The 1990 Queensland Criminal Justice Commission

The poker-machine transaction examined in Part 24 did not disappear when the NSW investigation ended. Four years later, the same transaction surfaced in the Queensland Criminal Justice Commission’s 1990 report on gaming machines, where Cowan believed the facts were misstated and the implications left uncorrected.

Somehow the Queensland Justice Commission accepted the false proposition, from an undisclosed source, that Panthers had paid $7,000 per machine when the list price was only $5,300. Every piece of documentation Howe had seen had clearly shown that the club paid only $5,300.

The poker machine purchase from Len Ainsworth’s company, Aristocrat, was mentioned in the Commission’s 1990 report on gaming machines. The QCJC used the purchase to illustrate what it called the ‘Byzantine transactions’ that it said were common in the club industry at the time.

‘Various manufacturers are alleged to have engaged in the offer of inducements of one sort or another to buy gaming machines’, said the report. It continues, ‘There is room in such contorted transactions for any number of corrupt arrangements.’

It quotes the same information that was in the original NSW police allegations, including the listing of only 90 machines. It provides all the figures, and mentions Ainsworth’s subsidisation of the interest, without providing any explanation of the circumstances. The report emphasised the payment by Panthers of an inflated price of $7,000.

After the report was released, Cowan had a solicitor write to the Commission asking that the report be amended to reflect the true facts of the transaction – that Panthers paid $5,300, not $7000, and that the list price was $7000, not $5300. The request was ignored. A subsequent approach was also ignored. No response was ever received, and the false representation still stands in the records.

Although Panthers had been cleared of all the original charges, with no action taken by the NSW police or the Liquor Administration Board, here was the very same information finding its way into the QCJC report. Cowan is mentioned specifically in the same report, saying he ‘has come to the notice of NSW police on a number of occasions and had been unsuccessfully prosecuted once’. No evidence was ever recorded of any specific occasions on which Cowan had ‘come to the notice of police’.

Phil Bennett also read the report, and, knowing the real facts of the transaction, sent a personal response to the QCJC, explaining his own knowledge of the sale. He told the Commission: ‘It was clearly established that there was nothing illegal or improper about this transaction and no action was taken, nor was the matter raised as an objection in Ainsworth’s licence application.

The Commission’s suggestion that this transaction was an example of an inducement paid to people in exchange for their club buying machines is clearly not sustainable.

Bennett also noted in his response that the prices of poker machines quoted in the QCJC report were ‘a nonsense’.

The QCJC did nothing to rectify its erroneous report. The blatant untruth still stands in its records.

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Gotcha!

Part 25 of 70 — Original Chapter: Chapter 8: A Taste of Injustice

This article forms part of the serialised republication of Panthers, Passion & Politics – The Roger Cowan Years.

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Most of the police and government officers involved in the police raids on Panthers had walked away satisfied that Cowan, and the club, had nothing to answer on any of those original allegations. Mick Howe didn’t give up.

Four months later, newspaper headlines and TV bulletins revealed that Cowan had been charged with four counts of fraud. Howe had finally hit his mark. But the charges had nothing to do with the original investigation or the letter of complaint.

A chance remark to a staff member about a questionable tax deduction, and the discovery of some discrepancies in the accounts of the Panthers’ travel agency¹ eventually rewarded the persistence of Detective Sergeant Mick Howe.

Early in 1986, before the investigation started, Cowan had taken a holiday in Thailand, which he booked through the Panthers travel agency. When booking the trip, he advised the manager of the agency that he was not going on club business, and that she should bill the travel expenses to his personal account. Part of the conversation touched on the tax deductibility of his trip.

It was suggested that if the trip was to Brisbane instead of Thailand, he might be able to claim the trip as a tax deduction. But it really was just a holiday, and Cowan did not claim any of the expense on tax. Unfortunately, though, on one of the travel agency records it was entered as a Brisbane trip.

In July 1986, Cowan was in his office when Mick Howe arrived.

He sounded casual and very friendly. “We’re almost finished”, he said. “I just need to look at some of the club’s trust companies. I understand there’s a travel trust? Maybe I could look at that first.

I told him “Not a problem”, with absolutely no inkling of what was happening. I picked up the phone and spoke to Irene Southern, the new travel agency manager. “Mick needs to have a look at the travel agency books. Can you give him whatever help he needs?”

When criminal barrister, Jack Birney, was called in later, his response was vigorous. “You must be crazy! You allowed a simple investigation to turn into a fishing expedition. This person has been doing everything he can to put handcuffs on you for months, and here you are doing your absolute best to help him!”’

A few days after Howe left the office, Cowan received a phone call from the Howe’s secretary.

Mick has asked me to call you to make an appointment. He would like you to come to the station. He needs a final discussion with you to clear up a few issues about minutes.’

Cowan replied, ‘Sure, when does he want me to come?’

She answered, ‘Next Tuesday and Wednesday’.

As I put the phone down, the penny dropped! All this time I had thought the best way to deal with Howe and his investigations was complete co-operation, and all I was doing was just getting myself deeper into some problem I didn’t understand. Eight months after Mick Howe first walked through Panthers’ door, I finally decided it was time to get legal advice.

Cowan’s first port of call was Steve Bowers, who was a solicitor and a personal friend. Bowers agreed urgent advice was needed before Howe’s ‘final interview’. He phoned barrister Jack Birney.² Birney was tied up in a court case at Parramatta but agreed to see them during the court lunch break.

Cowan explained what had been happening, including the request for a two-day ‘interview’ with the detective.

‘There is no way you will be attending that interview’, Birney said, at the same time suggesting that Cowan had been holding out his wrists to allow the handcuffs to be slipped on.

Awaiting Cowan’s arrival on Tuesday morning, Mick Howe was instead surprised to be confronted by a solicitor and a leading criminal barrister.

Steve Bowers says it was a very long conversation.

Howe just kept asking questions about Roger. How many holidays he took, the renovations on his house, and so many obscure things. While he was pumping us, Birney was pumping him, to try to find exactly where he was coming from.

The discussion centred around the documents which Howe had obtained from the travel agency. At the end of the meeting, the detective told the lawyers that he intended to lay charges against Cowan. The basis of Howe’s case was that Cowan had tried to defraud the Commonwealth by claiming a tax deduction to which he was not entitled. The charges rested solely on Cowan’s trip to Thailand, and the manner in which it had been recorded by the agency.

‘The conversation went on for two and a half hours‘, says Bowers. ‘Howe eventually got sick of it, and stood up and said, ‘that’s it, get Cowan down here now, or we’re sending the paddy wagon and we’ll bring him back here in handcuffs.’‘

As the three men left the detective’s office, Bowers remembers Howe ‘ranting and raving’ as they moved towards the foyer. As they passed a conference room, a high-ranking senior policeman in a light blue dress uniform noticed Jack Birney. He greeted the barrister, and the two got into a chat about the old days at the criminal court in Sydney, as Howe hovered in the background.

Bowers says as the conversation between the two old mates was winding up, the policeman said, ‘Jack, you remember — if there’s ever anything I can do for you …’. The barrister jumped in immediately, ‘Well as a matter of fact, there is one thing. If Detective Sergeant Howe were to issue a summons for Roger Cowan rather than coming down to the club to drag him away in handcuffs, I would be most appreciative?’

The senior police officer looked at Howe and said, ‘I think that can be arranged, can’t it, detective sergeant?’

Bowers says Howe could only growl, ‘Yes, sir!’

That evening, the lead story on the television news was that Cowan had been charged on four counts of fraud.

The likelihood that Mick Howe accidentally came across this evidence as he waded through thousands of travel agency documents is minimal. There was no money missing anywhere, and the travel agency had been paid in full by Cowan. Finding details of a particular journey, then discovering that it had been recorded incorrectly somewhere else would be an amazing stroke of luck. It would have been like finding a gold nugget in a haystack when you were actually looking for a needle.

Irene Southern remembers Howe’s visit clearly. ‘In actual fact, he had ‘waded through’ very few documents.’ She told Cowan later, ‘He spent a short time in the office, made a couple of casual requests, then went straight to your file and pulled out some documents. He knew exactly what he was looking for, and where to find it.’

Looking back, Roger Cowan supposes that a complainant from within the Club became aware of the discrepancy in the travel agency records, and tipped off Detective Sergeant Howe. It might have been mere coincidence that the old travel agency manager had been terminated a matter of days before Howe’s visit.

Jack Birney appeared for Cowan at the court hearing. Cowan’s main witness was the accountant who had prepared his tax returns for the previous year. He produced documents proving that Cowan had made no attempt to claim the Thailand trip as a tax deduction. Howe had not taken the simple and obvious step of obtaining a copy of the tax return, which would instantly have shown him there was no case to answer.

Cowan was found not guilty on all four charges.

During the hearing, Jack Birney was cross-examining Mick Howe. ‘Sergeant Howe, you have alleged that Mr Cowan committed fraud. Would you tell the court who he defrauded or attempted to defraud?’.

Howe’s answer: ‘I don’t have to say who it was.’

Former police gaming machine investigator, Steve Foote, tells what he knew of the history of the Poker Machine Task Force.

Howe, and the detectives he worked with, took a proposal to the Police Commissioner to set up the task force, probably around the late seventies or early eighties. They were asking for special resources to combat crime in clubs and were virtually a group of untouchables. The original brief was specifically to catch poker machine cheats, but the technology was progressing so fast in the early eighties, the opportunity for poker machine fraud all but vanished.

Foote says that when the task force’s main reason to exist all but disappeared, they had to find another focus to justify keeping the squad in operation, and they began to investigate club managers.

Says Foote: ‘Those guys in the task force always had a ‘holier than thou’ attitude, they were a pretty self-righteous group.’

Mick Howe resigned from the police force in 2005 at the level of Detective Inspector. He was contacted for his comments during the writing of this book but did not respond.

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Panthers ran its own travel agency for may years. It operated under a separate trust company.
↩︎
Jack Birney had been the Federal Member for Phillip from 1975 he was defeated by Jeanette McHugh in the 1983 election. Before his political career he’d been a barrister. ↩︎

← Part 24 · All Parts · Part 26→

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Negotiating a Good Deal Becomes the Act of a Criminal

Part 24 of 70 — Original Chapter: Chapter 8: A Taste of Injustice

This article forms part of the serialised republication of Panthers, Passion & Politics – The Roger Cowan Years.

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The second part of the police investigation was about the club’s purchase of 100 poker machines.

Bob Donaghy was one of the club’s two assistant managers, and his responsibilities included purchase of poker machines. Aristocrat was the largest manufacturer in the industry, but the Club had not bought any of its machines for quite a long period. Donaghy believed the quality of their machine design and security had slipped. But when the club was ready to freshen up its gaming area with 100 new machines, Donaghy recommended the latest release by Aristocrat, telling Cowan he now had confidence in their products.

They began to talk about cost. The listed price of the machines was $7,000 each. Cowan suggested that they go to Aristocrat with an offer. It was a large purchase, maybe even unprecedented in Australia. As such, it should warrant a considerable discount. They decided to offer $5,000 per machine. conditional on Aristocrat arranging the finance for leasing and subsidising the interest rate.

Aristocrat mostly agreed with the proposal but set a total price of $530,000 for the 100 machines; still an extraordinarily large discount on the $700,000 they would have paid at list price. Cowan and Donaghy were celebrating. It was a straightforward transaction, and they had done a great deal. The complications arose for Panthers in the accounting offices of Aristocrat.

Aristocrat had obtained leasing finance for the total amount of $530,000, and that was correct. But they had listed only 90 machines on their sale documents. In effect, they had financed 90 machines for $530,000 and given Panthers ten machines at no charge. It made no difference to the club, and it was Aristocrat’s own choice to account for the machines the way they did, but the ramifications moved even beyond the police investigations at Panthers in 1985, to resound in the Queensland Criminal Justice Commission in 1990.¹

The purchase was the subject of almost a full hour of questioning by Mick Howe after the fraud squad officer had left having no more interest. Cowan tried in vain to explain how the price of the machines and the interest rate had been discounted. He says the long conversation seemed to travel around in circles but it can be summarised easily in just a few paragraphs:²

Mick Howe: I have been to the Liquor Administration Board to examine the records of your poker machine purchases and I found that you had applied for the purchase of 100 machines. There were 100 serial numbers listed. I then did a survey of the machines in the club and found all 100 machines with those serial numbers. However, when I looked at the finance company records I found only 90 machines listed on their records.

Cowan: I don’t know what is listed in the finance company records, but I cannot understand what the problem is. We bought 100 machines at a heavily discounted price, and we correctly submitted licence numbers to the department. You know that all the machines have been installed, and you know that Aristocrat has been paid for them. I don’t understand what you think is wrong with the transaction?

Mick Howe: You know, that’s what I have been trying to figure out, and now I can see it. If the club goes broke, the finance company will only be able to repossess 90 machines, yet they have financed the payment for 100.

Reflecting on this exchange Cowan commented,

I was astounded at the detective’s logic: “Well so what!” I said. “We would hardly buy 100 machines if we thought we were likely to be going broke. In any event, if we had paid the list price for the machines, the borrowings would have been a lot more and the finance company’s security a lot less.”

Mick Howe remained unconvinced. He just did not get it.

The third matter for police investigation was the sale of the Station Street property. Rumours of something questionable in that transaction were investigated. Most of the police and government officers involved in the police raids on Panthers walked away satisfied that Cowan and the Club had nothing to answer on the original allegations.

Mick Howe stood out as the expectation.

The Station Street property transactions, discussed earlier in this series as part of the Club’s property strategy³, were also examined. Again, investigators found no evidence of criminal wrongdoing.

By now, most of the allegations that had prompted the raids had failed to produce the evidence investigators had hoped to find. For many involved, the matter appeared to be drawing to a close. Detective Sergeant Mick Howe saw things differently.

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Read Beyond the Book — Queensland Criminal Justice Commission for more on this. ↩︎
The following paragraphs are not a verbatim conversation but a paraphrasing of the conversation that eliminates the repetition and redundancy that characterises these types of discussion. ↩︎
See Part 13 — Bulding the Future, a Block at a Time ↩︎

← Part 23 · All Parts · Part 25→

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The First Shot at Phyro

Part 23 of 70 — Original Chapter: Chapter 8: A Taste of Injustice

This article forms part of the serialised republication of Panthers, Passion & Politics – The Roger Cowan Years.

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The first few questions of the interview, led by Detective-sergeant Mick Howe, implied that Phyro Holdings¹ was acting fraudulently, secretly, and without the knowledge of the Board. This complaint seemed of great interest to the fraud squad officer.

Cowan explained that Phyro was his family company, and it had a contract to provide certain services to the club. He reached into his desk drawer and handed over a contract. Some minutes passed as they went through the document. The fraud squad detective paused and drew Howe’s attention to one specific part on the last page of the contract. They both seemed surprised, and a quick look passed between them.

The fraud squad officer asked Cowan a few more questions, then made to leave. He said to Cowan,

I’ve heard enough. Mick might want to ask a few questions about some other matters, but I don’t need to be involved any further.

And he left the office.

Cowan says it took him a while to catch on to what had happened to cause the quick exit by the fraud squad officer.

That night I was lying in bed still trying to figure it out. What was in the contract that was such a surprise? They had not reacted until they reached the end of it. What was on the last page? Suddenly it hit me. The only thing on that page was the signatures of the parties to the agreement! Why would those signatures surprise them? Certainly, there was no surprise in mine being there, so it must have been one of the others.

It could only mean that the person who signed the letter of complaint to the Assistant Commissioner must have been the same person who had signed the Phyro contract. The person who wrote that the Board knew nothing of Phyro had actually signed the Phyro contract. No wonder the fraud squad detective signed himself off the case so quickly.²

The detectives had also told him that the informant was someone who was seen by the police as highly credible. A director who was a long-standing ex-chairman would certainly fill that description.

The letter of complaint has never been seen by any officer of the club, so its contents — and its signatory — can only be assumed. Whatever was in it, however, had brought large numbers of police and government officers on the Club. To prompt such strong action, the allegations must have led them to suspect dishonesty and breaches of the Registered Clubs Act.

What really bothers me about this affair is that the first part of the complaint had been discredited in the first half hour of the interview. The fraud squad officer acted accordingly. He was not wasting any more time once he saw that the complaint was flawed.

But Mick Howe was not so easily satisfied.

Current group chairman Barry Walsh³ was a director in 1985. He says it was the big topic of conversation around Penrith that the detective was after Cowan, and he was a very determined man.

‘But Phyro was no secret anyway’, says Walsh. It just wasn’t a big deal for anybody.’

Phil Bennett agrees with Barry Walsh that Phyro’s role and ownership were no secret. He says the investigative accountants went through everything at the time of the investigations.

I think one of them stayed on after the rest of us left. At that time Phyro Holdings was common knowledge. You would always read in the annual report, stuff about Phyro owning certain property.

Bennett points out that the name is “obviously compounded from Phyllis and Roger”.

Cowan remembers the several months of continuous inquiry as one of the most stressful periods he has ever experienced. The investigation itself was not a problem, he says, it was the rumours of Howe’s determination to ‘get him’.

The rumours were strong that Mick Howe had stated that he did not like Panthers, did not like me, and was confident he would find incriminating evidence. At that stage we were already a big organisation, with 850 employees. It is easy to make mistakes running a business that size. We had good systems in place, but there was always the fear that there might be something wrong that I knew nothing about, and it would be used against me.

I had that constant feeling of being in deadly competition with a well-armed predator and I was the defenceless prey. The hunter had all the time and resources he wanted, and he could attack from any angle. I had two choices, stand out in the open and let him see every side of the target, or go into defence mode by employing a good legal advisor.

I had chosen to stand out in the open. With the benefit of hindsight, it was a dumb move on my part.⁴

Barry Hubbard was also a director at the time of the police raid. He says everybody was feeling the pressures of Howe’s campaign.

Roger wondered if someone in the club was ‘talking’ to the police and giving them information. He went to each of the directors and asked us.

‘I told him “no”’, says Hubbard. But he was upset by the question.

I said, “Roger, if I knew of anything illegal that was going on in this club, I would first take it to the Board, and if nothing was done, only then would I go to the police”.

Hubbard says that around the time of the licensing raid, he was also questioned by a Penrith detective about a house he had bought from the club. The detective suggested that he had bought the house for nothing, or at a token fee. It was a ridiculous claim, says Hubbard, and he was easily able to prove that he’d paid the right amount for the house.

The same policeman later got in touch with him, asking did he know of anything dishonest that was going on in the club, and suggesting that he keep his eyes open. Hubbard assured him there was nothing, but the calls continued over the next couple of months, asking the same questions.

I wrote to the detective, telling him what I had told Roger. If I knew of anything untoward in the club, it would go straight to the board. If they did nothing, I would take it to the police. I also asked him to stop calling me.

For directors such as Hubbard, the repeated approaches from Howe and his colleagues reinforced the impression that the investigation was not winding down, despite the failure of the original allegations.

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Phyro Holdings Pty Ltd is the family company of Roger & Phyllis Cowan contracted to Penrith Rugby League Club Ltd to supply various services including the publications of The Panthers Magazine.
↩︎
Some 20 years later this scenario was replicated. Directors or former directors publicly asserting they had no knowledge of Phyro Holdings and the slipping on their story, showing they must have had knowledge. The final “slip-up” was during the Temby Inquiry when testimony by a former director in one session was recanted the next morning for fear of being in contempt.
↩︎
Barry Walsh was appointed Chairman when Leo Armstrong retired, and he held that position until 2009 when Don Feltis took the Chair.
↩︎
This approach was not unusual for Cowan, his belief that it was besst to be very open with investigators was considered naive by many colleagues and supporters of Cowan’s. Many saw it as a weakness that made him vulnerable to being ambushed. ↩︎

← Part 22 · All Parts · Part 24→

Commentary and Contributions

The End of Season Drinks That Weren’t So Cordial

A removed section from the original Chapter 8: A Taste of Injustice.

The Penrith-Parramatta game was the last home game of the 1984 season. If the Panthers won, it would mean a semi-finals appearance for the first time in the Club’s history.

By half-time it was becoming obvious that the game was not going well. During the second half, Cowan walked across and sat with the chairman, Leo Armstrong.

Cowan commented to Armstrong that it was pretty obvious this would be the last game of the season. He suggested to Armstrong that the success of the team should be acknowledged in some way. They — the CEO and Chairman — agreed to invite the players and officials back to the boardroom after the game.

Cowan admits he had not thought the invitation through carefully enough. Because it was a spur of the moment decision, only a few directors knew about it. At the time, though, it did not seem important.

At the start of the next board meeting, managers were asked to leave the room.

Don Ellks says,

It was the first time we had ever been asked to leave. Roger sat for some moments as if deciding what to do. He did leave, but reluctantly. After a while Leo came outside and said the board had moved a vote of no confidence in him, and that John Hewett had been re-elected as chairman.

The perceived slight on the directors who missed out on the after-game drinks had provided enough leverage for JohnHewett to make a grab for the chairman position he still resented losing. Cowan was in a tight spot. Conflict on the board had been effecting decision making since 1983, to the detriment of the Club.

This change would affect the morale of the management team. The turnover of the Club was increasing rapidly, scarcely a day seemed to pass without discussion of new initiatives, and it was vital to avoid any instability.

Sensitive negotiations were taking place to refinance the Club’s loans in a deal that would save the club hundreds of thousands of dollars. The reputation and experience of Leo Armstrong as a bank manager was an advantage – there was obvious respect for him by the negotiating bank.

One faction of the board, led by Armstrong, was supportive of management. As well, Armstrong was an excellent chairman, highly respected in the community, by staff and by the members. The other faction seemed to be driven by Hewett. He was seen as the leader of that faction, but Cowan believed he was being pushed by another director, Murray Clarke. Of late, these two had lost the respect of management, staff and quite a lot of members. In this instance they were not acting in the interests of the Club. Any publicity about the chairman’s removal had the potential to do damage.

Worse for Cowan was that Armstrong was about to be humiliated because he agreed with one of Cowan’s suggestions.

When the board called me back into the meeting, I had already decided that the resolution could do a great deal of damage. The negative publicity, the reaction of the members, the negative impact on the finance negotiations and the unfair impact on Armstrong’s reputation should be avoided at all costs. Importantly, the club’s constitution did not clearly give the Board the power to remove the Chairman and it needed a legal opinion. I refused to return to the meeting unless he was reinstated, or it went back to the members.

Cowan reminded the board that it was unconstitutional to continue the meeting without the company secretary. When they called on Don Ellks to come in to act as secretary, Ellks also refused.

During the following week, Hewett went to Cowan’s office to advise that the board had appointed him chairman. Cowan told him that he believed it was improper to move a vote of no confidence and damage Armstrong’s reputation over such a trivial issue. He told Hewett that the management team would continue to recognise Armstrong as the chairman unless there was compliance with the constitution and members of the club endorsed the vote of no confidence. A stalemate had been reached.

Soon after, two of the directors from the Hewett faction would resign, and a tentative peace would return to the board with Armstrong in the chair. Under the surface though, hostility continued to bubble. Hewett would seek revenge — and eventually get it. ‘The conflict between the two factions had been damaging the Club for years‘, says Cowan. ‘Now war had been declared in no uncertain terms.‘

The next election, in 1985, was the board’s first ever departure from its traditional practice of presenting itself as one solid unit for re-election. Neither Hewett nor Hubbard were re-elected to the board.

While Hubbard remains ambivalent about the events of those years, he says that Hewett was devastated. It hit him pretty hard, says Hubbard. ‘His health suffered, and I don’t know that he ever really got over it.’

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An Investigation Starts

Part 22 of 70 — Original Chapter: Chapter 8: A Taste of Injustice

This article forms part of the serialised republication of Panthers, Passion & Politics – The Roger Cowan Years.

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One afternoon in 1986, Roger Cowan was driving back from a meeting of the Registered Clubs Association in Sydney when he received a phone call from the club.

The call was to advise him that about 12 police and officers from the Liquor Administration Board had arrived at the club. They were demanding to see all the club records including minutes of meetings and financial records. There had been no prior notification of the raid. In Cowan’s absence, the task of meeting the officers fell to Glenn Matthews, then a young accountant. Nobody at the club had any idea of the purpose of the visit, or what they were looking for.

Phil Bennett¹, now with his own computer graphics company, was a gaming machine inspector for the LAB at the time and had worked with some of the police officers before. The officer leading the investigation was Detective Sergeant Mick Howe from the NSW Poker Machine Task Force. Howe had requested that Bennett join in the raid.

The group descended on the Club believing that Cowan would be on the premises. It was a logical assumption – he was there most days, from quite early in the morning. When he wasn’t, they jumped to the conclusion that he had seen them coming and left, adding fuel to the notion that he had something to hide.

Cowan, as we know, had not been in the club that day because of the meeting in Sydney. There was no way he could have known of the police visit.

At the time it was seen as a big deal, says Bennett. Mick had brought in a whole lot of people from other units – the Fraud Squad, Corporate Affairs, and the Sydney police unit that did all their accounting investigations.

The NSW police Poker Machine Task Force had been set up to overcome gaming machine crime. Steve Foote² came to Penrith as a police constable soon after the raid on Panthers. He was later to become part of the NSW police’s Licensed Gaming Investigation section. He is no longer in the police force, but he is aware of the raid, and of the task force and its history. The Task Force was, he says, ‘a clandestine operation that had special powers from the commissioner’.

Nothing like this had ever happened at the Club. The LAB investigated complaints from time to time, and made regular routine visits, but this was unprecedented. Before returning to the club, Cowan contacted the club’s solicitor, John Ffrench, to see if he knew anything about it and to ask for advice.

Ffrench’s first reaction was very cautious. He tactfully suggested to Cowan that if he was aware of anything that the police might find in their investigations, he should ‘come clean’.

The idea was, if there were any ‘snakes in the woodpile’, it would be better for John to know in advance rather than be surprised later. He satisfied himself that I had no knowledge of anything that could be of interest to the police, and we talked about what we should do next.

My preference was to simply answer all their inquiries and be quite open with the records. As far as I was concerned there was nothing to hide. But it was obvious that the police thought they had something, just because of the gung-ho way they were approaching the whole thing.

I wondered if I should have a solicitor with me when I was interviewed, but I still didn’t see the need. At first, John Ffrench thought that I should, but we finally agreed that I would go without legal representation and give the police every co-operation. In that way it would all be over quickly, and the club would be cleared of all suspicion.

That strategy backfired badly, but much later and for different reasons.

Ffrench called the officer in charge and set up an interview in my office for the following morning. In fact, that was the last involvement of the club’s solicitor in that chain of events. In hindsight that proved to be a serious mistake.

The officers conducting the interview were Mick Howe and a detective sergeant from the fraud squad. Cowan remembers being impressed by the fraud squad detective. He was highly qualified academically, asked probing questions, seemed to understand situations quickly and was all business and no nonsense. He seemed to assess what was happening quickly and then lose interest.

At that moment though, Cowan was asking himself how had he come to that point? Later, things would slowly fall into place and he would see a strong connection to an innocent event that caused some friction 2 years earlier at the end of Season 1984.³

The connections — between the end of season event and the police raid – began to fall in place for Cowan after the first police interview.

At the outset of the police interview, Cowan was told that the investigation arose from a written complaint to the Assistant Commissioner of Police. It would cover a number of issues, but there were three specific matters of importance. Cowan’s family company, Phyro Holdings Pty Ltd, was one matter. The second was related to the club’s purchase of 100 poker machines from Aristocrat. The third matter was the sale of a property in Station Street, Penrith, the site of the club’s premises before it moved to Mulgoa Road.

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Phil Bennett is the principal of Phil Bennett Consulting, established in 1989 to provide gaming consultancy services to clubs, hotels and casinos.
↩︎
Steve Foote grew up in the Penrith region, attending Penrith High School. After leaving the NSW Police Force, he took various roles in the safety & security sector. He is now retired and focuses on art.
↩︎
For Cowan there was a connection between this Police raid and an invitation to players & officials for drinks in the Boardroom after the final round game of the 1984 Season. You can read about this in Beyond the Book – The End Of Season Drinks That Weren’t So Cordial ↩︎

← Part 21 · All Parts · Part 23→

Commentary and Contributions

Major Player: Don Ellks

Don Ellks
*Image Source:* PRLC Annual Report 1976

Donald Stanley Ellks

Senior Manager/General Manager 1980s–1992

Donald (Don) Ellks was one of the most significant operational managers in Panthers’ history.Beginning as a casual barman carrying a drinks tray, he progressed through the ranks over more than twenty-five years to become General Manager, helping guide the club through its relocation to Mulgoa Road and the rapid growth that followed.

His association with Penrith Rugby League Club began through rugby league, including playing for St Marys and Penrith A Grade and serving as a committeeman.

Role in the Narrative

Don was an Assistant Manager then General Manager for the planning, establishment and ongoing operation of the club’s relocation to Mulgoa Rd and the addition of the hotel and Cables Ski Park.

He was also instrumental in supporting the unified governance model that ultimately transformed the management of Panthers.

Background

Born: 1940
Died: 2025

Recognition by Panthers
• Life Membership, Penrith Panthers (1994)

Relevance to Events Described

Panthers was early to recognise the importance of providing pathways for talent, effort and results to progress through the ranks instead of seniority. Don was a case in point, starting as a bar attendant and progressing to General Manager.

Don’s operational management skills and experience complemented Roger’s leadership. In the first few years after the relocation to Mulgoa Road, the club achieved strong double-digit year-on-year sales growth but remained under significant financial pressure. High interest rates, construction cost overruns and the operational demands of rapid expansion meant that increased turnover did not immediately translate into financial security. Don’s experience working in departments, managing departments and managing managers led to the development of the systems and procedures needed for the effective and efficient operation of all departments and the ultimate success of the relocation.

Don’s long history with rugby league and operations also provided Roger with valuable support in the boardroom and dealing with politics.

Don Ellks’ career reflected many of the qualities that underpinned Panthers’ growth during the Cowan era: loyalty, practical experience, operational discipline and a willingness to take responsibility.

While others often occupied the public spotlight, Don was a key figure responsible for turning vision into day-to-day reality.

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Editorial Note

This profile is presented as contextual background.
Additional material may be introduced as the narrative progresses.

The Right Structure. Finally!

Part 21 of 70 — Original Chapter: Chapter 7: The 16 Year Struggle to Streamline Rugby League

This article forms part of the serialised republication of Panthers, Passion & Politics – The Roger Cowan Years.

Start · Reader’s Guide · All Parts

The structural compromise — two CEOs answering to a single board — had not resolved the underlying problems. If anything, it had deepened them. By the early 1980s, the consequences were becoming impossible to ignore — both on and off the field.

The Gibson years saw the Penrith football team continue its sad record of recent times. The club was putting major resources into building the new premises, and there was criticism that the team’s rugby league performance was a direct reflection of that spending.

In their 1992 book Bound for Glory, Greg Pritchard and Gary Lester tell of that period. They quote 1980-81 coach, Len Stacker, as saying that rugby league funds had been frozen before the 1981 season, although this has been disputed by Roger Cowan. Stacker also said he had been forced to bring in some ‘blokes from the bush’ to prop up the numbers. One of these bush blokes turned out to be Royce Simmons, the hero of Penrith’s first premiership and the city’s favourite son.

Also playing for Penrith at the time was Tim Sheens. He had finished 1982 with the club record for the number of games played (166) and was looking forward to the season. Gibson went off on his Kangaroo tour, telling Sheens he would talk to him when he came back.

When Gibson returned, Sheens went to his office to see him. Gibson told him that there was no point in even sitting down. The club had overspent and there was no room for Sheens, who was dropped from the team. Instead, they had signed Tony D’Arcy, a rugby union international, at almost twice the salary of Penrith’s highest paid player. D’Arcy was never to play a first-grade game for Penrith.

By the end of 1983, the football club reached its lowest level yet. It finished close to the bottom of the competition, it had only two players on contract for the following year, and it had no coach.

Even Royce Simmons has said he seriously considered leaving the club at the end of 1983. Community support had dropped along with the team’s performance, resulting in an income shortfall. An injection of funds was urgently needed, but the club was being held on a tight budget. The club under construction over on the Mulgoa Road property incurred significant cost increases, causing anxious moments in management and at the bank.

The dismal prospects now facing the football team were enough to convince the Board. It finally voted to put rugby league back under the control of Roger Cowan. Gibson left soon after and successfully sued the club for wrongful dismissal. Keith Rhind, when he took the chairman’s seat, had formed a close friendship with Gibson but he would ultimately be instrumental in Gibson’s departure from the club.

‘It was one of the worst periods in my life’, he says, ‘and it still upsets me to think about it.’

When it came to the vote that would ultimately oust Charlie, it was four all and I had the casting vote. But I had been put in an impossible position. Whichever way I went, I was going to lose friends, but I knew that things couldn’t continue the way they were. I did what I believed was best for the club and voted to move the responsibility for rugby league to the licensed club management.

When it came to the vote that would ultimately oust Charlie, it was four all and I had the casting vote. But I had been put in an impossible position. Whichever way I went, I was going to lose friends, but I knew that things couldn’t continue the way they were. I did what I believed was best for the club and voted to move the responsibility for rugby league to the licensed club management.

The board decided that Cowan’s role would be expanded to include both the licensed club and the rugby league club, and his contract was changed again by mutual agreement. There would be one board of directors and one chief executive of the entire organisation.¹ It was the model that Cowan had been advocating for so many years.

After a decade of advocating change, Cowan now had the chance to prove the model that he had recommended. But he had a massive job ahead of him. Three years of compromise had put the club into a weak position. It had money problems, no coach and hardly any players.

He attacked the problem using a tactic that had proved successful within the licensed club. The think-tank-style brainstorming sessions had produced many good ideas for the business, so he decided to carry it through in his new role.

At the end of 1983, he invited a large number of key stakeholders to attend workshops at the Club. The objective was to bring together the people who had an interest, or who would benefit from a successful, competitive rugby league team. There were directors and players, club officials and some former players, representatives from the media and local businesses, even some politicians. The junior league and school rugby league were also well represented. He told them they had to take ownership of the problems, and find solutions they could all support.²

The workshops were facilitated by Cowan. Despite the gloomy outlook, there was a great deal of enthusiasm and a commitment to succeed irrespective of obstacles.

Again, the results would be positive – this time for rugby league in the district.

There had never been a state or Australian representative player from the Penrith Junior District. Arising from the workshop, the Five by Five Committee was formed. Its goal was to develop five representative players in five years – and it succeeded.

The schools and junior league forged closer relationships, and ideas came up for a stronger junior competition. Profiles of coaches were drawn up. But the most important outcome was a greater feeling of ownership and sharing of the problems throughout the community.

Tim Sheens attended the workshops, but he had a family commitment and left early. Cowan says he had been most impressed by Sheens’ contribution to the workshops and by his strong sense of loyalty to Penrith. Much of the discussion had centred on the type of coach they would need. Sheens had presented strong ideas about coaching and players – and about club management.

It became clear to Cowan that Sheens would be the ideal coach for Penrith. When he discussed his thoughts with some close associates, he found that they had been equally impressed.

When Cowan contacted Sheens, he discovered he was too late. He and wife Rhonda were moving to North Queensland. They had sold their furniture and were ready to leave within days. Further meetings followed, including a momentous dinner with the couple. By the end of the night, both could see the opportunity.

Rhonda Sheens encouraged her husband to take up the challenge. It was a big decision for her — she had been looking forward to a move back to Queensland to be closer to her family. Tim Sheens became the first grade coach, and agreed to also take on some management duties, including recruitment of players.

In his first year, Penrith missed the play-offs by a whisker. In 1985 Sheens guided the club to its first ever semi-final appearance.

For the following 15 years, the model stood firm. The board set all policy for the entire club including rugby league, and achieving that policy was the responsibility of one person, the CEO of the group. At times Cowan would take on the role of rugby league chief executive. He would have a manager looking after day-to-day issues, but be personally responsible for higher level decisions.

I really enjoyed that role, but when someone was doing a good job – Don Feltis and Mark Levy for instance – I promoted them to the top football position.

The reform had gone beyond the CEO and board — it now meant one management team working in harmony for the betterment of every part of Panthers. The catering manager was now just as likely to have input into rugby league strategies, as the rugby league CEO might have into staff motivation principles for the bars.

But even though Cowan had achieved the goal of ‘one board, one CEO’ at the end of 1983, the Board remained precariously balanced.

A spur of the moment decision by Cowan and Armstrong after a football game at the end of the 1984 season was enough to tip the balance, and almost put Hewett back in the chair. More importantly, it would put some events in motion that led to two police raids on Panthers.

The record books also show that from the time the model was implemented in 1984, there was a marked improvement on the rugby league side. In 1985 the first grade side made the semi-finals and in 1988, they lost a play-off for fifth place. In 1989 they made the finals. In 1990 they were grand finalists and in 1991 the Panthers won the trophy.

The success was not only on the scoreboard. A new sponsorship scheme with the Penrith Star newspaper began to ease the financial burden on the registered club. As the performance of the team improved, crowds began to pick up, which also had an impact on the bottom line.

Tim Sheens stayed until 1987, to be replaced by veteran coach, Ron Willey. Willey’s unorthodox methods led to unresolvable problems with the players, and Cowan negotiated a resignation settlement with him. In late 1989, Cowan and football chief executive Ross Gigg were able to recruit Phil Gould. Gould, who had begun his playing career with Panthers, had coached Canterbury to a premiership in 1988. After losing the grand final to Canberra in 1990, Gould steered the Panthers to their first premiership a year later.

In 1984, the same year that the new management model for rugby league was implemented, the club was opened in Mulgoa Road amid a fanfare of free publicity. It was a brand new model for licensed clubs, and it set the bar higher for the club industry. Both events were turning points for Panthers.

Although the new club opened in a blaze of favourable publicity, it had not been completed. The long delays in getting approvals and other factors beyond the club’s control contributed to a blow-out in the costs of construction. The main entertainment room was an empty shell until profits could be used to complete it. A large part of the car park was left unfinished.

In the planning phases of the new complex, the concept of motel accommodation came up. It would fit neatly into the club’s objectives, but the costs blow-out forced it into the “deferred ideas” drawer.

However, the builder could also see the potential. He made an offer to build a motel adjoining the new complex, and it was accepted. The agreement was that the club would sell the builder the required area of land for one dollar. The builder would then use the equity in that land to finance construction. Panthers would lease the motel back and manage it until it had the funds to purchase it. The Club had an option to purchase the motel and the land for the cost of construction, plus an agreed profit for the builder. The land would be part of that package and would be put back in at a one dollar value. It was a brilliant scheme, and it worked well for all the parties involved.³

The 54 room Panthers Motor Inn was completed in 1986, with 115 more rooms approved by the Board in 1988. The Club sold it – now 216 rooms – in 2006, for $28.5 million.⁴

Panthers barrister Terrence Lynch says that this transaction was one that DGR counsel, David Staehli, seized upon in the 41X inquiry, sure that at last he finally ‘had’ Roger Cowan. His hopes were dashed when Cowan was able to show exactly what had happened throughout the entire process.

The new rugby league regime brought the football club the successes that had eluded it for its first 17 years, including two premierships and several finals appearances. The new Panthers licensed club brought significant changes in management and structure, unprecedented growth, and the completion of assets that would ensure the security and cash flow of the organisation through some very difficult times.

But behind the scenes it was not all beer and skittles. John Hewett still carried a badly wounded ego. Cowan’s erstwhile friend and supporter, club patron Ron Mulock, was showing early signs of disapproval about the dramatic growth of the Club.

The football team was finally making its mark, and the business was showing the potential that would take it into the top 300 private companies. In the midst of the successes, trouble was simmering that would eventually bring Panthers and Cowan into their darkest periods.

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This decision fundamentally changed the governance structure of Panthers and helped resolve a decade of conflict over the management of rugby league. For a more detailed explanation of why the “one board, one CEO” model became so important see Beyond the Book — Why One Board, One CEO.
↩︎
Beyond the Book — The 1983 Strategic Reset explains how governance reform, the appointment of Tim Sheens and the Five by Five Committee formed part of a broader change in Panthers’ approach to football.
↩︎
The arrangement was designed to overcome the club’s immediate financial constraints. The builder funded construction and accepted the development risk, while Panthers retained the right to acquire the completed motel and land at a pre-agreed future price.
↩︎
The financial transactions around this part of the Mulgoa Road development would later be examined during the Temby 41X Inquiry where the legitimacy of the arrangement was able to be demonstrated. ↩︎

← Part 20 · All Parts · Part 22 →

Commentary and Contributions

How Penrith P Panther Was Born

Beyond the Book — Commentary & Contributions

Contributor: Phil Morehead

Phil Morehead was a partner in Thomas Marsden Advertising the advertising agency and design studio that supported Panthers for many years. Phil also was a long-time active member and President of the Penrith Valley Chamber of Commerce. In this contribution he recalls how Penrith P Panther came into existence and became a recognisable community figure.

All images courtesy of Phil Morehead and Thomas Marsden Advertising.

I believe Penrith P. Panther was one of the first mascots to represent a rugby league team in Australia.

I am not sure of the exact year, but I think it was probably in the late 1970s. Ron Workman was the football manager at the time, and he was a little difficult to convince that a mascot would be a good promotional tool.

Years later, at a function, Ron took full credit for Penrith P.’s creation, saying it was an idea he picked up when they went to America on an excursion looking at promotional ideas. I think the cheer girls may have been one idea adapted from America, but Penrith P. was home birthed.

The idea came to me from watching Humphrey B. Bear with my young son

At the time I was doing Max Wright’s Kingswood advertising — new Holdens, used cars and later Viscount Caravans. Max financed the project as part of his advertising.

I negotiated with Stafford Bullen to supply free kids’ passes to Bullen’s Animal World and Warragamba African Lion Safari, which Penrith P. would distribute at home games. Panthers’ contribution was to allow Penrith P. to parade at half-time and give out the tickets.

At the first game, we had Penrith P. distributing the passes from the back of a Max Wright sign-written ute, driving around the inside perimeter of the ground.

It turned into a nightmare.

We also brought 2KA into the partnership and did various pranks at games, with Frank Ley calling them live and promoting Max Wright, Bullens and the others involved.

Most of it was contra. Effectively, all parties were building community goodwill while getting promotional value at the same time.

When Max Wright passed away, 2KA took over ownership of Penrith P., which I think soon came under the control of the football club.

Later, Penrith P. was discarded due to the intellectual property disputes between the ARL and Super League. During the Super League year (1997), Super League came up with Penelope Panther but the suit was too difficult for the person wearing it. When the NRL formed they financed the development of club mascots and Paws and Claws. Claws are still active.

But the O.G. was Penrith P. Panther.

Max’s Note: Reggie Rabbit, with help from TV star Don Lane, debuted for South Sydney at the 1968 Grand Final. Despite Reggie preceding Penrith P. by some years, Penrith P was still one of the first mascots to take the field in Australian Rugbu League.

Related Themes

Culture · Growth · Innovation

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Rugby League’s Inner Circle

A removed section from the original Chapter 7: The 16 Year Struggle to Streamline Rugby League.

Cowan says that at the time of his campaign for one board, the NSW Rugby League was run by a clique. This was a widely held view within rugby league circles at the time. The General Committee consisted of delegates and vice-presidents from every club – more than 40 delegates attended the monthly meetings. It was extremely unwieldy and inefficient. It is difficult enough for a 15-person board to get to good decisions in reasonable time, says Cowan. He recalls his time on the NSWRL executive in the early seventies.

What’s really funny is that for a while I thought that I was in the clique. We used to meet before every general committee meeting and decide what we were going to support that night. There were about eight of us, and we all thought we were involved in the important decisions.

But I found out later that I was never really “in”. The “in” team was quite small. It was a bit like an archery target – you have the inner and outer circle of the bullseye. So, even though I was on the executive, I was on the outer circle. It took me till 1974 to work it out, and one night I publicly resigned from the executive over a decision they made, but I stayed on the committee as a delegate.

The week after his resignation Cowan crossed paths with Jack Gibson, the coach of Eastern Suburbs, who congratulated Cowan on making a stand. He said a lot of people were sick of the fact that a small group were running the league to suit themselves. The clique still existed in some measure until Super League came on the scene in 1995.

Tom Wilson also remembers the workings of the clique. At the time of the Mulgoa Road
purchase, he was a delegate to the NSWRL. The league was concerned about the bad state of many of the playing fields and was pushing clubs to make improvements.

Back then, the Penrith ground was leased to us by the Department of Lands. For us to commit to spending any large sums of money on doing anything, we would need them to guarantee us something like a forty-year lease. Anyway, there was some talk of having our own playing field on the new land. When I tried to explain all this at a league meeting, the chairman, Kevin Humphreys, accused me – in his inimitable fashion – of hedging. Basically, he said I was bullshitting. I objected and asked for an apology, which I got.

But of course, that was not the end of it. When we all went downstairs for the usual drink after the meeting, I was completely ostracised. The only person who came near me was Peter Moore [former Canterbury CEO]. It was a strong lesson.

Charlie Gibson was widely regarded as part of that inner circle. He was a good friend of Humphreys, and the man that Mackie and the Super Six recommended for the job of rugby league secretary for Penrith.

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Related Themes

Conflict · Governance · Football Club

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Part 25 of 70 — Original Chapter: Chapter 8: A Taste of Injustice

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Part 24 of 70 — Original Chapter: Chapter 8: A Taste of Injustice

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Part 23 of 70 — Original Chapter: Chapter 8: A Taste of Injustice

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Part 22 of 70 — Original Chapter: Chapter 8: A Taste of Injustice

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Donald Stanley Ellks

Role in the Narrative

Background

Relevance to Events Described

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Editorial Note

Part 21 of 70 — Original Chapter: Chapter 7: The 16 Year Struggle to Streamline Rugby League

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Beyond the Book — Commentary & Contributions

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