Category: Beyond the Book

The Article That Changed Panthers’ Thinking

In 1990, while preparing for Panthers’ first ever rugby league Grand Final appearance, Roger Cowan read a management article that changed the way he thought about organisations.

The article was Evolution and Revolution as Organizations Grow, written by American management academic Larry E. Greiner and first published in the Harvard Business Review in 1972. It would become one of the most influential pieces of management writing Cowan ever encountered and the catalyst for a complete reassessment of how Panthers should be managed.

A Different Way of Looking at Growth

Greiner challenged one of the most common assumptions about successful organisations—that growth is simply a matter of becoming bigger.

Instead, he argued that growing organisations pass through a series of distinct developmental stages. Each period of relatively stable growth, which he called an evolutionary phase, eventually reaches a point where the existing structure, management style and systems can no longer cope with the organisation’s increasing size and complexity.

At that point, growth stalls.

Frustrations build.

Old methods begin to fail.

The organisation enters what Greiner described as a revolutionary phase—a period of crisis requiring significant organisational change before growth can continue.

His central message was both simple and powerful:

The practices that create one period of successful growth eventually become the obstacles to the next.

Successful organisations recognise these moments and adapt. Those that fail to change often stagnate or decline.

The Five Stages

Greiner identified five broad stages through which many organisations pass:

  1. Growth through Creativity – entrepreneurial energy establishes the organisation until stronger leadership becomes necessary.
  2. Growth through Direction – clearer structures and management systems bring stability but eventually create demands for greater autonomy.
  3. Growth through Delegation – authority is pushed down through the organisation, creating faster decision-making before coordination problems begin to emerge.
  4. Growth through Coordination – increasingly formal systems and procedures restore control but, over time, can create excessive bureaucracy or what Greiner called a “red tape” crisis.
  5. Growth through Collaboration – organisations move beyond rigid structures, relying more on teamwork, flexibility, shared responsibility and cooperation across traditional departmental boundaries.

Greiner stressed that these stages were not rigid rules applying to every organisation. Rather, they described a recurring pattern observed in many growing businesses.

Why This Resonated with Roger Cowan

As Cowan read the article, he came to a stark realisation.

Panthers had already experienced several of the evolutionary and revolutionary cycles Greiner described.

Looking back over twenty-five years, he remembered periods when growth appeared to stall, followed by difficult struggles to overcome new problems. Once solutions had been found, the organisation would enter another period of rapid growth before eventually confronting the next set of challenges.

What had previously seemed like isolated management problems suddenly appeared as part of a much larger pattern.

Most importantly, the conclusion he’d arrived at in 1990 was profound:

The Panthers employing 850 people was not simply a larger version of the Panthers employing 300 people. It had become a fundamentally different organisation.

The management systems that had delivered outstanding results during one phase of growth could not be assumed to work indefinitely. Panthers needed new ways of thinking if it was to continue developing.

A Beginning, Not an Answer

The Greiner article did not provide a blueprint for Panthers’ future.

Rather, it provided a framework for asking better questions.

For him, the issue was ultimately one of organisational unity.

It convinced Cowan that the club needed to rethink almost every aspect of its management philosophy and organisational structure. That realisation triggered an intensive period of reading, research and experimentation as Panthers searched for new ideas capable of supporting its next stage of growth.

Many of the management changes introduced during the early 1990s can be traced back to that moment of discovery.

Looking back years later, Cowan often described reading Greiner’s article as one of the defining moments of his management career—not because it supplied all the answers, but because it fundamentally changed the questions he was asking.

Source Material

For those readers who wish to read the Larry Greiner article (PDF) in full:

Related Topics

Related Themes

Strategic Planning

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Major Player: Tim Sheens

Tim Sheens
Image Source: The Panthers: Men in Black

Tim Sheens

Player, Coach, Administrator.

Tim Sheens occupies a unique place in Panthers history.

Many people remember him as the coach who guided Penrith to its first finals appearance. Yet his most important contribution may have come before a ball was kicked in 1984.

At a time when questions were being asked about Penrith’s future in first grade, Sheens chose to stay and help rebuild the club.

Unlike many coaches who arrive from elsewhere, Sheens understood Penrith from the inside. He had played more than a decade of first-grade football for the club and his family’s involvement in district rugby league stretched back generations.

Role in the Narrative

Although Sheens’ appearance in Panthers, Passion & Politics is brief, it acknowledges him as one of the key figures in the football club’s revival following the introduction of the unified “One Board, One CEO” structure in 1980.

By 1983 the football club faced significant challenges. Player retention had become a major problem, results remained poor, and concerns existed both within Penrith and within the NSWRL about the club’s long-term competitiveness.

Following a series of community workshops organised to identify a path forward, Sheens emerged as a central figure in the proposed football rebuilding program.

His appointment as coach in 1984 represented one of the most important football decisions made during the Roger Cowan era.

The Risk

When Penrith approached Sheens about coaching the club, his future appeared to lie elsewhere.

Sheens had already accepted a player-coach position in Queensland and was preparing to leave Sydney when Panthers approached him. The opportunity offered greater certainty than a struggling Penrith side that had won only six matches in 1983 and faced serious questions about its future.

Before making a decision on the Panthers role, Sheens spent several days discussing the decision with his wife Rhonda – whose family were in Queensland. Remaining at Penrith meant abandoning established plans and taking responsibility for rebuilding one of the competition’s most troubled football clubs.

From a football perspective, accepting the Penrith role carried considerable risk.

The Panthers had won only six matches in 1983. Experienced players were leaving. Recruiting power was limited. Media commentary frequently questioned Penrith’s ability to compete with the stronger Sydney clubs.

For an aspiring young coach, failure at Penrith could easily have damaged future opportunities.

Roger Cowan later recalled being impressed by Sheens’ contribution during the community workshops and believed he possessed both the football knowledge and commitment needed to help implement the club’s new direction.

Sheens agreed to stay.

Building From Within

Rather than rely heavily on expensive recruitment, Sheens embraced the philosophy emerging from the workshops.

The focus shifted towards local talent, player development and creating stronger pathways from junior football to first grade.

This approach aligned with the club’s Five by Five objective: producing five representative players from Penrith’s junior system within five years.

Under Sheens, young local players were given opportunities and expectations began to change. For the first time, many within the club started to believe that Penrith’s greatest resource was not money but its own district.

Sheens did more than advocate for local development. He actively worked to retain and recruit players he believed could form the nucleus of the club’s future, including Mark Geyer, Greg Alexander, Colin Van Der Voort and future champion Brad Fittler. His approach reflected a belief that Penrith’s long-term success would be built from within the district rather than purchased from outside it.

Intermediate Results

The improvement was rapid.

In his first season as coach, Penrith narrowly missed the finals and recorded its best performance since entering first grade.

The turnaround was so significant that Sheens was awarded Coach of the Year by his fellow Sydney first-grade coaches.

The following season Penrith qualified for its first finals series.

The achievement provided tangible evidence that the governance reforms, strategic planning and renewed focus on junior development were working.

Background

Born: 30 October 1950

Playing Career
• Penrith Panthers Player #62 (1970-1982)
• Club record-holder for most first grade appearances at time of retirment (174).

Coaching Career
• Penrith Panthers (1984-1987)
• Canberra Raiders (1988-1996)
• North Queensland Cowboys (1997-2001)
• Australian Kangaroos
• NSW — State of Origin
• NSW — Super League Tri-Series

Recognition by Panthers
• Life Membership, Penrith Panthers (1990)

Relevance to Events Described

The significance of Tim Sheens within this story extends beyond coaching results.

The introduction of a unified governance structure provided Penrith with a framework for success. Sheens helped translate that framework into football outcomes.

His willingness to remain at Penrith during one of the club’s most uncertain periods, and his commitment to developing local talent, played a major role in establishing the pathway that eventually led to the club’s emergence as a genuine first-grade force.

For Panthers, Tim Sheens was not simply a successful coach. He was one of the people prepared to stake his future on the club when many others doubted it had one. In helping to change the club’s future, he changed the course of his own.

Related Topics

Related Themes:

Football Club · Culture

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Editorial Note

This profile is presented as contextual background.
Additional material may be introduced as the narrative progresses.

The 1990 Queensland Criminal Justice Commission

The poker-machine transaction examined in Part 24 did not disappear when the NSW investigation ended. Four years later, the same transaction surfaced in the Queensland Criminal Justice Commission’s 1990 report on gaming machines, where Cowan believed the facts were misstated and the implications left uncorrected.

Somehow the Queensland Justice Commission accepted the false proposition, from an undisclosed source, that Panthers had paid $7,000 per machine when the list price was only $5,300. Every piece of documentation Howe had seen had clearly shown that the club paid only $5,300. 

The poker machine purchase from Len Ainsworth’s company, Aristocrat, was mentioned in the Commission’s 1990 report on gaming machines. The QCJC used the purchase to illustrate what it called the ‘Byzantine transactions’ that it said were common in the club industry at the time.

‘Various manufacturers are alleged to have engaged in the offer of inducements of one sort or another to buy gaming machines’, said the report. It continues, ‘There is room in such contorted transactions for any number of corrupt arrangements.’

It quotes the same information that was in the original NSW police allegations, including the listing of only 90 machines. It provides all the figures, and mentions Ainsworth’s subsidisation of the interest, without providing any explanation of the circumstances. The report emphasised the payment by Panthers of an inflated price of $7,000.

After the report was released, Cowan had a solicitor write to the Commission asking that the report be amended to reflect the true facts of the transaction – that Panthers paid $5,300, not $7000, and that the list price was $7000, not $5300. The request was ignored. A subsequent approach was also ignored. No response was ever received, and the false representation still stands in the records.

Although Panthers had been cleared of all the original charges, with no action taken by the NSW police or the Liquor Administration Board, here was the very same information finding its way into the QCJC report. Cowan is mentioned specifically in the same report, saying he ‘has come to the notice of NSW police on a number of occasions and had been unsuccessfully prosecuted once’. No evidence was ever recorded of any specific occasions on which Cowan had ‘come to the notice of police’.

Phil Bennett also read the report, and, knowing the real facts of the transaction, sent a personal response to the QCJC, explaining his own knowledge of the sale. He told the Commission: ‘It was clearly established that there was nothing illegal or improper about this transaction and no action was taken, nor was the matter raised as an objection in Ainsworth’s licence application.

The Commission’s suggestion that this transaction was an example of an inducement paid to people in exchange for their club buying machines is clearly not sustainable.

Bennett also noted in his response that the prices of poker machines quoted in the QCJC report were ‘a nonsense’.

The QCJC did nothing to rectify its erroneous report. The blatant untruth still stands in its records.

Related Topics

Related Themes

Financial Management · Licensed Club

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The End of Season Drinks That Weren’t So Cordial

A removed section from the original Chapter 8: A Taste of Injustice.

The Penrith-Parramatta game was the last home game of the 1984 season. If the Panthers won, it would mean a semi-finals appearance for the first time in the Club’s history.

By half-time it was becoming obvious that the game was not going well. During the second half, Cowan walked across and sat with the chairman, Leo Armstrong.

Cowan commented to Armstrong that it was pretty obvious this would be the last game of the season. He suggested to Armstrong that the success of the team should be acknowledged in some way. They — the CEO and Chairman — agreed to invite the players and officials back to the boardroom after the game.

Cowan admits he had not thought the invitation through carefully enough. Because it was a spur of the moment decision, only a few directors knew about it. At the time, though, it did not seem important.

At the start of the next board meeting, managers were asked to leave the room.

Don Ellks says,

It was the first time we had ever been asked to leave. Roger sat for some moments as if deciding what to do. He did leave, but reluctantly. After a while Leo came outside and said the board had moved a vote of no confidence in him, and that John Hewett had been re-elected as chairman.

The perceived slight on the directors who missed out on the after-game drinks had provided enough leverage for JohnHewett to make a grab for the chairman position he still resented losing. Cowan was in a tight spot. Conflict on the board had been effecting decision making since 1983, to the detriment of the Club.

This change would affect the morale of the management team. The turnover of the Club was increasing rapidly, scarcely a day seemed to pass without discussion of new initiatives, and it was vital to avoid any instability.

Sensitive negotiations were taking place to refinance the Club’s loans in a deal that would save the club hundreds of thousands of dollars. The reputation and experience of Leo Armstrong as a bank manager was an advantage – there was obvious respect for him by the negotiating bank.

One faction of the board, led by Armstrong, was supportive of management. As well, Armstrong was an excellent chairman, highly respected in the community, by staff and by the members. The other faction seemed to be driven by Hewett. He was seen as the leader of that faction, but Cowan believed he was being pushed by another director, Murray Clarke. Of late, these two had lost the respect of management, staff and quite a lot of members. In this instance they were not acting in the interests of the Club. Any publicity about the chairman’s removal had the potential to do damage.

Worse for Cowan was that Armstrong was about to be humiliated because he agreed with one of Cowan’s suggestions.

When the board called me back into the meeting, I had already decided that the resolution could do a great deal of damage. The negative publicity, the reaction of the members, the negative impact on the finance negotiations and the unfair impact on Armstrong’s reputation should be avoided at all costs. Importantly, the club’s constitution did not clearly give the Board the power to remove the Chairman and it needed a legal opinion. I refused to return to the meeting unless he was reinstated, or it went back to the members.

Cowan reminded the board that it was unconstitutional to continue the meeting without the company secretary. When they called on Don Ellks to come in to act as secretary, Ellks also refused.

During the following week, Hewett went to Cowan’s office to advise that the board had appointed him chairman. Cowan told him that he believed it was improper to move a vote of no confidence and damage Armstrong’s reputation over such a trivial issue. He told Hewett that the management team would continue to recognise Armstrong as the chairman unless there was compliance with the constitution and members of the club endorsed the vote of no confidence. A stalemate had been reached.

Soon after, two of the directors from the Hewett faction would resign, and a tentative peace would return to the board with Armstrong in the chair. Under the surface though, hostility continued to bubble. Hewett would seek revenge — and eventually get it. ‘The conflict between the two factions had been damaging the Club for years‘, says Cowan. ‘Now war had been declared in no uncertain terms.‘

The next election, in 1985, was the board’s first ever departure from its traditional practice of presenting itself as one solid unit for re-election. Neither Hewett nor Hubbard were re-elected to the board.

While Hubbard remains ambivalent about the events of those years, he says that Hewett was devastated. It hit him pretty hard, says Hubbard. ‘His health suffered, and I don’t know that he ever really got over it.’

Related Topics

Related Themes

Board Decisions · Conflict· Football Club

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Major Player: Don Ellks

Don Ellks
Image Source: PRLC Annual Report 1976

Donald Stanley Ellks

Senior Manager/General Manager 1980s–1992

Donald (Don) Ellks was one of the most significant operational managers in Panthers’ history.Beginning as a casual barman carrying a drinks tray, he progressed through the ranks over more than twenty-five years to become General Manager, helping guide the club through its relocation to Mulgoa Road and the rapid growth that followed.

His association with Penrith Rugby League Club began through rugby league, including playing for St Marys and Penrith A Grade and serving as a committeeman.

Role in the Narrative

Don was an Assistant Manager then General Manager for the planning, establishment and ongoing operation of the club’s relocation to Mulgoa Rd and the addition of the hotel and Cables Ski Park.

He was also instrumental in supporting the unified governance model that ultimately transformed the management of Panthers.

Background

Born: 1940
Died: 2025

Recognition by Panthers
• Life Membership, Penrith Panthers (1994)

Relevance to Events Described

Panthers was early to recognise the importance of providing pathways for talent, effort and results to progress through the ranks instead of seniority. Don was a case in point, starting as a bar attendant and progressing to General Manager.

Don’s operational management skills and experience complemented Roger’s leadership. In the first few years after the relocation to Mulgoa Road, the club achieved strong double-digit year-on-year sales growth but remained under significant financial pressure. High interest rates, construction cost overruns and the operational demands of rapid expansion meant that increased turnover did not immediately translate into financial security. Don’s experience working in departments, managing departments and managing managers led to the development of the systems and procedures needed for the effective and efficient operation of all departments and the ultimate success of the relocation.

Don’s long history with rugby league and operations also provided Roger with valuable support in the boardroom and dealing with politics.

Don Ellks’ career reflected many of the qualities that underpinned Panthers’ growth during the Cowan era: loyalty, practical experience, operational discipline and a willingness to take responsibility.

While others often occupied the public spotlight, Don was a key figure responsible for turning vision into day-to-day reality.

Related Topics

Related Themes:

Licensed Club · Culture

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Editorial Note

This profile is presented as contextual background.
Additional material may be introduced as the narrative progresses.

How Penrith P Panther Was Born

Beyond the Book — Commentary & Contributions

Contributor: Phil Morehead

Phil Morehead was a partner in Thomas Marsden Advertising the advertising agency and design studio that supported Panthers for many years. Phil also was a long-time active member and President of the Penrith Valley Chamber of Commerce. In this contribution he recalls how Penrith P Panther came into existence and became a recognisable community figure.

All images courtesy of Phil Morehead and Thomas Marsden Advertising.

I believe Penrith P. Panther was one of the first mascots to represent a rugby league team in Australia.

I am not sure of the exact year, but I think it was probably in the late 1970s. Ron Workman was the football manager at the time, and he was a little difficult to convince that a mascot would be a good promotional tool.

Years later, at a function, Ron took full credit for Penrith P.’s creation, saying it was an idea he picked up when they went to America on an excursion looking at promotional ideas. I think the cheer girls may have been one idea adapted from America, but Penrith P. was home birthed.

The idea came to me from watching Humphrey B. Bear with my young son

Certificate of Registration of Design for Penrith P. Panther — click to enlarge.

At the time I was doing Max Wright’s Kingswood advertising — new Holdens, used cars and later Viscount Caravans. Max financed the project as part of his advertising.

I negotiated with Stafford Bullen to supply free kids’ passes to Bullen’s Animal World and Warragamba African Lion Safari, which Penrith P. would distribute at home games. Panthers’ contribution was to allow Penrith P. to parade at half-time and give out the tickets.

At the first game, we had Penrith P. distributing the passes from the back of a Max Wright sign-written ute, driving around the inside perimeter of the ground.

It turned into a nightmare.

We also brought 2KA into the partnership and did various pranks at games, with Frank Ley calling them live and promoting Max Wright, Bullens and the others involved.

Most of it was contra. Effectively, all parties were building community goodwill while getting promotional value at the same time.

When Max Wright passed away, 2KA took over ownership of Penrith P., which I think soon came under the control of the football club.

Later, Penrith P. was discarded due to the intellectual property disputes between the ARL and Super League. During the Super League year (1997), Super League came up with Penelope Panther but the suit was too difficult for the person wearing it. When the NRL formed they financed the development of club mascots and Paws and Claws. Claws are still active.

But the O.G. was Penrith P. Panther.

Max’s Note: Reggie Rabbit, with help from TV star Don Lane, debuted for South Sydney at the 1968 Grand Final. Despite Reggie preceding Penrith P. by some years, Penrith P was still one of the first mascots to take the field in Australian Rugbu League.

Related Topics

Related Themes

Culture · Innovation

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Rugby League’s Inner Circle

A removed section from the original Chapter 7: The 16 Year Struggle to Streamline Rugby League.

Cowan says that at the time of his campaign for one board, the NSW Rugby League was run by a clique. This was a widely held view within rugby league circles at the time. The General Committee consisted of delegates and vice-presidents from every club – more than 40 delegates attended the monthly meetings. It was extremely unwieldy and inefficient. It is difficult enough for a 15-person board to get to good decisions in reasonable time, says Cowan. He recalls his time on the NSWRL executive in the early seventies.

What’s really funny is that for a while I thought that I was in the clique. We used to meet before every general committee meeting and decide what we were going to support that night. There were about eight of us, and we all thought we were involved in the important decisions.

But I found out later that I was never really “in”. The “in” team was quite small. It was a bit like an archery target – you have the inner and outer circle of the bullseye. So, even though I was on the executive, I was on the outer circle. It took me till 1974 to work it out, and one night I publicly resigned from the executive over a decision they made, but I stayed on the committee as a delegate.

The week after his resignation Cowan crossed paths with Jack Gibson, the coach of Eastern Suburbs, who congratulated Cowan on making a stand. He said a lot of people were sick of the fact that a small group were running the league to suit themselves. The clique still existed in some measure until Super League came on the scene in 1995.

Tom Wilson also remembers the workings of the clique. At the time of the Mulgoa Road
purchase, he was a delegate to the NSWRL. The league was concerned about the bad state of many of the playing fields and was pushing clubs to make improvements.

Back then, the Penrith ground was leased to us by the Department of Lands. For us to commit to spending any large sums of money on doing anything, we would need them to guarantee us something like a forty-year lease. Anyway, there was some talk of having our own playing field on the new land. When I tried to explain all this at a league meeting, the chairman, Kevin Humphreys, accused me – in his inimitable fashion – of hedging. Basically, he said I was bullshitting. I objected and asked for an apology, which I got.

But of course, that was not the end of it. When we all went downstairs for the usual drink after the meeting, I was completely ostracised. The only person who came near me was Peter Moore [former Canterbury CEO]. It was a strong lesson.

Charlie Gibson was widely regarded as part of that inner circle. He was a good friend of Humphreys, and the man that Mackie and the Super Six recommended for the job of rugby league secretary for Penrith.

Related Topics

Related Themes

Conflict · Football Club

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Major Player: Leo Armstrong

Leo Armstrong
Image Source: The Panthers: Men in Black

Murray Leo Armstrong

Director, Chairman Penrith Rugby League Club Ltd

Murray Leo Armstrong — Leo — was one of the most significant and well-respected figures in Panthers history. A distinguished World War II veteran, respected community leader and long-serving chairman, he helped guide Panthers through some of the most important and turbulent years in its development.

Leo Armstrong (2nd from left) and crew in front of Lancaster bomber G for George. On an “away” to Canberra, the 2003 Panthers squad visited the Australian War Memorial and were inspired by this photo and the story of Leo’s service. (Photo: Australian War Memorial)

Armstrong served on the Panthers board from 1980 and became chairman in 1984, following the unification of the licensed club and football club boards. He remained chairman until 2000, making him the longest-serving chairman in the club’s history.

His chairmanship spanned many of the defining events of the modern Panthers era, including the move to Mulgoa Road, the club’s first premiership in 1991, the Super League conflict, the transition to the NRL, and significant growth in both the football and licensed club operations.

Role in the Narrative

Leo Armstrong appears throughout the Panthers, Passion & Politics narrative as chairman during many of the events described in the Roger Cowan years.

His relationship with Roger Cowan was generally characterised by mutual respect and trust. Armstrong frequently found himself chairing the organisation through periods of intense debate, organisational change and external pressure. His calm demeanour and measured approach were important stabilising influences during some of the club’s most challenging periods.

He was also instrumental in supporting the unified governance model that ultimately transformed the management of Panthers.

Background

Born: 4 November 1922, Gayndah, Queensland
Died: 22 June 2015, North Parramatta, New South Wales

Military Service:
• Royal Australian Air Force, World War II
• Served with 460 Squadron RAAF
• Navigator, Bomb Aimer and Front Gunner
• Flew 32 operational missions over Europe
• Flew the final three missions aboard the famous Lancaster bomber G for George

Profession: Commonwealth Bank of Australia, retired (1984) as Manager of the Penrith Branch

Recognition by Panthers
• Life Membership, Penrith Panthers (1991)

Relevance to Events Described

Armstrong became chairman at a pivotal moment in Panthers history. The newly unified board had adopted a radically different management structure, the Mulgoa Road development was underway, and the football club was struggling both financially and competitively.

Throughout the following sixteen years, Armstrong chaired the organisation during a period of extraordinary transformation. Under his leadership, Panthers grew into one of Australia’s most successful licensed clubs while simultaneously establishing itself as a competitive force in first-grade rugby league.

His tenure was not without controversy. Board disputes, the Super League war, questions about governance and growing political tensions within the organisation all occurred during his chairmanship. Yet Armstrong’s personal dignity and steady leadership earned him widespread respect from many who worked with him.

For many involved with Panthers during this period, Leo Armstrong represented a style of leadership that was thoughtful, measured and deeply committed to both the club and the wider Penrith community.

Related Topics

Related Themes:

Board Decisions · Governance

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Editorial Note

This profile is presented as contextual background.
Additional material may be introduced as the narrative progresses.

Why One Board, One CEO?

Readers of Parts 19–21 may wonder why Roger Cowan spent more than sixteen years arguing for what appeared to be a relatively simple administrative reform. Why did the issue matter so much to him? Why did he keep returning to it despite repeated setbacks, opposition and criticism?

The answer lies in a question that had troubled Panthers almost from the beginning:

How could the Club pursue a unified direction when rugby league and the licensed club were governed separately?

The issue was not new.

Readers familiar with the events of 1971 may recognise some familiar themes. The removal of football club secretary Merv Cartwright and treasurer Ron Partridge arose from concerns about the administration of rugby league affairs and accountability for financial decisions. Although the circumstances were different, the disputes that emerged again in the late 1970s centred on many of the same questions. Who should make decisions? Who should be accountable for those decisions? And what happened when agreements were not honoured?

From the time Penrith entered first grade rugby league in 1967, the football club and licensed club operated under separate governance structures. The arrangement was common in rugby league, but Roger increasingly came to believe it created problems that could never be fully resolved.

It would be easy to assume the conflict was simply about money. Certainly finances played a part. Rugby league required increasing investment, while the licensed club was trying to strengthen its financial position and pursue long-term development projects. Yet Roger’s frustration was not that football sought resources. In his view, the licensed club had repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to support rugby league and invest heavily in its future.

The real problem arose after decisions had been made.

Budgets would be negotiated. Agreements would be reached. Plans would be approved. Yet time and again, football expenditure exceeded agreed limits or new commitments were entered into without the knowledge or approval of those responsible for managing the Club’s overall finances.

From Roger’s perspective, this was not simply a financial problem. It made long-term planning almost impossible.

A licensed club board could approve a football budget, commit to major development projects and make decisions based upon expected cash flows. If those assumptions later proved incorrect because spending commitments had changed, the consequences extended well beyond rugby league. The entire organisation could be affected.

By the late 1970s, these tensions had become increasingly public. In December 1979, the Sydney Morning Herald reported on financial difficulties and disagreements between the football and licensed club administrations. Around the same time, Panthers was preparing for the enormous financial challenge of constructing its new Mulgoa Road complex.

SMH 1979 Dec 9 – click image for full article.

Reports to members in 1980 revealed the extent of the concern. Directors reported that the football club had exceeded an agreed annual budget of $485,000 by more than $100,000 during 1979, while additional commitments had already been entered into for the following season. To the licensed club board, the issue was not simply the amount involved. It was that decisions affecting the future of the entire organisation had been made outside the framework that had previously been agreed.

These events helped bring the governance debate to a head, but they do not fully explain Roger’s determination.

For him, the issue was ultimately one of organisational unity.

He believed Panthers would never achieve its potential while parts of the organisation operated according to different priorities, different assumptions and different lines of accountability. A football club and licensed club could share the same colours, the same members and the same ambitions, yet still find themselves working against each other.

His solution was straightforward.

One board would determine policy and direction for the entire organisation. Management would then be responsible for implementing those decisions. Everyone would work towards the same agreed objectives and everyone would be accountable to the same governing body.

Not everyone agreed.

Some viewed Roger’s campaign as an attempt to centralise power. The perception is understandable. After all, he was advocating a structure that would eventually place responsibility for football and licensed club operations under a single administration. His persistence over sixteen years inevitably raised questions about motive.

Yet there is another interpretation.

Roger was not arguing that football should receive less support. Nor was he arguing that rugby league was less important than the licensed club. Rather, he believed the entire organisation should operate according to a common plan and that all parts of Panthers should be accountable to that plan.

Many years later, Panthers would use concepts such as “twin citizenship” to describe the idea that people belonged not only to their immediate team but also to the wider organisation. While that language did not exist in the 1970s, the philosophy behind it helps explain Roger’s thinking. He wanted rugby league, club management, directors and staff to see themselves as contributors to a single enterprise rather than separate interests competing for influence.

The first major breakthrough came in 1980 when a single board was finally established. Yet even then, the model remained incomplete. Rugby league and the licensed club continued under separate chief executives. As described in Parts 20 and 21, the compromise produced its own difficulties and did not resolve the underlying tensions.

It was not until the end of 1983 that the structure Roger had advocated for so long was fully implemented. One board and one chief executive became responsible for the entire organisation.

Whether that decision alone explains the improvements that followed is impossible to know. Organisations are rarely transformed by a single reform. Nevertheless, the years that followed saw a stronger emphasis on cooperation, planning and shared ownership. The workshops that led to the Five by Five program, closer relationships throughout the rugby league district and a more integrated approach to football and club operations all emerged during this period.

Reasonable people may still disagree about whether Roger was right. They may also disagree about the extent to which later successes flowed from the governance reforms he championed.

What is difficult to dispute is that he regarded the issue as fundamental. For more than sixteen years he returned to the same argument, often in the face of resistance and disappointment.

Ironically, that persistence contributed to one of the enduring myths about Roger Cowan — that he was somehow anti-rugby league.

The evidence suggests a more complex reality.

His long campaign for “One Board, One CEO” was not driven by a desire to diminish rugby league, but by a belief that Panthers could only achieve lasting success when every part of the organisation was working towards the same goals and operating under the same commitments.

Whether one agrees with that belief or not, it became one of the defining ideas in the history of Panthers.

Source Material*

The following documents are extracts of the relevant sections of larger reports:

Related Topics

Related Themes

Financial Management · Governance · Board Decisions · Culture · Club Structure

* Resource material courtesy of The Ausburn Collection

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Looking Abroad — Bringing Stephenson and Ashurst to Penrith

In the winter of 1973, Penrith found itself searching for answers.

The club had entered the first-grade competition only six years earlier and was struggling badly. Results were poor, confidence was low and the future looked uncertain. The low point came when Manly-Warringah inflicted a humiliating 70–7 defeat on the Panthers. The result became part of club folklore and reinforced the belief that dramatic action was needed.

Penrith’s response was bold. Rather than look only within Australia, the club turned its attention to England.

Club president Wally Ward and director Bruce Welladsen travelled to England with a clear objective: find experienced players who could strengthen the team and help establish a culture of professionalism. Their first target was Bill Ashurst, one of Britain’s leading second-row forwards. Negotiations were successful and Penrith secured his signature for what was reported at the time as a record rugby league transfer fee. Contemporary reports noted that Penrith had committed more than $27,000 to secure Ashurst’s services.

But Penrith wanted more than a forward. They also wanted leadership.

While in England, Ward and Welladsen turned their attention to Mike Stephenson, captain of the English champions, Dewsbury. Stephenson later recalled receiving an unexpected approach while working on a building site in Yorkshire. A workmate shouted up a ladder asking whether he was Mike Stephenson. When he answered yes, he was told that visitors from Australia wanted to speak with him.

The meeting that followed would change the course of Stephenson’s career.

Ward and Welladsen outlined their vision for Penrith and offered Stephenson a long-term contract. At first he was uncertain. Penrith sat at the bottom of the premiership table and had just suffered one of the heaviest defeats in its history. Yet the honesty of the approach impressed him. Rather than paint an unrealistic picture, the Penrith representatives openly explained the club’s position and their plans for the future.

Stephenson later said that this honesty was one of the decisive factors in his decision. The club was struggling, but it had ambition. Just as importantly, it had a strong junior base and a growing district. He believed there was an opportunity to help build something meaningful rather than simply join an established powerhouse.

Penrith eventually secured Stephenson’s release after complex negotiations with Dewsbury. The reported transfer fee of almost $40,000 established a new benchmark and attracted national attention. The press described the signing as a record-breaking deal and evidence of Penrith’s determination to improve its fortunes.

The arrival of Ashurst and Stephenson generated enormous excitement. Two of Britain’s finest players were heading to Penrith. Expectations rose accordingly.

The results, however, were mixed. Despite the quality and commitment of both men, rugby league success remained elusive. Penrith finished with the wooden spoon in 1973 and continued to struggle for consistency. Yet the significance of the signings went beyond wins and losses. They demonstrated that Penrith was prepared to think differently, act boldly and invest in its future.

Those qualities would become recurring themes throughout the Roger Cowan years.

Related Topics

Related Themes

Football Club · Innovation

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