The structural compromise — two CEOs answering to a single board — had not resolved the underlying problems. If anything, it had deepened them. By the early 1980s, the consequences were becoming impossible to ignore — both on and off the field.

The Gibson years saw the Penrith football team continue its sad record of recent times. The club was putting major resources into building the new premises, and there was criticism that the team’s rugby league performance was a direct reflection of that spending.

In their 1992 book Bound for Glory, Greg Pritchard and Gary Lester tell of that period. They quote 1980-81 coach, Len Stacker, as saying that rugby league funds had been frozen before the 1981 season, although this has been disputed by Roger Cowan. Stacker also said he had been forced to bring in some ‘blokes from the bush’ to prop up the numbers. One of these bush blokes turned out to be Royce Simmons, the hero of Penrith’s first premiership and the city’s favourite son.

Also playing for Penrith at the time was Tim Sheens. He had finished 1982 with the club record for the number of games played (166) and was looking forward to the season. Gibson went off on his Kangaroo tour, telling Sheens he would talk to him when he came back.

When Gibson returned, Sheens went to his office to see him. Gibson told him that there was no point in even sitting down. The club had overspent and there was no room for Sheens, who was dropped from the team. Instead, they had signed Tony D’Arcy, a rugby union international, at almost twice the salary of Penrith’s highest paid player. D’Arcy was never to play a first-grade game for Penrith.

By the end of 1983, the football club reached its lowest level yet. It finished close to the bottom of the competition, it had only two players on contract for the following year, and it had no coach.

Even Royce Simmons has said he seriously considered leaving the club at the end of 1983. Community support had dropped along with the team’s performance, resulting in an income shortfall. An injection of funds was urgently needed, but the club was being held on a tight budget. The club under construction over on the Mulgoa Road property incurred significant cost  increases, causing anxious moments in management and at the bank.

The dismal prospects now facing the football team were enough to convince the Board. It finally voted to put rugby league back under the control of Roger Cowan. Gibson left soon after and successfully sued the club for wrongful dismissal. Keith Rhind, when he took the chairman’s seat, had formed a close friendship with Gibson but he would ultimately be instrumental in Gibson’s departure from the club.

 ‘It was one of the worst periods in my life’, he says, ‘and it still upsets me to think about it.’ 

When it came to the vote that would ultimately oust Charlie, it was four all and I had the casting vote. But I had been put in an impossible position. Whichever way I went, I was going to lose friends, but I knew that things couldn’t continue the way they were. I did what I believed was best for the club and voted to move the responsibility for rugby league to the licensed club management.

When it came to the vote that would ultimately oust Charlie, it was four all and I had the casting vote. But I had been put in an impossible position. Whichever way I went, I was going to lose friends, but I knew that things couldn’t continue the way they were. I did what I believed was best for the club and voted to move the responsibility for rugby league to the licensed club management.

The board decided that Cowan’s role would be expanded to include both the licensed club and the rugby league club, and his contract was changed again by mutual agreement. There would be one board of directors and one chief executive of the entire organisation.¹ It was the model that Cowan had been advocating for so many years.

After a decade of advocating change, Cowan now had the chance to prove the model that he had recommended. But he had a massive job ahead of him. Three years of compromise had put the club into a weak position. It had money problems, no coach and hardly any players.

He attacked the problem using a tactic that had proved successful within the licensed club. The think-tank-style brainstorming sessions had produced many good ideas for the business, so he decided to carry it through in his new role.

At the end of 1983, he invited a large number of key stakeholders to attend workshops at the Club. The objective was to bring together the people who had an interest, or who would benefit from a successful, competitive rugby league team. There were directors and players, club officials and some former players, representatives from the media and local businesses, even some politicians. The junior league and school rugby league were also well represented. He told them they had to take ownership of the problems, and find solutions they could all support.²

The workshops were facilitated by Cowan. Despite the gloomy outlook, there was a great deal of enthusiasm and a commitment to succeed irrespective of obstacles.

Again, the results would be positive – this time for rugby league in the district.

There had never been a state or Australian representative player from the Penrith Junior District. Arising from the workshop, the Five by Five Committee was formed. Its goal was to develop five representative players in five years – and it succeeded.

The schools and junior league forged closer relationships, and ideas came up for a stronger junior competition. Profiles of coaches were drawn up. But the most important outcome was a greater feeling of ownership and sharing of the problems throughout the community.

Tim Sheens attended the workshops, but he had a family commitment and left early. Cowan says he had been most impressed by Sheens’ contribution to the workshops and by his strong sense of loyalty to Penrith. Much of the discussion had centred on the type of coach they would need. Sheens had presented strong ideas about coaching and players – and about club management.

It became clear to Cowan that Sheens would be the ideal coach for Penrith. When he discussed his thoughts with some close associates, he found that they had been equally impressed.

When Cowan contacted Sheens, he discovered he was too late. He and wife Rhonda were moving to North Queensland. They had sold their furniture and were ready to leave within days. Further meetings followed, including a momentous dinner with the couple. By the end of the night, both could see the opportunity.

Rhonda Sheens encouraged her husband to take up the challenge. It was a big decision for her — she had been looking forward to a move back to Queensland to be closer to her family. Tim Sheens became the first grade coach, and agreed to also take on some management duties, including recruitment of players.

In his first year, Penrith missed the play-offs by a whisker.  In 1985 Sheens guided the club to its first ever semi-final appearance.

For the following 15 years, the model stood firm. The board set all policy for the entire club including rugby league, and achieving that policy was the responsibility of one person, the CEO of the group. At times Cowan would take on the role of rugby league chief executive. He would have a manager looking after day-to-day issues, but be personally responsible for higher level decisions.

I really enjoyed that role, but when someone was doing a good job – Don Feltis and Mark Levy for instance – I promoted them to the top football position.

The reform had gone beyond the CEO and board — it now meant one management team working in harmony for the betterment of every part of Panthers. The catering manager was now just as likely to have input into rugby league strategies, as the rugby league CEO might have into staff motivation principles for the bars.

But even though Cowan had achieved the goal of ‘one board, one CEO’ at the end of 1983, the Board remained precariously balanced.

A spur of the moment decision by Cowan and Armstrong after a football game at the end of the 1984 season was enough to tip the balance, and almost put Hewett back in the chair. More importantly, it would put some events in motion that led to two police raids on Panthers.

The record books also show that from the time the model was implemented in 1984, there was a marked improvement on the rugby league side. In 1985 the first grade side made the semi-finals and in 1988, they lost a play-off for fifth place. In 1989 they made the finals. In 1990 they were grand finalists and in 1991 the Panthers won the trophy.

The success was not only on the scoreboard. A new sponsorship scheme with the Penrith Star newspaper began to ease the financial burden on the registered club. As the performance of the team improved, crowds began to pick up, which also had an impact on the bottom line.

Tim Sheens stayed until 1987, to be replaced by veteran coach, Ron Willey. Willey’s unorthodox methods led to unresolvable problems with the players, and Cowan negotiated a resignation settlement with him. In late 1989, Cowan and football chief executive Ross Gigg were able to recruit Phil Gould. Gould, who had begun his playing career with Panthers, had coached Canterbury to a premiership in 1988. After losing the grand final to Canberra in 1990, Gould steered the Panthers to their first premiership a year later.

In 1984, the same year that the new management model for rugby league was implemented, the club was opened in Mulgoa Road amid a fanfare of free publicity. It was a brand new model for licensed clubs, and it set the bar higher for the club industry. Both events were turning points for Panthers.

Although the new club opened in a blaze of favourable publicity, it had not been completed. The long delays in getting approvals and other factors beyond the club’s control contributed to a blow-out in the costs of construction. The main entertainment room was an empty shell until profits could be used to complete it. A large part of the car park was left unfinished.

Although the new club opened in a blaze of favourable publicity, it had not been completed. The long delays in getting approvals and other factors beyond the club’s control contributed to a blow-out in the costs of construction. The main entertainment room was an empty shell until profits could be used to complete it. A large part of the car park was left unfinished.

In the planning phases of the new complex, the concept of motel accommodation came up. It would fit neatly into the club’s objectives, but the costs blow-out forced it into the “deferred ideas” drawer.

However, the builder could also see the potential.  He made an offer to build a motel adjoining the new complex, and it was accepted. The agreement was that the club would sell the builder the required area of land for one dollar. The builder would then use the equity in that land to finance construction. Panthers would lease the motel back and manage it until it had the funds to purchase it. The Club had an option to purchase the motel and the land for the cost of construction, plus an agreed profit for the builder. The land would be part of that package and would be put back in at a one dollar value. It was a brilliant scheme, and it worked well for all the parties involved.³

The 54 room Panthers Motor Inn was completed in 1986, with 115 more rooms approved by the Board in 1988. The Club sold it – now 216 rooms – in 2006, for $28.5 million.⁴

Panthers barrister Terrence Lynch says that this transaction was one that DGR counsel, David Staehli, seized upon in the 41X inquiry, sure that at last he finally ‘had’ Roger Cowan. His hopes were dashed when Cowan was able to show exactly what had happened throughout the entire process.

The new rugby league regime brought the football club the successes that had eluded it for its first 17 years, including two premierships and several finals appearances. The new Panthers licensed club brought significant changes in management and structure, unprecedented growth, and the completion of assets that would ensure the security and cash flow of the organisation through some very difficult times.

But behind the scenes it was not all beer and skittles. John Hewett still carried a badly wounded ego. Cowan’s erstwhile friend and supporter, club patron Ron Mulock, was showing early signs of disapproval about the dramatic growth of the Club.

The football team was finally making its mark, and the business was showing the potential that would take it into the top 300 private companies. In the midst of the successes, trouble was simmering that would eventually bring Panthers and Cowan into their darkest periods.

1. This decision fundamentally changed the governance structure of Panthers and helped resolve a decade of conflict over the management of rugby league. For a more detailed explanation of why the “one board, one CEO” model became so important see Beyond the Book — Why One Board, One CEO.
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2. Beyond the Book — The 1983 Strategic Reset explains how governance reform, the appointment of Tim Sheens and the Five by Five Committee formed part of a broader change in Panthers’ approach to football.
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3. The arrangement was designed to overcome the club’s immediate financial constraints. The builder funded construction and accepted the development risk, while Panthers retained the right to acquire the completed motel and land at a pre-agreed future price.
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4. The financial transactions around this part of the Mulgoa Road development would later be examined during the Temby 41X Inquiry where the legitimacy of the arrangement was able to be demonstrated. ↩︎

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