Super League — The Real Money Fight

For most rugby league supporters, the Super League War is remembered as a bitter struggle between the Australian Rugby League and Rupert Murdoch’s News Limited.

That description is accurate—but it tells only part of the story.

Looking back three decades later, it is easy to view the conflict simply as a battle over the control of rugby league. At the time, however, respected financial journalist Robert Gottliebsen argued that the game itself was not the real prize. In an article published in the Australian Financial Review in April 1996, he described Super League as just one front in a much larger corporate struggle involving Australia’s emerging pay television industry, the nation’s two largest telecommunications companies, and two of its most powerful media empires.

In Gottliebsen’s view, rugby league had become one of the weapons in “the real money fight.”

A Bigger Vision

The origins of that conflict can be traced back several years before the first Super League contracts were signed.

Around 1992, Rupert Murdoch and Frank Blount, the Managing Director of Telstra, began discussing the enormous potential of cable and satellite technology. Their vision extended well beyond television. They believed that broadband networks would eventually carry not only entertainment but also telephone services, banking, retailing, medical services, gambling and countless other forms of communication.

To pursue that vision, Murdoch suggested bringing Kerry Packer into the venture. The proposal became known as the PMT consortium—Packer, Murdoch and Telecom.

For a brief period, Australia’s two most influential media families appeared to be working towards a common future.

It did not last.

The Alliance Breaks Apart

As Australia’s telecommunications industry prepared for competition, Optus recognised the strategic value of Kerry Packer’s media interests and encouraged him to align with its own plans.

Murdoch, meanwhile, ultimately partnered with Telstra.

What had begun as a shared vision quickly evolved into competing alliances.

Telstra and Murdoch established Foxtel.

Optus assembled its own powerful consortium, supported by Kerry Packer and eventually the Seven Network.

Suddenly, the emerging pay television market had become a battleground between rival telecommunications companies, rival media organisations and rival strategic visions for Australia’s communications future.

Billions of dollars were now at stake.

Gottliebsen reported that Telstra’s own internal modelling suggested as much as $7–8 billion of corporate value could be affected depending on which side prevailed.

Why Rugby League Suddenly Mattered

Pay television needed something that could persuade Australians to subscribe.

Movies were important.

News was important.

But live sport was essential.

Existing broadcasting arrangements meant Kerry Packer’s Nine Network already held the free-to-air rights to rugby league. When Murdoch’s executives struggled to secure premium sporting content for Foxtel, creating a new national rugby league competition became a commercially attractive option.

From this perspective, Super League was far more than a football competition.

It became part of a much larger contest over subscribers, broadcasting rights, market share and ultimately the future of Australia’s communications industry.

This does not diminish the genuine rugby league issues that also existed. Questions about the game’s administration, its national expansion, club structures and commercial future were all real and important. However, Gottliebsen argued that these football issues had become intertwined with a much broader corporate struggle that most supporters could neither see nor fully appreciate while it was unfolding.

What It Meant For Penrith

None of these corporate manoeuvres were visible to most Panthers members or supporters.

They saw clubs changing sides.

Players signing confidential contracts.

Court battles.

Television cameras.

Public accusations of betrayal.

Behind those events, however, some of Australia’s largest corporations were fighting over far more than rugby league.

Understanding that broader context helps explain why events moved so quickly during 1995 and why the decisions confronting clubs became so significant.

For Penrith, the immediate question was never which media company would ultimately prevail.

Would Panthers still have a place in the highest level of rugby league when the dust finally settled?

That was the question management sought to answer in Part 29.


Continue Exploring the Super League Story

These companion Historical Context articles examine different aspects of Panthers’ decision to join Super League:

  • The Panthers Move — How the Penrith Panthers came to join the new competition.
  • When Panthers Faced the Community — How Panthers’ decision affected its members, supporters and the wider Penrith community.
  • The Real Money Fight — The corporate battle that lay behind the Super League War.

Related Topics


Related Themes

Football Club · Conflict · Governance


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Super League — The Panthers Move

Part 29 — Joining Super League begins with a deceptively simple statement:

“In May 1995 Panthers had resolved to leave the Australian Rugby League to join Super League…”

Read in isolation, it almost sounds like an ordinary administrative decision. In reality it followed months of uncertainty, strategic analysis and one of the most turbulent periods in rugby league history.

It would be easy for a reader to miss the nuance and significance behind that statement — it sounds almost as simple as resolving to change the club’s soft drink supplier.

The opening phrase is followed up with a hint that this was, in fact, a major decision and noting that Super League was a new competition established by News Limited.

Many simplify the establishment of this new competition as an attempt by Murdoch to attain the broadcast rights of rugby league for his pay television platform, Foxtel. This was true. Kerry Packer’s Consolidated Press held those rights but they were not being used — and it was commonly believed that the Packer deal did not represent the true value of the game.

It’s worth briefly doing a quick history — to take us up to that point in May 1995 when the Penrith Panthers made their resolution to join Super League.

Just over a year before Penrith’s resolution, in April 1994, John Ribot (Chief Executive Officer, Brisbane Broncos) sent Ken Cowley (Chief Executive, News Ltd) a report outlining the concept of a new structure for rugby league in Australia. This was followed up in May 1994 with discussions of the concept with some leading players.

By August 1994 News Ltd had moved well beyond an idea. It had developed an outline for an entirely new national competition. The main points of this outline were:

  • To establish an elite national competition (including New Zealand) between 12 privately owned teams. Up to 4 of these teams to be owned by News Ltd.
  • Superleague Ltd would get revenue from sponsorship, free-to-air and pay television rights, gate receipts and merchandising. New Ltd would receive a 15% management fee and the profit shared amongst the 12 clubs.
  • The 12 clubs would be:
    • 4 based in Sydney
    • 4 continuing teams — Brisbane, Canberra, Newcastle and Auckland
    • New teams in Perth, Adelaide and Melbourne

The greatest challenge was reducing eleven Sydney clubs (plus Illawarra) to four Sydney franchises. News Ltd proposed grouping clubs into sets of three and inviting them to jointly own a single Super League franchise.

For example: Wests, Parramatta, and Penrith could be grouped together and offered a franchise. Ownership would be split evenly between those clubs taking up the offer. The owner of the old club eg Penrith Rugby League Club Ltd would be entitled to 50% of its share of the new club, the other 50% would be offered directly to members.

Over the remaining months of 1994 there was considerable media speculation and News Ltd and ARFL Ltd executives held private discussions.

Following those discussions, Ken Arthurson (ARFL Ltd Chairman) and John Quayle (ARFL CEO) issued agreements to each of the 20 existing club aimed at securing their loyalty to the ARL for the 5 season starting 1995. All 20 clubs signed these agreements by November 1994.

On 6th February 1995 News Ltd presented their proposal to the ARL — offering the ARL positions on the Super League Board as well as the ongoing rights to administer various rugby league programs.

On that same day Kerry Packer addressed the 20 clubs declaring his ownership of the broadcasting rights (free-to-air and pay television) until the year 2000. Part of this address was a threat to sue any club that joined a Super League competition. A short time later in February 1995 all 20 club signed another agreement — the so-called Loyalty Agreements — reinforcing those signed 4 months earlier.

Packer’s declaration made one thing abundantly clear. The dispute was no longer simply about rugby league administration. Rugby league had become the battleground in a much larger corporate struggle over broadcasting, telecommunications and pay television. Robert Gottliebson in an Australian Financial review article in April 1996 suggested this was a battle where $7 billion dollars was at stake.

Packer’s declaration made one thing abundantly clear. The dispute was no longer simply about rugby league administration. Rugby league had become the battleground in a much larger corporate struggle over broadcasting, telecommunications and pay television. Robert Gottliebson in an Australian Financial review article in April 1996 suggested this was a battle where $7 billion dollars was at stake.

By late March 1995, after having their momentum slowed by the reaction of Packer, the ARL and the club, News Ltd resolved to press on. In their eyes they had three strategic choices as shown in the table from Super League Case Study a 2003 research paper for Victoria University written by Robert D, McDonald.

News Ltd elected to take the third approach and start a “rebel competition”.

Their attack was on two fronts:

  1. In late March, early April News Ltd launched an aggressive and clandestine campaign — a ”blitzkrieg” — to sign players and coaches for the rebel league.
  2. Legal action commenced challenging the validity of the two agreements clubs had signed in November 1994 and February 1995.

The early targets for Super League were Brisbane, Canberra, Auckland and Canterbury. When news broke that players and coaches from these four clubs had signed with Super League, there was a flurry of signing activity from both Super League and the ARL.

Neither side approached the Penrith Panthers.

Here’s how the Super League clubs fell:

29 March — Canterbury-Bankstown Bulldogs. Key players signed contracts. Two day later an 1st April, Bulldogs CEO Peter Moore resigned his position on the Board of the NSWRL after aligning the club with Super League.

1 April — Brisbane Broncos. This is the date the Broncos defection broke publicly.  Broncos CEO, John Ribot, left the Broncos to become CEO of Super League at around the same time.

1-2 April — Cronulla- Sutherland Sharks. The Sharks’ players were signed after playing the Western Reds in Perth on 31st March.

2 April — Auckland Warriors. The players signed on this date. Coach John Monie had signed late in March. The Board signed the club to Super League on 20th April.

2-3 April — Canberra Raiders. Following the news breaking on April Fool’s day, most of Canberra’s high profile roster signed.

Early April — Western Reds and North Queensland Cowboys.

During all this activity and publicity there were no communications, offers or invitations for teh Penrith Panthers — from either the ARL or Super League.

The management team at Panthers was very concerned by the silence and paid close attention to every piece of information that could be found about what was happening on both sides of the battle. A comprehensive critical analysis of the situation facing Panthers was undertaken — despite the fact reliable information was scant.

The analysis process was steered by Outcomes Thinking. Rather than beginning with today’s problems, Outcomes Thinking began by defining what success would look like several years into the future. (See Beyond the Book: Education by Experience.)

The highest-level outcome was simply:

Our first step towards survival was to ensure that at least one of the two sides were interested in having Panthers in their competition.

Super League represented the best opportunity to create that interest — among the reasons for this conclusion was that their team list, to date, only included two Sydney-based clubs, Canterbury-Bankstown and Cronulla-Sutherland.

There was also a strong belief Panthers had a compelling case that News Ltd had not yet fully appreciated — while the ARL had had many years to understand the strengths of the Penrith club.

Cowan requested a meeting with Ken Cowley and John Ribot. At that meeting he let them know Panthers hadn’t made any decisions about its future and that we’d be an important club to either Super League or the ARL. In particular, rugby league in Penrith had strong financial backing from the largest licensed club and it also ran junior rugby league with the strongest participation anywhere in the country.

The meeting achieved its immediate objective. Super League, which until then had shown no interest in Penrith, quickly reassessed the club’s strategic value. Negotiations followed and an agreement was reached within days.

That brings us back to the opening of Part 29, where the Penrith Panthers formally resolved to become the eighth club to join Super League.


Continue Exploring the Super League Story

These companion Historical Context articles examine different aspects of Panthers’ decision to join Super League:

  • The Real Money Fight — The corporate battle that lay behind the Super League War.
  • When Panthers Faced the Community — How Panthers’ decision affected its members, supporters and the wider Penrith community.
  • The Panthers Move — How the Penrith Panthers came to join the new competition.

Related Topics


Related Themes

Football Club · Conflict · Governance · Financial Management


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Joining Super League

This article forms part of the serialised republication of Panthers, Passion & Politics – The Roger Cowan Years.

Start · Reader’s Guide · All Parts

In May 1995 Panthers had resolved to leave the Australian Rugby League to join Super League, the new competition being established by Rupert Murdoch’s multi-national corporation News Limited. It had been one of the most difficult decisions the Club had faced.1 Cowan had spent months analysing the situation with both Board and management before a consensus recommendation was finally put to the directors.

Not long before the decision was made, he was still hoping the problem would go away. Long-time Parramatta CEO, Denis Fitzgerald, remembers Cowan standing up at a CEO function at Souths Juniors, speaking passionately about ‘putting up the barriers to News Limited’.

Within a week he’d gone to Super League. I have to say I lost some degree of confidence in Roger after that particular situation.

There was no doubt that Cowan initially supported staying with the ARL and a short time later changed his position — he was nervous about the way things were shaping up and feared that Penrith might miss out completely.  

Coach Phil Gould had asked for a release from his contract with Panthers2 to go to Easts, citing the exciting things that Easts were proposing to do in rugby league. Kerry Packer was putting pressure on clubs to stay loyal to the ARL, but was not offering anything specific, and he had a contract with the ARL to protect.

There were rumours that Packer and a few clubs, including Easts and Manly, were involved in a plan to cull some clubs in order to make a stronger and more profitable competition.3 The rumours fitted with Gould’s statements when he asked for a release but there was never any real evidence to support the rumours.

But rumours often travelled faster than fact during this period — it was increasingly difficult for clubs to distinguish genuine intelligence from speculation.

Packer appeared to have the TV rights tied up for a ridiculously low price and something was in the wind. Fewer teams in the competition would give the remaining teams a bigger slice of the TV revenue. A higher standard of competition would increase the TV value.

First-hand experience had left Cowan with the suspicion that there would no hesitation in cutting clubs that were outside the clique and considered expendable. For him it was another case of risk management. The first step in risk management is to identify the risk. In this case there was a chance that both media organisations, headed by Packer and Murdoch, were both planning how to maximise the commercialisation of Rugby League.

What was the risk to Penrith?

It seemed highly likely that both organisations would want a 12-team competition. They would also want a National Competition including Perth, Adelaide, Melbourne, New Zealand, Newcastle, Brisbane, even North and South Queensland.   It followed that some Sydney clubs would be dropped.   Both groups would already know which teams they wanted in an elite competition.

Neither side had shown any interest in approaching Penrith.

Considering the connections, it was impossible to think Manly or Easts would lose out. Parramatta and St George would seem to be certainties and that might leave only one spot for another Sydney club.

As it turned out, fewer teams was exactly what the Murdoch side wanted. There was never any evidence of any plans by the other side to drop Sydney teams.4 The rumours were never substantiated, but the value of the TV rights was later proved to be more than twenty times what Packer had contracted to pay.

Cowan recalls it was a difficult time.

There was no way of knowing what was happening behind the scenes and the departure of Phil Gould had built a feeling of uncertainty in my mind about the future of the game. I felt that something was going on. I started to think about how we would handle worst case scenarios, and the worst-case possibility was that the two sides would get together and form an elite National Competition of 12 teams. All the other teams would then be relegated to a supporting competition. On all the evidence I could see, the risk of Penrith being one of those relegated teams was very high indeed.

When the two media giants started shaping up to each other it was obvious that Panthers was not a high priority for either of them. It was a worrying time and I started to feel that we had to consider our position carefully and urgently.

All the clubs that had so far joined Super League had been approached by News Limited. Penrith had not. Cowan went to News and put the case that the new competition needed Penrith.

David Gallop, CEO of the new National Rugby League [NRL] remembers that Panthers was the last Sydney club to join.

Roger looked pretty carefully at the ramifications of joining or not. It took him longer to decide.

Cowan became a prominent player in the world of Super League. He was on the board, and chaired its meetings during what became known as the Super League Wars.

He was also invited to be on the international Super League board. In that capacity he attended an international board meeting in Paris, along with representatives from Australia, New Zealand, France, England, South Africa, USA and Pacific Islands. Cowan says this experience gave him an excellent opportunity to get to know the people who were driving Super League, including News Limited executives. 

Super League was due to commence in 1996 with ten teams, but a Federal Court ruling delayed its launch. Instead, a traditional ARL competition was played while the legal battle continued. At the end of 1996 the Federal Court ruled in favour of Super League, allowing the rival competition to proceed in 1997 alongside the ARL. Australian rugby league was now heading into one of the most turbulent periods in its history.


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  1. For readers seeking historical background to the emergence of Super League and Panthers’ decision to join the new competition, see the three realted Historical Context articles The Panthers Move ; The Real Money Fight ; and When Panthers Faced the Community
    ↩︎
  2. This had happened in the middle of the 1994 ARL Season. I think the Souths v Penrith at the SFS on 17th June 1994 was Gould’s last as Penrith coach. We lost that game 26-18 after being well down at half-time. Several players remarked that Gould’s half-time address was uncharacteristically one of resignation – they were puzzled by it.
    ↩︎
  3. One of the catalysts for those rumours was a large offer being made to Canberra lock Brad Clyde, which would have torpedoed salary cap limits. Of course, these sorts of accusations fly through the rugby league world.
    ↩︎
  4. There weren’t rumours about an elite ARL competition after Murdoch made his strike – at that time they were intent on staving off the raid from Murdoch. Before Murdoch struck, there were rumours about clubs opening their chequebooks in anticipation of a big change to the competition. ↩︎

Part 28 · All Parts · Part 30

Commentary and Contributions

The 1983 Strategic Reset — Did it Work?

The companion article explained how Panthers changed the way it thought. This article asks the obvious next question: did that change in thinking actually change the club’s fortunes?

One of the earliest outcomes of the strategic reset was the appointment of Tim Sheens as Manager-Coach

The “Coach” part of Sheens’ role delivered quickly, the team performance in the 1984 season was in stark contrast to the seasons before. His impact was roundly recognised and applauded by all, including his peers.

But the “Manager” part of the Manager-Coach role was more strategic, as was the role of the Five by Five Committee.

The stated goal — to have five local juniors named as Kangaroos within 5 years — was really about something far more valuable:  to shift the Club’s trajectory.

Was it successful?

Let’s look first at that main goal.

PlayerRepresentative TeamFirst ChosenPenrith Junior
Royce SimmonsAustralia1986No
Greg AlexanderAustralia1986Yes
John CartwrightAustralia1990Yes
Mark GeyerAustralia1990Yes
Brad FittlerAustralia1990Yes
Brad Izzard*NSW1990Yes
Steve CarterNSW1992No
Graham MackayAustralia1992No

*Brad Izzard had represented NSW in 1982 — before the strategic reset.

The Committee narrowly missed its stated target. More importantly, however, the effort reflected a broader ambition—to create a football club that the district could believe in and one capable of producing representative players consistently rather than occasionally.

Winning Games

The following table shows the results of the regular season games for the 10 seasons before and after the 1983 strategic reset. The Panthers won almost twice as many regular-season games during the decade following the strategic reset as they had during the preceding decade.

1974-19831984-1993
Games Played228228
Games Won66123
Win Percentage29%54%

Attack and Defence (Tries Scored & Tries Against)

The following table shows the tries scored and conceded during the regular season for the 10 seasons before and after the 1983 strategic reset. Note: I’ve used tries rather than points here because the value of the try changed from 3 to 4 in 1983.

The Panthers attack improved by 4% which is inconsequential. More importantly defence improved by 38%.

1974-19831984-1993
Games Played228228
Total Tries Scored614638
Total Tries Against872539
Tries For – Tries Against-258+99

The improvement in defence is extremely important – Strong defensive records are widely regarded as one of the defining characteristics of premiership-winning teams. Defence speaks volumes about the character and culture of a club – the change represents a distinct shift in both for the Penrith Panthers.

Overall, the Panthers’ tries-for-and-against differential moved from –258 to +99—a turnaround of 357 tries. In other words, they went from consistently being outscored to consistently outscoring their opponents.

Final Ladder Position

The numbers above suggest a big difference in performance of Penrith team before and after the changes put in place between the 1983 and 1984 seasons.

As to the trajectory. The graph below shows the finishing position of the Panthers for the 10 years before (red) and the 10 years after (blue) the late 1983 changes.

There is a distinct and positive difference between the two decades in being compared.

A further consequence of the change …

The following table shows average home crowd for regular season games, comparing the 10 seasons before and after the 1983 strategic reset. Crowds increased by 20%.

Home Games1974-19831984-1993
Played114114
Total Attendance871,0421,047,261
Average Crowd7,6419,187

Conclusion

No single committee, coach or governance reform can claim sole responsibility for the transformation of Penrith Panthers during the 1980s. However, the evidence strongly suggests that the strategic reset undertaken in late 1983 fundamentally altered the club’s direction. The Five by Five Committee did not achieve its headline target exactly as written, but the broader ambition—to reshape the football club’s future—was overwhelmingly realised.


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The 1983 Strategic Reset

The Low Point

In the 2001 publication Hooked On League: Royce Simmons1,  Royce tells the story of Darryl Brohman asking his advice, at the end of 1983, about an offer he’d received to move to Canterbury-Bankstown. Royce’s advice paints a clear picture of the state of the Penrith Panthers at that time:

… thanks for thinking of us but right now we’ve got five players on contract and you’re a free agent being chased by probably the best club in the world.

The reasoning behind Royce’s that advice is also telling:

I don’t think he wanted to leave us high and dry but we told him that we were high and dry whether he stayed or not.

Simmons’ view was that “things were looking bleak” for Penrith.

In fact, things were so bleak, even the independently run Panthers Supporters Club had dissolved at the end of 1983 and needed its own reset. The supporter’s club had two Panther diehard supporters — Cathy O’Kane and Berryl Moss who took on the task of whipping up wider support for the 1984 Season and beyond.

And Panthers had Roger Cowan who had finally been granted the governance structure he’d so long been advocating.

The Change

One of Cowan’s first steps under the new One Board, One CEO structure was to involve more people in finding solutions to serious problems. Problems like the performance of the rugby league team.

Royce had been weighing up whether to leave Penrith when he was invited to join the effort to find those solutions. He described that first step to a reset of football fortunes.

Prior to the start of the 1984 season Roger Cowan organised a series of seminars at Penrith Leagues Club — a ‘think-tank’ involving prominent Penrith business people, junior rugby league administrators, past and present players, and local community leaders. In one of the groups, Tim Sheens’ name came up as a possible coach.

It was an approach that mirrored what he had done with the licensed club in the early days of his tenure.

This symposium produced a range of strategies and goals, two of the goals had a significant impact on Panthers football performance.

The first, most immediate, goal was to secure Sheens for the coaching position — it was late in 1983, training for the 1984 season needed to begin soon yet Penrith had few players and no coach. This was a pressing need. And it was a challenging task given the fact Sheens had sold his real estate business and was preparing up to move his family to Queensland.

Royce worked in the background to get Sheens to stay, but says:

I’m sure Roger Cowan worked the hardest to convince Tim to take on the job.

[He] really went out of the way to chase hard and talk Tim out of going. The players played a supporting role in letting Tim know that we’d support him.

Tim signed on as the club’s first Manager-Coach.

Appointing a Manager-Coach was unusual in the rugby league world — although it was a pressing short-term need to appoint Sheens as coach, expanding the role was a strategic move.

The second goal was more long-term and strategic — to have 5 Penrith juniors selected for the Kangaroos — the Australian Rugby League team. A Five by Five Committee was established to take responsibility for developing initiatives to achieve this goal.

Don Feltis was a member of this Committee:

We talked about strategies and all the rugby league development issues … like making sure our best juniors were selected into representative squads; to set up development squads — age groups between the representative squads — like 13s, 15s and 17s and give them personalised coaching; panels to interview possible coaches and to have only the best coaches — and to have all our coaching techniques standardised so that all our juniors from 13s to  19s were getting similar tuition … under the guidance of Tim Sheens.

It was a great exercise and made a lot of difference to the future development of our club. … it made us all wake up and realise all the things we had to do to be successful. Roger had always been a dreamer … a visionary. He realised we had to lift our club up from the level we were performing at.

A Different Way of Thinking — from Goals to Outcomes

The stated goal of the Five-by-Five Committee was to have five home-grown players represent Australia within five years.

Looking back, this appears to have been an early example of a planning philosophy Roger Cowan would later apply much more broadly throughout the Panthers organisation. That philosophy centred around “outcomes thinking“.

This goal was an outcome – a description of a future that would be proof of a successful project. During the 90s at Panthers this would have been framed:

 In November 1999 (5 Seasons away) the Australian Kangaroos have included five representatives from Panthers who were developed in the Penrith Junior Rugby League District.

Working backwards from that future enabled a more creative approach to uncovering the initiatives, programs and strategies that would have a positive effect on creating that future. Initiatives like those described by Don Feltis above.

The Five-by-Five goal was never intended as a prediction. It was a deliberately ambitious picture of what success would look like if the club fundamentally changed the way it developed players in their huge junior catchment area.

Quite quickly early indicators drove some optimism —  the governance model reduced conflict, Cathy and Berryl re-launched the supporters’ club, Tim Sheens had players wanting to stay, and the team began making its way up the competition ladder.2

Continue: The 1983 Strategic Reset — Did It Work? examines whether the strategic changes introduced in late 1983 produced measurable improvements in the Panthers’ football performance over the following decade.


  1. Hooked On League: Royce Simmons with Alan Whiticker published 2001. Chapter 19.
    ↩︎
  2. The headline in the SMH clipping is dramatic but not accurate – Penrith had been in the top 5 before, a few times but only once before had they been there after at least 5 rounds of a season. ↩︎

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Education by Experience

A removed section from the original Chapter 9: An Urgent Need for Research and Change.

IN THE COURSE of more than a year and a half of research and writing for this book, I conducted a large number of interviews. For obvious reasons, more than one of those was with Roger Cowan. Many of our discussions focused on the way things were done at Panthers.

On one occasion, I asked a very specific question. How did that little club evolve into the half billion dollar enterprise that is Panthers today? What made the difference, what did he see as the most important parts of the management philosophy during his 40 years at the helm?

It was an important question, and he wanted plenty of time to consider. Eventually, we decided that it would work better if Roger answered it in his own words.

It is difficult to answer this question because 40 years is such a long time. Many changes have occurred along the way — in knowledge, attitudes, technology, even the way the industry is regulated. In the earlier days  I used a calculator for payroll.

To multiply by seven, for example, we turned a handle seven times. Accounting and stock control were all done manually. The management tools available today demand a much different approach to the use of management time and the expectations of administrative productivity. In many ways, management change has been driven by the changing environment.

The other difficulty I have in answering the question is that I was always inclined to try something new if it looked good. Some things were effective for a while, and made a significant difference at the time, but failed to see the long distance. Some became permanent influences and some failed completely. Some seem too small to mention, yet they held a lot of significance for me.

Applying a very strong filter, I came up with what I considered to be the three most important influences. I am sure it would be an interest­ing debate if members of our management teams were asked the same question. But there is a common thread that runs through the three I have chosen. Each one has quite a lot to do with the need to manage evolu­tionary change rather than merely cope with it. We tend to cope with the results of evolution in our private lives, but business requires a different level of thinking.

Thinking in Outcomes. The success of the human race has depended on the ability to take in information and make rapid decisions. Imagine if our hunter and gatherer forefathers had held meetings to evaluate the knowledge they had gleaned from their observations and then debated what action should be taken. They would have died of starvation or been eaten, and we would not be here to write about it. The natural decision making process for humans is still the same. Our senses collect informa­tion, feed it into our brains in an amazingly short time, and this central processor quickly decides on the options and tells us what to do. Just as well we have that power. You see a car hurtling towards you, out of control, and there is no time to hold a brain storming session to work out how to survive.

Quick thinking is important to us as individuals. My theory, though, is that when it becomes the predominant thinking style used in business, it is often inappropriate and can be downright dangerous. Looking back, I think I harped and nagged about this principle more than anything else in management meetings and training sessions. I was never better than partially successful. It is actually quite difficult to break out of the natural thinking style. It requires discipline and technique. And as soon as you relax the discipline, the natural way of thinking takes over again.

The difference between quick thinking and thinking in outcomes is demonstrated in the following example. The Security Manager puts a proposal to a meeting: there has been an increase in behaviour problems in the club, and the security staff should be increased to deal with the situation. Others in the meeting, respecting the expertise of the Security Manager and seeing the logic of his suggestion, support the proposal. The Finance Manager agrees that the extra cost is affordable. A quick vote and it is all done.

But someone skilled in Outcome Thinking says, “Hold up there. Let’s first agree on what we are trying to achieve. Is it just to cope with increased behaviour problems, or is there more to it?”

The best way to answer that question is by imagining another meeting, some point in the future -say three months ahead. You sit in that meeting, and ask, “What evidence can we find today that proves we made a great decision three months ago? Not just a good decision, but a great one?”

One person might say there are more people visiting the club now than there were three months ago. That proves it was a good decision. Another might suggest that the cost of security has decreased. Others might add that there are fewer incidents of bad behaviour now, the people causing the problems three months ago have gone, there have been no negative stories in the newspapers, and so on.

The challenge is now much different. It is no longer about coping with increased behaviour problems by increasing costs. A great decision would achieve fewer problems, less cost and increased patronage.

The most important debate is about what outcomes the group is willing to support, and what it believes it can achieve. They will usually be much more challenging than expected. When there is an agreed set of outcomes, the next challenge is to find every possible idea for achieving them. That then brings out the creativity in management and usually achieves a better result.

The number -and quality-of ideas might be surprising. In this case it might mean changing the entertainment mix, increasing public relations, zero tolerance in some issues, a different marketing approach, or any number of bright ideas that would never be raised in the quick decision scenario.

The point is that the natural process of quick decision making is the killer of creativity, and often provides solutions to the wrong problems.

Thinking in outcomes ensures that the best goals are set and that they will be creatively pursued. It also encourages creative opposition, and avoids the dangers of ‘groupthink’, where people tend to go along with each other because of respect for expertise or position.

In this situation, you are able to manage the thinking processes, rather than going along with nature.

Values, Beliefs and Culture. Our deep-seated beliefs and values are mostly developed in the very early years. Culture develops from experi­ences, and dictates how people treat each other and expect to be treated. The behaviour in an organisation is a reflection of its culture. The combined beliefs and values of the staff, managers, board, and custom­ers form a rich cultural soup that has to meet the needs of everybody. We see examples every day, and in every part of the world, of the enormous problems caused by clashes of culture, most of which can be traced back to differences in beliefs and values.

Beliefs and values are not impossible to manage. We cannot ask people to change what they believe or how they feel, but we can structure an organisation around the differences. Being aware of the differences allows us to manage them, and achieve a positive culture without the clashes.

Recognition and understanding of values was one of the topics of man­agement training at Panthers. There are many ways of finding out what drives people. When there is better understanding, people work together more harmoniously. There are some good programs and tests available, and most of them are interesting and non-threatening.

One important advantage of setting agreed outcomes is that they define what the group wants to own and achieve in working together. Where there are opposite values, the list will be more limited, but there will still be common purpose.

There is another element in play in the club industry – one that is much less likely to affect other businesses of similar sizes. There is a much stronger board influence on culture, varying significantly from one club to another. Some directors in some clubs enjoy socialising with staff, talking to them during breaks and even – in ways ranging from very subtle to quite demanding – interfering in the way they work. The impact on culture can be profound. Even worse, the influence can be difficult to see until it is entrenched and starts to show up in behaviour.

That is one of the good reasons for clearly separating the responsibili­ties of management from those of directors. A good culture is built on consistency —what is said and done has to be within consistent patterns and plans, and everyone has to be singing the same tune. A good management plan can easily be undermined, quite unknowingly, by directors getting too close to staff and not knowing what the tune is.

The cultures and sub-cultures throughout an organisation will affect the behaviour of people, their satisfaction and productivity. One important subculture is the relationship between board and management. It is the one most difficult to manage. Some of the chapters in this book spell out the type of problems that can arise when it is not well managed.

Panthers workshops involving both management and board always centred on strategic issues. If I had the time over, I would try to interest the directors in joining other workshops that focused on values and culture. In learning to recognise values and understand their impact, everyone could work together to build a shared vision about the cultural objectives of the business. It would not be an easy task, considering that directors often have many other commitments, and the difficulties in getting all the key players together for the time required, but it would be worthwhile.

Evolution and Revolution. Larry Greiner wrote of his theory in 1971, and it was almost 20 years before I discovered it. I wish I had studied it much earlier. It would have helped my understanding of periods of stag­nation and other difficulties.

When a business only has a few employees, the style of management is not as important. The entrepreneurial manager with one assistant and lots of subcontractors can be autocratic and successful. As a business grows and matures, it requires adjustment. Autocracy will not be as effec­tive in a business employing 3,000 people, where the best results come from communication, delegation, participation and good controls. That is not to deny that some successful larger companies are run in a very autocratic fashion. It simply says that Greiner’s research influenced his theory that growth should be handled differently.

There are several stages in the path from small to large, and from young to mature. The needs change through the range of creativity, direction, delegation,  co-ordination and collaboration, each one building on the previous phase. As the business evolves naturally through one stage, pressures start to build almost to bursting point. This causes its own crisis. It is a case of success creating its own problems.

Had I understood the principles much earlier, it would have allowed a smoother transition between the Club’s evolutionary phases. It would probably also have meant a quicker and more effective pathway to what I eventually hoped to achieve — on the democratic ideals of an organisation driven by principles of collaboration. In our case, it was probably more spectacularly noticeable because of the rapid growth of the business over a relatively short period.


Those three principles stand out in my mind because of the impact they had on my thinking. I was influenced about outcomes by reading a great little book on outcomes and performances in my first few years at the Club. I read a lot about culture and did some courses on values and beliefs. In everything you read, you will probably find some gem of wisdom that can improve how you do things. A chance meeting, a brief conversation, a quick word of advice – can plant the tiny seeds that grow into the ideas and concepts that become part of your life.

In my first year at the club I met a director of the City Tattersalls Club in Sydney. One of the things he said that struck a chord in me was that each of us is a totally different person in the eyes of every person who knows us. This had quite an impact on me. It changed not only the way I saw others, but also how I saw myself. We are many, many people living inside the same skin.

In my first year at the Club, I also received some advice from a man named Ken Charlton.

Ken had been a big name in rugby league in the 50s. Around the same time that I started with the Club, he was, if I remember correctly, working as a representative for one of the breweries. He seemed genuinely inter­ested in seeing me make a success of my radical move from teaching to club management. I came to respect him, and when we talked I listened carefully. He told me one day that it is much more effective to ask ques­tions than to make statements. It was simple advice that sounds no more than good common sense. I don’t think that either of us knew just how profound it was at the time. I had an amusing example of its power some years later.

The Club was in the middle of one if its extensions, and I was walking through the work area. We had employed a very clever air conditioning expert, and I wandered up and stood beside him – basically just for a chat. I had no idea at all of what he was doing. I have never been mechanically or technically intelligent. He was explaining some of the work, and I said, purely to show him that I was interested in what he was saying, “Why do we do it like that?”

He stopped for a minute, looked back at the job, and looked at me again. After a pause he said, “You know what? You’re right. That’s not the best way to do it. It would be better if I …

I had asked a dumb question, he mistakenly thought it was an intelligent observation and took it as a challenge to find a better way. Meanwhile, I stood there trying to look as if I really was intelligent. His final disillusionment might come if he reads this book.

But over the years I found that asking questions was important to culture as well as results. Imagine an assistant in the marketing depart­ment prepares a corporate design and presents it to the CEO for approval. The CEO could say, ‘No, I don’t like that. Change the red to purple and make the yellow stronger. Use upper case in the title.’ After the time and effort that has been put into that design, how does the assistant feel about that reaction?

What if the CEO asked questions instead? “Do YOU think the red sends out the message WE want? What if WE tried a bit of purple? How do YOU think that would go?” Plenty of YOU clarifies who still owns the project. Plenty of WE says we are here to work together and help each other.

Questions involving YOU and WE raise the odds in favour of a more motivated assistant, a higher degree of ownership of the design job – and a better design. It is the cultural difference between the organisation being driven autocratically from the top and people collaborating for a better result.

The three main issues I chose are closely linked. They are all about people. Setting outcomes before deciding what to do smooths out values and cultural differences. Some of the essential components of a good, productive culture are well constructed forward plans, logical decisions, and ownership of the plans by all who participated in their making. Outcomes thinking is an important tool.

In some ways the three concepts are a little idealistic. Despite the efforts of a committed management team, we never really reached our own measure of satisfactory. Some sections at Panthers were always closer than others, but we never stopped having to remind people to think in Outcomes. Culture was constantly on the agenda for testing, meas­uring and improvement. And having an organisation fully embrace the Greiner concept of Collaboration is a really challenging dream. Culture and decision-making work in a similar way to systems in a business. Without constant review and discipline, they gradually revert to chaos. What is certain, though, is that we were much closer to those ideals than we would have been had we not been conscious of them, and committed as a team to their pursuit.


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Club Structure · Governance · Growth· Culture


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The System is the Solution

This article forms part of the serialised republication of Panthers, Passion & Politics – The Roger Cowan Years.

Start · Reader’s Guide · All Parts

In 1991, Glenn Matthews decided that he wanted one day to be CEO of Panthers. He says that while he was never promised the job, he was always given enormous encouragement and support in his growth with the company. ‘There’s always been an atmosphere of “anything’s possible” at Panthers’, he says. ‘It’s an environment that nurtures self- belief.’

When Roger Cowan retired in 2005, Glenn Matthews was able to step comfortably into the position of CEO.

The flat structure replaced the ‘us and them’ culture that still existed in some sections of the Club, with an atmosphere of co-operation — both within each business unit and between team leaders. Glenn Matthews says,

‘Teamwork is important and you need to be comfortable with ambiguity. You need to be able to say to yourself, this is my role, but it might work better if someone else comes to assist me with this. Also, if you see something that needs to be done, and it’s not in your area, do it. But the people in that department also need to accept that and not feel threatened.

The leaders of the new small business groups had stepped into a whole new world, according to Bob Adamson.

We’d taken a bunch of young, enthusiastic, energetic supervisors who were now leading a team. We then had to start training those people, to give them some business acumen, and the skills to run a business. So we framed a scheme called Business Unit Development. We ran that for eight or nine months, took every group through it. There were regular sessions, and each of the team leaders brought along different members of their teams each time.

But it was much more complicated than that. There always seemed to be another step to take. We were never satisfied. The overall structure had to support what we were doing. We regularly held one or two day workshops to go over it all and do some fine tuning or make changes. If we brought another book into our management library we would discuss how it might add improvements. For example, The Empty Raincoat by Charles Handy inspired some change in our attitudes, so we looked at other books he had written.

Panthers was probably the first registered club to embrace official quality assurance, moving towards ISO 9000 accreditation with Standards Australia. The incentive increased when the NSW government’s purchasing arm let it be known that the Government would only deal with companies that had qualified through ISO 9000.

Since the move to Mulgoa Road, with its new space and improved facilities, the conference and banquet business had become a lucrative part of club activity. Panthers’ thinking was that there would be very few others in the conference business that would go to the trouble and expense involved in quality accreditation, so there would be significant commercial benefit in taking it forward. Eventually, after management compared the annual expense of Standards Australia re-auditing to the commercial return, it decided not to proceed with the accreditation. However, they elected to retain the stringent quality control measures and systems that were part of the process.

We removed a few items that were there to make it easy for Standards Australia to audit a company, but left the rest in place. We felt we were in a good position to take advantage of the valuable tools in such a system, but without spending the money.

People have asked, what’s the point of having all these systems when we’re a service industry? Much of what we sell is intangible — so how can we monitor the quality? Basically, the general idea of all that documentation is that we can look at our customer — whether it’s an internal or external customer — and ask ourselves, what does this customer want from us? Is it good entertainment? A comfortable environment? Good food? Or just excellent service? Having identified that, then in the preparation of that product, we have to ask “what does ‘good’ look like?” And if we can define what good looks like, we have to write it down so that everybody knows. When a keg of beer is delivered to the dock, how do we guarantee its quality from the time it arrives till the time it’s poured into a glass? There has to be a system in place to ensure the quality through all the stages. The same applies to a leg of lamb. Who ordered it, was it from the right supplier, what did we do with it when it got here, did we store it properly, did we cook it properly, serve it properly — slice it, put it on a plate, present it to the customer?

Adamson recalls that some people, particularly those who saw themselves in creative roles, found it hard to embrace the concept of systems written down to do everything. He gave an experience with a chef as an example.

I asked him, ‘What goes wrong most in the kitchen?’ ‘Well, we don’t get the right information from the people in the functions department.’

So, if we could fix that by putting a system in place that ensured that you did get the right information, that would give you more time, less stress, to get on with being creative in the kitchen? Once we identified the quality control that was most important to the chef, it was simple to get his commitment.

If you have all the basic mechanisms in place, that leaves the creative person free to be creative.

Peter Sheridan is Panthers’ Group Internal Auditor.1 He began work in the early 90s, and was very impressed with the systems that were in place when he arrived.

There was a quality system that documented all the policies and procedures for the majority of operational areas. This is very important from an auditor’s perspective, because you have something to audit against — that’s the standard. You can easily see how a department is performing against that standard. It was a very different environment, and a different culture from other places that I’d worked. Most of my experience had been with large corporations or government departments which were much more regimented. I hadn’t worked in a flattened organisation before, but there were still policies and procedures in place to temper that and make it easy to adapt to.

I came to the club soon after the structural changes, into what was now a decentralised organisation. When an organisation goes flat, a lot of the normal controls can get a bit wishy-washy. I believe that Roger foresaw this and decided to put something in place to temper any falling down in controls. It would give them a way of monitoring the functions to see that the business controls remained in place, allow them to keep an eye on things.

Cowan’s motives in appointing an internal auditor were exactly as Sheridan said.

I was concerned about the tendency for good systems to degenerate into chaos if not constantly checked. People look for short cuts and sometimes they even think they are making improvements, but they are not seeing the full picture.

A small change by one person, then another one by a different person, a bit later a slight improvement by someone else, and after a few months the system is nothing like what was intended.

We were still working to overcome some significant problems brought about through rapid growth and I could not afford to have systems deviating from the plan.

When I appointed Peter Sheridan, he was given authority to look into every nook and cranny.

Panthers was probably the first club to appoint an auditor as a permanent member of staff. The internal auditor had the authority to investigate any matter that came to his attention except one. There was an agreement that all management salaries would be confidential, known only to the executive of the Board and the external auditors.2 On Cowan’s recommendation, the Club also implemented a Board Audit Committee in 1997, although there is no regulation under corporate law requiring it.

It was also the first club to implement total quality management systems. The results are evident in the recognition it receives through awards and government subsidies in such areas as energy and risk management.

Over the ten years leading up to the interview with Glenn Matthews for this publication, the Club has been looking at the possibility of having its own property trust. Management had presented a number of papers to the Board advocating such a move, but a company needs to have substantial financial resources to pursue the concept.

The timing is now right for us. The experts tell us that the critical mass is a total property value of $200 million, so at more than $500 million, we’re now in a great position. Our assets grew as a result of strict governance policies over the years, and our very successful amalgamation strategy. Major companies like Woolworths and Bunnings all invest in property trusts.

In 2006, the Board and the members approved a proposal for the management to begin pursuing such a venture. Matthews says the Club will always retain at least 51 per cent interest in any trust, but it will open up enormous opportunities for the company and its 14 properties. It will enable Panthers to convert part of its equity in property into working capital.

It’s another transition for the small business that Roger Cowan took on in 1965, and left forty years later, which is now positioned to take its place as one of Australia’s leading property trusts.

It almost lost that chance. At one stage the Club was on the brink of losing half the potential of the property trust. The amalgamation story involves allegations of management lies, broken promises, back door takeover fears and preservation of power bases. The ensuing conflict could have put a very large part of that future value at risk.

In a way, the ailment began with the fiery difference of opinion discussed in the next chapter – the possibility of a rugby league merger between Parramatta and Penrith.


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  1. Peter Sheridan left Panthers in the early 2010s.
    ↩︎
  2. The exception that prevented the Internal Auditor from having access to management salaries was driven by the same respect for confidentiality that would become significant in later controversy. ↩︎

Part 27 · All Parts · Part 29

Commentary and Contributions

1991 — Shadows Behind the Story

The text [in Part 27 – From Left Field] simply says that Roger contacted his long-time friend Norm Bowers looking for two people who could help research management theory, distil complex ideas and assist with communicating organisational change. Norm suggested two tutors from his coaching college. One of them was me.

That summary is accurate enough, but it leaves out a much bigger story.

For as long as I can remember Roger held a firm principle that close family members should not work together at Panthers. Unlike many family businesses, he believed employment should never depend upon bloodlines. It protected the organisation from accusations of favouritism and, just as importantly, protected the family from the pressures and complications that inevitably arise when work and home become entangled.

My brothers and I experienced that principle long before employment was ever contemplated.

As children we watched children from families of Roger’s Panther colleagues enjoy privileges that were simply unavailable to us. The children and grandchilren of some Panthers’ officials could wander into dressing rooms. Other children became ball boys or travelled with teams. We remained outside those circles. At the time it felt unfair. Looking back, I understand that Roger was drawing a line he was determined not to cross.

So why did he cross it in 1991?

The simple answer is that he believed Panthers had reached a point unlike anything it had previously faced.

The move to Mulgoa Road had been spectacularly successful in one sense. Sales had exploded. The club had become one of the largest in the country. But behind those impressive numbers Roger could see problems that few others recognised. The organisation had outgrown the management systems that had served it so well in earlier years. The challenge was no longer simply managing a licensed club. It was understanding how organisations evolve, why they stall, and how they successfully reinvent themselves.

He needed people who could immerse themselves in ideas, research widely, challenge assumptions and then translate abstract concepts into practical language that managers throughout the organisation could understand and use. Club management experience was almost beside the point. In some respects, it was an advantage not to have it.

By 1991 Roger was carrying burdens — some were widely visible, others were not so obvious.

The public could see the club’s growth and football success. The long hours were seen by the Panthers staff — especially the management team who shared the search for answers to the dilemmas faced by the Club. This commitment was hidden from the wider public.

Hidden from all but those closest to him was the stress of discovering that he had serious underlying health issues. The most serious of these was polycythemia, an incurable blood disorder in which the bone marrow manufactures too many red blood cells.

The combined challenges of the Club’s financial stress and the newly diagnosed health issues are sufficient to drive unhealthy levels of stress. But, by mid-year 1991 a huge shadow was cast across this picture — Peter, the third of the four Cowan boys, was dying.

Through the second half of the eighties, Peter was diagnosed HIV/AIDS. Remember, by 1987 big budgets were directed towards advertising that elevated concerns about the spread of AIDS – lifting the feeling from concern to horror and fear.

Imagine being the parent of someone with the virus, imagine thinking about their future while watching their physique reduce to the skeletal, imagine seeing the grim reaper repeatedly visiting your living room.

By the early part of 1991, Peter’s withering physique made his destiny clear. Roger & Mum were regularly taking trips between Penrith and Sydney, spending time with Peter.

On July 15, we gathered at St Vincent’s Hospice for what we suspected would be his last hours. Our time with him was one-on-one, holding and stroking his skeletal hand, listening as he ranted against some imaginary barman who would not serve him a drink, or some incompetent cabbie taking the wrong route.

We laughed with him, crying inside at what we were about to lose.

He couldn’t hear us; he couldn’t see us; but I’m damned sure he felt us.

He left us just before the sun went down that day.

Three months later, Panthers took their first premiership lap. Peter would have loved that.

I started at Panthers a month after Peter left us.

Beneath this shadow and amidst all the turmoil and stress swirling around Roger’s worklife, his focus on the future health of Panthers didn’t falter – in fact his dedication and commitment to this ambition may well have increased.

It would be wrong to suggest these private events somehow caused my appointment. They did not.

But they formed part of the context in which Roger found himself confronting perhaps the greatest organisational challenge of his career while carrying some of the heaviest personal burdens of his life. For someone who had always preferred solving problems himself, this was one of the few occasions where he openly acknowledged that he needed help.

Even then, abandoning his principle about family employment was not a decision he made lightly. Before I joined Panthers he took the proposal to the Board. Approval was unanimous.

Looking back, I don’t think this episode says very much about me.

It says far more about Roger.

He had principles, and he took them seriously. They were not ornaments. They were not things to be put on display when convenient and packed away when awkward. But he also understood that a principle should serve a purpose. It should not become a cage.

In 1991, Panthers needed something different. Roger needed something different too.

I think he knew both things.


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Related Themes

Growth · Governance · Culture


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The Article That Changed Panthers’ Thinking

In 1990, while preparing for Panthers’ first ever rugby league Grand Final appearance, Roger Cowan read a management article that changed the way he thought about organisations.

The article was Evolution and Revolution as Organizations Grow, written by American management academic Larry E. Greiner and first published in the Harvard Business Review in 1972. It would become one of the most influential pieces of management writing Cowan ever encountered and the catalyst for a complete reassessment of how Panthers should be managed.

A Different Way of Looking at Growth

Greiner challenged one of the most common assumptions about successful organisations—that growth is simply a matter of becoming bigger.

Instead, he argued that growing organisations pass through a series of distinct developmental stages. Each period of relatively stable growth, which he called an evolutionary phase, eventually reaches a point where the existing structure, management style and systems can no longer cope with the organisation’s increasing size and complexity.

At that point, growth stalls.

Frustrations build.

Old methods begin to fail.

The organisation enters what Greiner described as a revolutionary phase—a period of crisis requiring significant organisational change before growth can continue.

His central message was both simple and powerful:

Successful organisations recognise these moments and adapt. Those that fail to change often stagnate or decline.

The Five Stages

Greiner identified five broad stages through which many organisations pass:

  1. Growth through Creativity – entrepreneurial energy establishes the organisation until stronger leadership becomes necessary.
  2. Growth through Direction – clearer structures and management systems bring stability but eventually create demands for greater autonomy.
  3. Growth through Delegation – authority is pushed down through the organisation, creating faster decision-making before coordination problems begin to emerge.
  4. Growth through Coordination – increasingly formal systems and procedures restore control but, over time, can create excessive bureaucracy or what Greiner called a “red tape” crisis.
  5. Growth through Collaboration – organisations move beyond rigid structures, relying more on teamwork, flexibility, shared responsibility and cooperation across traditional departmental boundaries.

Greiner stressed that these stages were not rigid rules applying to every organisation. Rather, they described a recurring pattern observed in many growing businesses.

Why This Resonated with Roger Cowan

As Cowan read the article, he came to a stark realisation.

Panthers had already experienced several of the evolutionary and revolutionary cycles Greiner described.

Looking back over twenty-five years, he remembered periods when growth appeared to stall, followed by difficult struggles to overcome new problems. Once solutions had been found, the organisation would enter another period of rapid growth before eventually confronting the next set of challenges.

What had previously seemed like isolated management problems suddenly appeared as part of a much larger pattern.

Most importantly, the conclusion he’d arrived at in 1990 was profound:

The management systems that had delivered outstanding results during one phase of growth could not be assumed to work indefinitely. Panthers needed new ways of thinking if it was to continue developing.

A Beginning, Not an Answer

The Greiner article did not provide a blueprint for Panthers’ future.

Rather, it provided a framework for asking better questions.

For him, the issue was ultimately one of organisational unity.

It convinced Cowan that the club needed to rethink almost every aspect of its management philosophy and organisational structure. That realisation triggered an intensive period of reading, research and experimentation as Panthers searched for new ideas capable of supporting its next stage of growth.

Many of the management changes introduced during the early 1990s can be traced back to that moment of discovery.

Looking back years later, Cowan often described reading Greiner’s article as one of the defining moments of his management career—not because it supplied all the answers, but because it fundamentally changed the questions he was asking.


Source Material

For those readers who wish to read the Larry Greiner article (PDF) in full:


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Governance


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Major Player: Tim Sheens

Tim Sheens
Image Source: The Panthers: Men in Black

Tim Sheens

Player, Coach, Administrator.

Tim Sheens occupies a unique place in Panthers history.

Many people remember him as the coach who guided Penrith to its first finals appearance. Yet his most important contribution may have come before a ball was kicked in 1984.

At a time when questions were being asked about Penrith’s future in first grade, Sheens chose to stay and help rebuild the club.

Unlike many coaches who arrive from elsewhere, Sheens understood Penrith from the inside. He had played more than a decade of first-grade football for the club and his family’s involvement in district rugby league stretched back generations.

Role in the Narrative

Although Sheens’ appearance in Panthers, Passion & Politics is brief, it acknowledges him as one of the key figures in the football club’s revival following the introduction of the unified “One Board, One CEO” structure in 1980.

By 1983 the football club faced significant challenges. Player retention had become a major problem, results remained poor, and concerns existed both within Penrith and within the NSWRL about the club’s long-term competitiveness.

Following a series of community workshops organised to identify a path forward, Sheens emerged as a central figure in the proposed football rebuilding program.

His appointment as coach in 1984 represented one of the most important football decisions made during the Roger Cowan era.

The Risk

When Penrith approached Sheens about coaching the club, his future appeared to lie elsewhere.

Sheens had already accepted a player-coach position in Queensland and was preparing to leave Sydney when Panthers approached him. The opportunity offered greater certainty than a struggling Penrith side that had won only six matches in 1983 and faced serious questions about its future.

Before making a decision on the Panthers role, Sheens spent several days discussing the decision with his wife Rhonda – whose family were in Queensland. Remaining at Penrith meant abandoning established plans and taking responsibility for rebuilding one of the competition’s most troubled football clubs.

From a football perspective, accepting the Penrith role carried considerable risk.

The Panthers had won only six matches in 1983. Experienced players were leaving. Recruiting power was limited. Media commentary frequently questioned Penrith’s ability to compete with the stronger Sydney clubs.

For an aspiring young coach, failure at Penrith could easily have damaged future opportunities.

Roger Cowan later recalled being impressed by Sheens’ contribution during the community workshops and believed he possessed both the football knowledge and commitment needed to help implement the club’s new direction.

Sheens agreed to stay.

Building From Within

Rather than rely heavily on expensive recruitment, Sheens embraced the philosophy emerging from the workshops.

The focus shifted towards local talent, player development and creating stronger pathways from junior football to first grade.

This approach aligned with the club’s Five by Five objective: producing five representative players from Penrith’s junior system within five years.

Under Sheens, young local players were given opportunities and expectations began to change. For the first time, many within the club started to believe that Penrith’s greatest resource was not money but its own district.

Sheens did more than advocate for local development. He actively worked to retain and recruit players he believed could form the nucleus of the club’s future, including Mark Geyer, Greg Alexander, Colin Van Der Voort and future champion Brad Fittler. His approach reflected a belief that Penrith’s long-term success would be built from within the district rather than purchased from outside it.

Intermediate Results

The improvement was rapid.

In his first season as coach, Penrith narrowly missed the finals and recorded its best performance since entering first grade.

The turnaround was so significant that Sheens was awarded Coach of the Year by his fellow Sydney first-grade coaches.

The following season Penrith qualified for its first finals series.

The achievement provided tangible evidence that the governance reforms, strategic planning and renewed focus on junior development were working.

Background

Born: 30 October 1950

Playing Career
• Penrith Panthers Player #62 (1970-1982)
• Club record-holder for most first grade appearances at time of retirment (174).

Coaching Career
• Penrith Panthers (1984-1987)
• Canberra Raiders (1988-1996)
• North Queensland Cowboys (1997-2001)
• Australian Kangaroos
• NSW — State of Origin
• NSW — Super League Tri-Series

Recognition by Panthers
• Life Membership, Penrith Panthers (1990)

Relevance to Events Described

The significance of Tim Sheens within this story extends beyond coaching results.

The introduction of a unified governance structure provided Penrith with a framework for success. Sheens helped translate that framework into football outcomes.

His willingness to remain at Penrith during one of the club’s most uncertain periods, and his commitment to developing local talent, played a major role in establishing the pathway that eventually led to the club’s emergence as a genuine first-grade force.

For Panthers, Tim Sheens was not simply a successful coach. He was one of the people prepared to stake his future on the club when many others doubted it had one. In helping to change the club’s future, he changed the course of his own.

Related Topics


Related Themes:

Football Club · Governance · Growth · Culture


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Editorial Note

This profile is presented as contextual background.
Additional material may be introduced as the narrative progresses.