Tag: Financial Management

The Cow Paddock Purchase

Part 12 of 70 — Original Chapter: Chapter 5: Building the Basics – Business Principles and Property

This article forms part of the serialised republication of Panthers, Passion & Politics – The Roger Cowan Years.

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There was one more monumental event for the Penrith Leagues Club in the seventies.

In 1971, the club became aware of a property on Mulgoa Road that was for sale for around $2 million.  It was nearly 100 hectares, with large sections of swampy dairy farmland. Parts of it extended all the way to the Nepean River.

In Cowan’s eyes, Mulgoa Road was destined to be a major link in the future. The part of the property fronting Mulgoa Road, about 10 hectares, had already been zoned for residential development. Because of the residential zoning, he saw the purchase as a low-risk strategy, although it would be a massive investment for such a small club. The land would provide enormous development options for both the registered club and the football club. He became a passionate advocate of acquiring the property.

When he first floated the idea of buying the Mulgoa Road property, most people thought he was crazy. The price on the property was $2.25 million, not an amount that could be shrugged off easily. It had to be financed and the Club’s bankers refused. Undaunted, Cowan negotiated to transfer financial dealings to another bank where the management could see that the Club was going places and was worthy of support.

The criticism came from many quarters. One local newspaper ran the headline, “Roger’s Pipe Dream”.

‘People called it Frog Hollow’, says Don Ellks, one of the senior managers at the time. He says people were either laughing or sceptical. ‘It was very difficult to convince the Board, but Roger persisted and eventually won out. It showed enormous vision when he was being ridiculed from every quarter.’

Don Feltis, later a director at Panthers, was at the time a member of the police force in Penrith. He remembers a police inspector friend telling him the purchase was the worst decision the Club ever made. ‘It’s too far out of town. No-one is going to go that far to go to a club.’

Anyone who has ever visited Panthers’ Penrith club, exiting the M4 and travelling along Mulgoa Road, will know that the club is the focal point of a thriving commercial centre outside the city’s CBD.

But in 1971, once it left Penrith’s main street, Mulgoa Road was little more than a country road. It paralleled the Nepean River, heading out in the direction of Warragamba Dam. Along the way it passed through Wallacia, with its impressive Tudor-style hotel, seen by some at the time as an alternative to Medlow Bath’s Hydro Majestic for honeymoons and romantic trysts.

Former director Tom Wilson agreed that many people thought Roger was mad when he proposed the purchase.

But they thought he was mad about a lot of things. At one time we went and had a look at Australiana Village, out along the Hawkesbury near Windsor, when it came up for sale. We looked at buying other land in Penrith too, but at the time we thought it might be overextending. But Roger could see how that whole area was going to go ahead.

Phyllis Cowan remembers that Jamison Park — now one of Penrith’s major parklands with playing fields and recreational areas — was also considered by Cowan as a possibility to expand the club. It was covered in thick scrub and even further out of town.1

There was a lot of discussion about the land purchase, Max Connors recalls.

Many people in town were against it and some on the Board were not sure. But Roger was very persuasive, he saw it as a great opportunity.

Barry Hubbard said the criticism came from locals, club members and from Council. People were saying,

Why on Earth would they want to buy that swamp? You’ll never be able to build anything on it.

The view from corner of Mulgoa & Jamison Rds looking west. (Unknown source.)

After about four months of deliberations, the Board finally agreed to the purchase.

Penrith Rugby League Club 1973 Annual Report – middle page spread. Main image shows the Mulgoa Rd property with various points of interest. The smaller images are an early aerial shot of Penrith Park and an artsis impression of a club design. Click image to enlarge.

Hubbard’s first visit to the property did not go well. He had seen the property from the road, but once the decision was made, he and another director, Murray Clarke, decided they wanted a closer look.

We were in Murray’s four-wheel drive. We drove in about 100 metres, and the car was up to its axles in mud. “You’d better get out and have a look”, Murray said. I stepped down, and I was up to my knees. We eventually got the car out, and I went back to the club to clean myself up before I went home.

The boardroom had its own bathroom, so Hubbard decided to wash his trousers in the basin. It was the classic scenario of ‘one of these days, you’re going to get caught …’ . When sprung by the chairman, in his boxers, doing his laundry in the washbasin, he explained that he had just inspected the club’s new site.

Phyllis Cowan says she could never have imagined in 1971 what the Club would become. She could see the drive her husband had, though.

I think that Roger knew, right from the start. And I think if he was still there, he’d still have the same dreams and visions. He was always very conscious of what it was doing for Penrith, that it was putting the area on the map. His sense of community was very strong. Even in the early days he often talked about Penrith becoming a major centre in the state, and how the Club could help.

Pat Sheehy has been on Penrith Council since 19872, he says:

Panthers has been an asset to the city of Penrith for the very simple reason that people found out where we were. So, we benefited as a community by that exposure – and that advertising didn’t cost us anything.

The relationship between Panthers and Council has at times been symbiotic, and at others almost parasitic, says Sheehy.

What stage it was at depended on where you were standing. Often Panthers thought that we were the greatest mongrels on Earth, and just as often council thought the same about Panthers.

But the two have worked together on many community projects and are always ready to forget their differences in times of local crisis, such as bushfires and floods.

Council was particularly opposed to the development of a club on Mulgoa Road. One of the reasons given was the land’s proximity to the Jamison Hospital and the noise that a new club might generate. But the current club was quite close to the town, in what was essentially a residential area. Ellks says the neighbours were already starting to complain about the noise, and there were some problems with young people hanging around in the street. The Club was growing, so the complaints could only increase.

Although he wasn’t on council at the time of the purchase, Sheehy was living and working in Penrith, and has heard much of the history from council colleagues.

Roger had the vision for that land long before anyone else ever saw it. All the pundits around town were saying, “What do they want to move there for? It’s on the edge of bloody town, no-one’s going to go there”.

He was able to cut through a lot of the wowserism that was current in council in those days. I would think that most councillors were middle-aged men in grey suits, who were not really into the whole club scene.

 And he had no background in clubs – it was quite brave. What he was seeing was enormous potential, where most of us were still seeing the country town where we’d grown up. He had this whole concept of what Panthers could become, which I don’t believe was shared by many people. He certainly had to convince the board – and he didn’t get a lot of support from the people on council at the time.

Yes, he was definitely seen as an upstart. Especially wanting to set up this huge expanse of club-land. They thought he was biting off more than he can chew, driving too far, too quickly. To some extent, I think the belief – and hope – in council was that this bloke will end up being put in his place.

That thinking was to continue, at least in some quarters, over the entire Cowan years at Panthers. One particular aspect irked Cowan for the rest of his life — how Council managed the disposal of two roads on the Station Street property. For further background see Beyond the Book — Negotiating with Council: The Station Street Road Closures.

With the purchase of the Mulgoa Road property going ahead, Roger Cowan faced the prospect of raising the money to develop the site. Cowan came up with some unusual ideas about how to do it, says Tom Wilson.

Anyone who knows Penrith knows that there’s vast deposits of sand and gravel under the land all along the river, right through to Castlereagh. The quarries on the northern side of the city have been operating for many years. One of Roger’s early concepts to finance the development was to mine some of the blue metal under the new site. The idea was to sub-contract the work out to BMG, who would take it over the river to Emu Plains and process it.

The concept did not get very far. There was no way it would ever be approved, given the position and the need for thousands of noisy trucks plying back and forth on the edge of town, holding up traffic on the narrow bridge across the river. But he said it was typical of Cowan’s style, to look beyond what’s in front of your face and see what could be.

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  1. Jamison Park already included playing fields, the scrub referred to here was at the southern end of the Park.
    ↩︎
  2. Pat Sheehy retired from Penrith City Council in 2008. He passed away in 2025. ↩︎

← Part 11 · All Parts · Part 13 →

Commentary and Contributions

Feeney Electronics – Ahead of its Time

The following material draws upon club publications from the early and mid-1970s, later interviews and recollections from former Panthers staff and executives.

By the mid-1970s, Penrith Rugby League Club was doing something few licensed clubs in Australia would even have contemplated — experimenting with computerised gaming and security systems.

The project emerged from a practical problem. As poker machine revenue increased across the club industry, so too did concerns about theft, scams, inefficient cash handling and poor operational oversight. Panthers had already experienced some of these issues directly. Roger Cowan believed tighter systems and better information could reduce losses and improve efficiency.

What followed was an ambitious venture into electronics and computer technology through a company known as F.C. Electronics Pty Ltd.

Contemporary club material described F.C. Electronics as producing “probably the world’s most sophisticated poker machine security system”. While that language reflected the promotional enthusiasm of the period, there is little doubt the system was unusually advanced for an Australian club environment of the 1970s.

The system attempted to electronically monitor poker machine activity from a central control point.

Early F.C. Electronics monitoring reports published by Panthers during the 1970s showed the system identifying jackpots, abnormal machine activity and security irregularities. Click image to enlarge.

According to material published by the club, poker machine events were coded and transmitted to television monitors around the club, allowing supervisors to immediately identify jackpots and machine activity. The system also attempted to monitor irregularities including abnormal wheel movement, door openings and jackpot inconsistencies.

The operation relied on technology that, at the time, would have appeared extraordinary to most club employees and patrons. The club’s own promotional material featured computer consoles, printers, monitoring screens and electronic reporting systems — all at a time when many organisations still relied entirely on manual record keeping.

Promotional page for F.C. Electronics showed an interconnected monitoring and reporting system linking poker machines to central computer and television displays. Click image to enlarge.

Former Panthers executive Bryn Miller later recalled that the system was “so far ahead of its time” that most clubs did not even possess a computer when Panthers was experimenting with electronic monitoring and reporting.

The project extended beyond poker machine security. F.C. Electronics also produced industrial control equipment and commercial products including lighting dimmers and environmental control systems. Club publications noted that the company’s capabilities had expanded sufficiently for it to seek work beyond the club industry itself.

Yet the venture also carried substantial cost and risk.

Club material acknowledged that F.C. Electronics operated at a financial loss during part of this period, while Roger Cowan later conceded that Panthers may have persisted with the project longer than it should have. Had the technology evolved commercially the way he hoped, the rewards may have been significant. Instead, the project became one of several ambitious experiments that pushed the club into areas rarely explored by licensed clubs of the era.

Club journal material outlined the broader ambitions of F.C. Electronics, which expanded into industrial and commercial electronic products beyond gaming systems. Click image to enlarge.

Even so, many who observed the system believed its core ideas eventually became standard throughout the gaming industry. Automated monitoring, centralised reporting, electronic jackpot recording and machine data analysis are now routine parts of modern club gaming operations.

In that sense, the Feeney Electronics project reflected something larger about the Panthers administration during the Cowan years. The club was rarely content simply to follow established practice. Whether the experiments succeeded or failed, there was often a willingness to try ideas that others considered unrealistic, premature or unnecessarily ambitious.

Feeney Electronics was one of the clearest examples of that philosophy in action.

Related Topics

Related Themes

Financial Management · Innovation

Image Credits: All images in this post — including the feature image — are from Panthers Annual Reports. These were kindly provided by The Ausburn Collection.

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Panther Stamps

In modern clubs, loyalty systems are everywhere.

Members accumulate points through gaming, dining and entertainment spending, redeeming them for meals, prizes, discounts or benefits through sophisticated computerised systems linked to membership cards and databases.

Security surrounding gaming operations was often basic, particularly in smaller or rapidly growing clubs where staffing and oversight systems struggled to keep pace with expansion.

Long before those systems became standard across the club industry, Panthers experimented with an early version of the same idea.

It was called Panther Stamps.

Introduced in 1972, the scheme rewarded patrons — with bonus stamps that could later be exchanged for prizes and trophies. While simple by modern standards, the concept reflected a surprisingly advanced understanding of customer loyalty, repeat visitation and member engagement

The Panthers Annual Report for 1972 described the program as:

“one of the most outstanding successes we have ever had.”

The scheme had officially commenced on 10 July 1972 after several months of delay caused by what the club described as “security and administrative problems involved.”

Even at this early stage, Panthers recognised that a rewards system required careful operational controls, stock management and accounting procedures.

Within less than six months:

  • and prizes worth approximately $22,000 at cost price had been distributed.
  • members had collected more than 150,000 stamps
  • over 90,000 had already been redeemed

The prizes ranged from trophies and sporting awards through to toys and household items. The report noted that demand became particularly intense in the weeks before Christmas, with thousands of dollars’ worth of toys redeemed by members.

Importantly, Panthers did not present the scheme simply as generosity or entertainment.

Club management acknowledged that while the program carried significant administrative costs — including staffing, storage, stationery and prize purchasing — they believed the increased engagement from members more than justified the expense.

In effect, Panthers had identified an idea that would later become central to the modern club and gaming industries: reward loyalty, encourage repeat visitation, and strengthen the relationship between the member and the venue.

The system also demonstrated the increasingly sophisticated operational mindset developing within Panthers during the early 1970s. By this period, the club was not merely expanding physically — it was experimenting with new forms of marketing, patron engagement and gaming promotion that were relatively advanced for the time.

Although Panther Stamps relied on physical booklets and manual administration rather than computers and swipe cards, the underlying principle was remarkably familiar to modern readers.

Today’s digital loyalty programs — with their points systems, rewards catalogues and member incentives — are built upon many of the same ideas.

While modest by modern standards, Panther Stamps reflected the growing importance of structured member engagement within the evolving licensed club industry of the period.

Panther Stamps were simply an early analogue version of that future.

Related Topics

Related Themes

Financial Management · Innovation

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Wires, Magnets and Monitoring

During the 1960s and 1970s, poker machine operations were still relatively primitive by modern standards. Machines were largely mechanical, heavily cash-based and vulnerable to manipulation.

Across the NSW club industry, stories circulated of patrons using wires, magnets, lead discs being used as coins, and other improvised devices in attempts to interfere with machine mechanisms or influence payouts.

Security surrounding gaming operations was often basic, particularly in smaller or rapidly growing clubs where staffing and oversight systems struggled to keep pace with expansion.

At the same time, the sheer volume of coins moving through gaming rooms created operational difficulties of its own. Machines required constant clearing, counting and refilling. Cash handling was labour intensive and exposed clubs to risks ranging from simple human error to outright theft.

These problems were not unique to Panthers. They reflected broader challenges facing the club industry as poker machine revenue expanded rapidly during this period.

For administrators such as Roger Cowan, such vulnerabilities highlighted the need for tighter operational systems and greater technological oversight. At Panthers, this gradually led to innovations in surveillance, accounting controls, machine monitoring and broader administrative systems designed to improve both security and efficiency.

Part of Cowan’s reputation within the club industry stemmed from his willingness to embrace technology earlier than many contemporaries. What later became sophisticated electronic monitoring and integrated management systems began, in part, as practical responses to very immediate operational problems.

The issue was not simply dishonesty. It was scale.

As clubs grew larger and gaming operations expanded, informal methods that may once have worked in smaller suburban venues became increasingly inadequate. Stronger systems, better monitoring and more professional management structures became essential to running modern licensed clubs.

Seen in that light, the technological innovations discussed in Part 9 were not merely about efficiency or modernisation. They were also responses to a rapidly changing gaming environment in which security, accountability and operational control had become central concerns for the industry.

Related Topics

Related Themes

Financial Management · Innovation

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Removing the Football Club Secretary and Treasurer

The removal of Merv Cartwright (Secretary) and Ron Partridge (Treasurer) from their respective roles with the Penrith District Rugby League Football Club occurred against the backdrop of a broader and more complex set of issues than is immediately apparent in the main narrative.

While Cartwright became the central public focus of the dispute, the Board’s concerns also extended to the financial administration of the football club more broadly, including the role of Treasurer Ron Partridge.

Contemporaneous Board papers and meeting records from the period indicate a growing concern among Directors regarding both the financial management of the Club’s football operations and the processes by which financial commitments were being made.

At the centre of these concerns was the relationship between the Licensed Club — which generated the revenue — and the District Rugby League Club, which was responsible for football operations. While this arrangement had supported the Club’s early growth, it also created a structural tension: financial responsibility and operational control were not always aligned.

By the late 1960s, the Board had become increasingly uneasy that commitments were being entered into without sufficient oversight, and in some cases without formal authority. This was not framed as a single incident, but as a pattern that had developed over time.

Internal analysis presented to the Board suggested that the Club’s financial position was more fragile than it appeared. Liabilities associated with player payments, bonuses and sign-on fees were, in the Board’s view, not being fully or consistently reflected in financial reporting. When assessed against normal operating income, there was concern that the Club could not meet its existing commitments without significant restraint.

These concerns were reinforced by a pattern of escalating expenditure. Board discussions from the period refer to sharp increases in allocations to football operations, alongside uncertainty as to how those figures had been determined. Directors questioned both the reliability of the budgeting process and the basis upon which commitments had been made.

In response, the Board moved to assert clearer control over financial decision-making. Proposals and subsequent resolutions emphasised that:

  • no contracts or financial commitments were to be entered into without explicit Board approval;
  • committees operating within the football structure were to act within clearly defined limits;
  • and all funds were to be subject to centralised oversight and reporting.

These measures were not presented as routine administrative adjustments, but as necessary steps to address what was seen as a deteriorating financial and governance position.

At the time the NSW Rugby Football League (NSWRFL) was responsible for the debts of all District Clubs — and should Penrith Rugby League Club Ltd (Licensed Club) stop funding the Penrith District Rugby League Football Club (District Club), the Board was confident it would not prevent the District Club from operating. It could, however, trigger intervention by the NSWRFL as administrators of the Penrith District Club.

Within this context, the recommendation to cease funding unless Secretary Merv Cartwright and Treasurer Ron Partridge resigned can be understood not as an isolated or sudden decision, but as the culmination of these concerns. This was not an easy decision for the Board, a fact reflected in the final paragraph of the Board Resolution.

Resource Material*

The following documents can be seen as PDFs:

Related Material

Related Themes

Conflict · Governance · Financial Management

* Resource material courtesy of The Ausburn Collection

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The Panthers Magazine Arrangement

In February 1966, the Penrith Rugby League Football Club published the first edition of its official members’ journal.

The publication, issued monthly, was introduced at a critical point in the club’s development — as it sought admission to the New South Wales Rugby League First Division.

A central feature of the journal was a column titled From the Secretary’s Desk, written by Roger Cowan in his role as Secretary-Manager. In the opening issue, Cowan outlined club activities, membership growth and upcoming events, and referred to the club’s ambition of securing promotion to First Division.

The magazine was largely written and produced by Cowan and served as a means of communicating with members during the club’s First Division campaign.

In June 1968, Phyro Holdings Pty Ltd was registered, with Roger and Phyllis Cowan as directors. The name itself was derived from their first names — Phy from Phyllis and Ro from Roger.

In the years that followed, responsibility for publishing the club’s magazine — The Panthers Magazine — was transferred to Phyro Holdings under an arrangement approved by the club committee. The structure included conditions relating to profit limits, auditing of accounts and the remuneration deetails of Cowan’s role.

The arrangement formalised the transfer of publication responsibilities from the club to Phyro Holdings, under agreed financial and audit conditions.

The magazine arrangement — and the broader financial relationship between the club and Phyro Holdings — was later subject to scrutiny. Questions raised in subsequent decades focused on governance, transparency and the management of related-party transactions.

The Panthers Magazine became much more than a publication for PRLC members – it was a powerful community voice and was distributed to over 200,000 households in the Penrith Junior Rugby League District – Katoomba to Blacktown.

Those issues are examined in more detail in later sections of this project.

Related Topics

Related Themes

Financial Management · Strategic Planning

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The Bungool Picnic and Unpaid Players

Part 6 of 70 — Original Chapter: Chapter 4: Insolvency to First Division in One Year

This article forms part of the serialised republication of Panthers, Passion & Politics – The Roger Cowan Years.

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Penrith in the 60s was, in many ways, still a country town. Some of the trains were still steam hauled, and holidaymakers would pass through on their way to the Blue Mountains – or stop off and catch the Bales’ bus out to one of the many guesthouses at Wallacia, some ten miles out of town.

Through 1963-64, Roger Cowan continued teaching while acting as honorary treasurer of the football committee. What started out as an amicable relationship with Merv Cartwright gradually deteriorated into frequent clashes.

The registered club’s main function in those days was to finance rugby league.

In 1964, the registered club committee had agreed to a football budget of £10,000 and player contracts were agreed within that budget. Payday for the players was planned for the traditional end of season picnic on the banks of the Hawkesbury River — Bungool1.

When Cowan went to the club administration to organise the cheques for the players, he was informed that they didn’t have the money. He had no warning of the problem. Merv Cartwright who sat on the registered club committee and was also secretary of the football club, would known much earlier that the Club was in financial trouble — yet the football club had been allowed to proceed on its merry way without any warning.2

Before this Cowan had never thought about getting into club politics. It was this failure — the inability to meet its obligations to the players — that first motivated him to stand for election onto the committee of the licensed club – ‘to understand how £10,000 could be promised and not paid’.

He was elected, and soon after asked to take on the role of treasurer. It quickly became apparent that the club had virtually no systems of control. Dishonesty was widespread, enabled by the absence of basic procedures.

I started to look into why the club wasn’t making any money. We were losing money hand over fist. The bank was threatening to take action. One of the first things I did was to install control systems for poker machines.  This included a monthly analysis of each of the 26 machines to ensure they were operating within carded percentages.

I also put as much time as I could into getting some systems operating. There was no system for stock control, no cash systems, there was nothing. I began with cash systems. We started to count the money, and balance it against the cash register tapes, and so on. Basic stuff, but it had never been done.

 Cash control was a simple system before then. When trading finished for a shift, the cash would be taken to the vault and tipped into a large container with all the cash from other cash registers. Nobody checked the cash register tapes to see if there was a balance. Each morning the money in the container would be counted and banked.

Rumour has it that one employee boasted that he never bothered taking less than a twenty pound note when he wanted some cash. He bought a new car in less than 12 months working as a bar steward.  After getting a system started, I came in one Sunday morning and discovered a £1,700 discrepancy between the cash register tapes and the money we had. That was a lot of money in those days for such a small club.’

At a special meeting, the board decided that the Secretary-Manager Rocky Davis wasn’t managing things properly, and asked for his resignation. There was no suggestion of dishonesty, only mismanagement.

The Club immediately advertised for a replacement. But the small size and low profile of the Club meant that the quality of candidates was not very high. After three months of advertising, they had still found nobody suitable. In the meantime, Cowan continued holding things together in his spare time – evenings and weekends – and continued to improve the systems.

I was doing the job anyway, as well as teaching. I was convinced in my own mind that I could put systems in place to make the place work. So I just said to the committee one night, “I’m prepared to resign from teaching. I’ll take the job for a trial period if you want to give it to me. And I’ll give you a guarantee that if I’m not making a profit within three months, I’ll resign and you can keep looking”. I agreed to commence on a very low salary.

That was October 1965. The Board agreed, and Cowan remained in the position continuously for almost 40 years.

There is a logical question here, of course. Here is a young man – 29 years old, married, four young kids. He’s a schoolteacher, which is a reasonably secure job for life. He suddenly decides to turn his whole life upside down. There is no contract, no security of tenure – just ‘give me three months to make a success of it. If not, I’ll go’.

Phyllis Cowan says it was the challenge.

He loved school teaching, he was an excellent teacher, but he didn’t like the system. I don’t think he wanted to be doing that for the rest of his life. Many people advised him against it at the time. But he always could have gone back to teaching, she said –- it was easier back then.

It was the challenge that attracted him, and kept him there, she said. He was being successful, the club was making money, it was growing, and he was introducing all these new measures. She spoke of a couple of nights in the early days when he took a blanket and pillow and sat on a roof where he could watch for the people that he knew were stealing stores from the club.

Under Cowan’s stewardship, the club began to more stable financially. The systems he implemented, some while acting as treasurer and others when he took the management role, had already begun to have an impact on the profitability of the business.

Within a year, the club had moved out of the red. For the first time, it had the financial stability needed to think beyond survival.

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  1. Bungool’s location was at Cattai on the Hawkesbury River where Riverside Oaks Golf Resort is today. ↩︎
  2. This failure became evident at the end-of-season Bungool picnic, when players could not be paid in full.
    See Beyond the Book: The Bungool Picnic. ↩︎

← Part 5 · All Parts · Part 7 →

Commentary and Contributions

From Tin Shed to Taj Mahal — Scale and Contrast in 1963

In 1963, Penrith and St George Rugby League Clubs each opened new premises. The contrast between them — in scale, cost, and ambition — highlights the gap between an emerging club and one already established as a powerhouse of the game.

To describe Penrith Rugby League Club as a minnow compared to St George Rugby League Club in the early 1960s is no exaggeration.

In 1963, the St George Dragons had already secured seven consecutive premierships, a run that would extend to eleven.

In 1963, both clubs opened new premises.

In March, Penrith Leagues Club opened a new building adjacent to the old Boys Club, at a cost of approximately £150,000.

Official Opening Program PRLC 1963 — image from The Ausburn Collection — click to enlarge

In July, St George Leagues Club opened its new premises at Kogarah, with construction costs approaching £1,000,000.

William “Bill” Buckley (1906–1973), Chairman of the Australian Rugby League, officially opened both clubs. During a tour of the new St George premises, struck by its scale and extensive use of marble, he is said to have remarked: “This reminds me very much of the Taj Mahal.”

The nickname endured.

St George Leagues Club — Photo: Joan Hatton

Both developments marked a move beyond earlier, more modest beginnings — the kinds of facilities often remembered, and sometimes simplified, as the “tin shed” era.

For St George, that transition had already occurred.

For Penrith, it was only just beginning.

The scale of the St George club did more than impress. It set a benchmark — one that emerging clubs like Penrith could not yet match, but would, over time, seek to close.

From the Narrative

This contrast sits alongside the developments described in Part 4 — From Small Beginnings, where Penrith’s early structures begin to take shape against a backdrop of more established clubs.

A Little Extra

Here is the complete 1963 Opening Program for Penrith Rugby League Club — it was a big day, starting with lunch, then evening and supper — and lots of dancing! And plaudits to the Penrith Rugby League Orchestra who must have exhausted by night’s end.

PRLC Official Opening Saturday 9rh March1963 — image courtesy of The Ausburn Collection — click image to enlarge

Related Material

Related Themes

Financial Management · Growth

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The Impact of a Turnover Tax

A turnover tax on gambling is a tax imposed on the total amount of money wagered or “turned over” in a gambling activity, rather than on the profits generated by the gambling operators.

For example, imagine you take $100 to the races, and you place a $100 on the first race, it wins and you now have $350. You continue to bet $50 on each of the 7 remaining races. So, if you add up the amount you bet it comes to $450 – your first bet of $100 plus 7 bets of $50.

A turnover tax on this activity means the tax is calculated on the total value of the the bets placed, $450. Yet, the amount spent by the punter was only $100.

This example shows the very best result for the betting provider would be for the punter to finish the day broke – and the provider would have a revenue of $100. But they would be paying tax on $450.

Of course, it would be possible for the provider to lose hundreds of dollars to this punter, yet still pay tax on the $450 turned over.

Industry opponents of turnover taxation argued that the structure materially reduced operators’ capacity to improve return-to-player rates.

The mathematics of a turnover tax make it extremely restrictive – and, in fact, for some gambling games (like blackjack) even a small turnover tax would mean the game would not be viable.

For example, poker machines in NSW have a minimum return to player rate of 87%.

At a theoretical level this means a couple of things:

  • Firstly, it means the theoretical revenue for the operator is 13% – that is the operator can expect to retain $13 in every $100 staked on their games.
  • Secondly, it means the theoretical turnover for the player is 3.42 times their orginal stake. So, starting $100 and playing until depleted will generate a theoretical turnover of $342.

In the case of a starting stake of $100, theoretically the operator will retain $13. If a 3% turnover tax is applied their obligation to the tax office will be 3% of $342, which is $10.25.

Now, imagine an operator wants to offer a better deal to their patrons with a 90% return to player. So $100 stake produces a theoretical $10 revenue for the operator. The turnover is $388 and a 3% turnover tax will produce a tax obligation of $11.74 – so the tax office will take all the operator’s revenue plus more.

Critics maintained that turnover taxation limited pricing flexibility and distorted game viability.

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Introduction — An Industry Insight

Part 3 of 70 — Chapter 1: Introduction

This article forms part of the serialised republication of Panthers, Passion & Politics – The Roger Cowan Years.

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Because of Cowan’s deep involvement in the licensed club industry, the history of Panthers cannot be separated from the broader history of the NSW club movement..

Phil Bennett1 was an officer with the Liquor Administration Board2 for many years. He remembers some of the interesting episodes. He had first encountered Cowan in the early 1980s. When Treasury was pushing to use turnover as the basis for taxing poker machine revenue, it was Bennett’s job to sell the concept to the clubs. Until then, only gross revenue had been taxed. Bennett said:

The idea was to tax the money being spent by the gamblers — a turnover tax3 — taking it off the top. Roger had a great moral difficulty with this, and he was very vocal.

I wrote a whole lot of papers and reports, and had to present them to the industry. By then I was in the policy section of the Chief Secretary’s department. We used the analogy of liquor . . . Clubs were paying a tax on the purchase of their liquor — which is like a turnover tax. And I also brought out other examples. So, we were trotting out all these arguments, and Roger would come back to me and say ‘that’s completely ridiculous, and a false analogy’. And proceed to explain in detail why it was, and shoot all my arguments down in flames. There was one day I distinctly remember. I had put together this paper and sent it to him, and then we met to discuss it. We were sitting opposite each other in his office, talking about the issues.

Roger presented a different analogy. ‘Look, this is different to a liquor tax. If you go and buy a beer, you pay tax on it at that point. But then you go into the toilet, and you piss it up against the wall, and it goes down the drain — and it’s all over. With gaming machines, if you put on a turnover tax, you’re taxing me when I spend it now, and then I get my money back when I get a payout. But then, if I bet it again you’ll make me pay another lot of tax, and when I win again you’ll tax it again, and again, and again.’

He was right, but we were saying that’s the way all gambling is taxed. At the races, the punter is taxed out of the turnover tax. But it was very funny. He sat there, looked across at me and said, ‘well, the person who wrote this paper obviously has no understanding of the club industry.’ He knew very well that I wrote it.

Cowan does not remember being so tactless:

When Phil asked me to discuss turnover tax I was appalled, and my body language was probably negative. I was convinced that one day we would have higher denomination machines and a turnover tax would restrict the return that we could offer the customers. The turnover tax they were proposing was only 3% and that sounded small enough to get acceptance from the industry. But I was concerned it would stifle the growth and eventually it would be unfair to players. I believed that higher denominations would eventually be part of the gaming market — and that should mean offering higher returns to the player. I knew for example that there were machines in the casinos in Las Vegas paying the player 99% — not many to be sure, but it would be impossible to do that under a turnover tax.

A turnover tax would force clubs to have machines set to the lowest possible return to players, and yet, it would be highway robbery to introduce high denomination machines at less than say, 94% return to players.

So, what I was trying to convey to Phil was that they were not looking at the future potential of the industry.

I was so concerned that I called a special meeting of several of the larger clubs and made a presentation to them of the dangers of a turnover tax. It was a long battle and finally the government saw the point and withdrew the proposal. Even though I was probably seen as the leader of the push to have it withdrawn, I never felt any sense of resentment from the government or the department officers . . .

If it had been a Carr/Egan government, I might have been facing a Royal Commission inquiry much sooner.

Bennett says:

You always knew that Roger would speak out if he believed that something was wrong. And he did his research, so he always knew what he was talking about.

Researching this book, I heard many words used to describe Roger Cowan, both positive and negative.

In recent years some have sought to attach another label to Cowan — dishonest.

Barrister Terrence Lynch4 says that from the start, he never believed that the inquiry would find any type of dishonesty in Cowan’s behavior.

I really was very relaxed about the inquiry. If a man is a crook, you don’t get staff five and six years in retirement still volunteering their time to assist him.

Dishonesty was just not consistent with any part of my exposure to what that place was like. My impression of Panthers is of a very internally open organisation. There never seemed to be the sense that if you disagree with Roger, there was going to be any discomfort or risk in doing that. You can’t operate dishonestly in such an open environment. And then, that flowed down through the organisation. I got the impression that he expected those people to be equally open with their own teams.

The events of 2004 have left permanent scars on Roger Cowan. There is no doubt that he sees Panthers as his life’s work, something that he could take pride in on his retirement. In his mind, the Inquiry, and the attendant headlines and publicity, altered that. That Inquiry, and the circumstances surrounding the events leading up to it, is a story that certainly needs telling.

The real story here is the growth of Panthers from a near-bankrupt suburban club into a significant force within the NSW club movement — and how that success eventually drew it into complex and contested political terrain.

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  1. Phil Bennett worked in gaming-related departments within the NSW public service, including Treasury, the Liquor Administration Board, Casino Control and as Senior Policy Adviser in the Chief Secretary’s Department. In 1989 he established Phil Bennett Consulting, advising organisations in the gaming and liquor industries.
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  2. The Liquor Administration Board (LAB) has since undergone structural and naming changes. Its current successor body is the Independent Liquor & Gaming Authority (ILGA) of NSW.
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  3. A turnover tax is calculated on the total amount wagered rather than net loss. For example, if $10 is gambled and returns $100, and $40 of those winnings is wagered again, the tax applies to the total $50 wagered. For a fuller explanation, see The Impact of A Turnover Tax in Beyond the Book.
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  4. Terrence Lynch was a member of the legal team engaged to represent Panthers during the Inquiry. Senior Counsel for the Panthers legal team was Bernie Coles KC.
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