an echo of the words he used to describe the Cowan management philosophy.

Thomas gets the best out of all of us, because he gives us autonomy, he allows us to grow and use our own initiative. He believes we can do it. Underneath the business thing, which is a very big part of it all, there’s also a strong sense of caring about people.

Thomas Paynter’s journey from bar staff at Penrith to CEO of Port Macquarie Panthers illustrates how the club’s culture of trust, responsibility and opportunity translated into leadership beyond the organisation.


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  1. Thomas left the Panthers organisation in November 2008. He spent a further four years in the club industry before moving into the insurance sector, where he has continued in specialist and leadership roles.
    ↩︎
  2. Janette Hyde retired from Panthers in 2011. She has continued to contribute to the Port Macquarie region through leadership roles in Business Port Macquarie and the Greater Port Macquarie Tourism Association, and was named 2019 Citizen of the Year. ↩︎

Negotiating with Council — The Station St Road Closures

A removed section from the original Chapter 5: Building the Basics — Business Principles and Property. This examines the challenges faced in negotiating with Council over the Station Street site.

Roger reflected that certain individuals within Council held the view — and perhaps the expectation — that he would eventually be taken down a notch or two. To this day one aspect of this attitude irks Cowan, describing it as one of his worst memories.

While others involved in the negotiations may have viewed the issues differently, Roger believed the Club received little recognition for its contribution to the community. In his view, the charges and conditions imposed during the sale and development process reflected a lack of support for what Panthers was attempting to achieve.

I think the Club was treated very unfairly by Council. Before we could start building on Mulgoa Road, we had to sell the Station Street site. Council made it extraordinarily difficult. One of the conflicts related to two roads on the Station Street property. One of them was no more than a line on a map. It had never been a road. But the only way we were going to be able to sell that property was to negotiate with Council. The price Council sought was $850,000 — around a quarter of the total amount the Club expected to receive for the entire property.

I tried everything to get a better deal. I told them of a similar case where a club had been able to negotiate an agreement with its local council to close a road for the nominal sum of $1, as a sign of support for the club.

Our involvement in our community was far greater than that of the other club. For instance, we had previously agreed to a joint venture with Council to build a Police Citizen’s Boys Club in Penrith. It was the first boys club ever built without the need to raise funds from the public. We were sponsoring most sports in the area. On top of this the Club’s work to get Penrith to the elite level of rugby League had dramatically increased the city’s profile. I thought we had earned the right to support from Council, rather than obstruction. The city was benefiting on a number of levels from the work we had done, and it was giving nothing back. In fact it was profiteering from our planning.

I told them what we were planning to do would be a tremendous boost for Penrith. But all they saw were the problems, rather than the advantages.

The roads incident was not the only problem imposed on us by Council over that property sale. Another episode contributed to a very nasty police investigation a few years later.

One of the key issues underlying these negotiations related to what are known as paper roads. Paper roads are sections of land set aside by councils for roads in the future. According to Pat Sheehy:

Council planners had discovered the paper road in earlier negotiations for the property. It meant that Panthers did not own the whole site, with the result that Council said “OK, if you want to buy that land back from us, this is what we’re going to charge. All this happened before I was on council, but as far as Panthers was concerned it was absolutely exorbitant.

Robinsons 1957 Street Directory showing Frederick St ( a “paper road”) between Station & Wooddriff Sts. The other street in the negotiation was Park St.

Cowan said the problems extended beyond the property sale and continued into the approval process for the new site:

Council imposed a per hectare sewerage fee on the property based on the total area of land we owned. We were planning to build the club on an area of about 8 hectares. Most of the land was flood-prone, so you couldn’t build on it anyway. But we were hit with this huge bill, based on 86 hectares.

We had to negotiate to defer the payment, but this also became an issue. Even though we eventually came to an agreement, there are still people on Council who believe that Panthers ripped off the Council over that sewerage fee. Under the circumstances, that’s quite laughable

These issues illustrate the complexity of the negotiations and the differing perspectives that would continue to shape relations between the Club and Council.


Related Topics


Related Themes

Governance · Growth · Board Decisions · Licensed Club · Conflict


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The Bungool Picnic

This is Cowan’s description of what happened when the players were given the news that their pay would be “short”. This was taken directly from the manuscript.

We decided to go ahead with the picnic and pay the players half their contracts in the hope that we would be able to pay more later. When I turned up at the picnic, I found I was the only person from the football committee there. Everyone else, including Cartwright and the club’s president, had suddenly found they were unable to attend. It was up to me to explain to the players.

Most were OK with it, until it came to a player called Billy Tonkin. He was a terrific football player – big, tough, strong – and I’m sitting down. Billy’s next in line, and I say, “Bill, I can only give you half your money.”

Billy growls, “Yeah, Cowan, bullshit! You write my cheque out.”

I say, “Bill, I can only give you half.”

“Write the cheque for the full amount”, says Bill in a very menacing tone, leaning across the table.

The next bloke in the queue is Cec Reddy, who used to play hooker for us. Cec was only slightly built but he was a real pug. He used to box in the ring. Some people used to joke that he should sell advertising on the soles of his shoes.

Cec walks up to Bill and says, “Look, he said he can’t pay you, so leave him alone”. These two proceeded to have a big argument across the picnic area, but in the end, Bill did accept his half pay.

Max’s Notes

The drive to Bungool at Cattai — and back — felt long. The Club’s monthly journal even published directions for members to follow, a reminder of how different travel was at the time.

When I first read Roger’s account, I assumed it referred to the 1964 or 1965 season — certainly before Penrith entered the major competition in 1967. I can remember, even as a child, him returning home frustrated by events at the football club. This felt like one of those occasions, although there were many.

However, the reference to Billy Tonkin complicates that assumption.

Bill Tonkin (pictured right) was signed to Penrith in 1967. He is Player #11 and played in our opening game against Canterbury-Bankstown. Bill played 18 1st grade games in his two seasons (1967-8), scored 2 tries and kicked a goal for a total of 8 points. He was a lock forward who’d previously played for Balmain, Wests, and Souths.

If the player in Roger’s account was indeed Tonkin, the incident must have occurred in either 1967 or 1968 — suggesting it took place after Penrith’s admission to the competition. Alternatively, and almost certainly, the identity of the player has been misremembered.

Either way, the underlying issue remains clear.

The club had committed to player payments it could not meet. Those responsible for managing the football budget failed to address the situation in advance, and were not present when the consequences had to be explained.

Roger, a rookie then, was left to do so alone.


Related Topics


Related Themes

Growth · Governance · Licensed Club


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